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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
MICHAEL B. BROWDE*

INTRODUCTION

The central purpose of this section of the Survey is to review Administrative Law developments, in an attempt to aid the New Mexico
Administrative Law practitioner. Primary focus will be given to the
appellate cases decided during the year. The organization will follow
the three central topics of administrative law: 1) the authority of
agencies to act; 2) the proper exercise of the authority conferred; and
3) the scope and timing of judicial review afforded agency action.
The three appendices developed in last year's survey of administrative law' have been retained to aid the reader in the use of this portion of the Survey. Not every administrative law case decided during
the year is given treatment in the text, 2 and no attempt is made to
review the substantive law of the agencies.I
A number of important issues were raised during the Survey year
in each of the three broad areas of administrative law which are of
importance. Under the first topic-authority of agencies to act-one
non-delegation case sheds some light on the developing attitude of
our court to the legislative prerogative." Also, several ultra vires
*Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law; B.A., Brown
University, 1965; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1968.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Donna Hattersley for her attentive and expeditious word processing, to student research assistant Karen Griffith for her able assistance
with footnotes, and the editorial board of the Review for their patience and exceptionally
capable editing. For the inevitable errors and omissions, the author alone is responsible.
1. Appendix A contains an alphabetical index of the administrative law cases decided during
the survey year. Appendix B indexes the cases by government agency, and Appendix C indexes
them topically by resort to the outline used in the text.
2. Textual treatment is limited to those cases which either give substantial treatment to a
particular area of the law or which suggest some addition to or deviation from existing law.
Cases which touch upon several administrative law topics may be considered in more than one
context. All the administrative law cases, however, are listed in the appendices.
3. No treatment is given to the cases brought against state and local governmental entities
under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-1 to -29 (1978 and Supp.
1981). Similarly, no effort has been made to cover the state and federal cases brought against
New Mexico governmental entities to recover damages for civil rights violations pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). These statutorily authorized tort cases rarely consider administrative law
principles. Furthermore, federal cases arising in New Mexico, but dealing with federal agencies
or principles of federal administrative law, are not covered.
4. See text accompanying notes 17-51 infra.
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cases decided during the survey period suggest that our courts will
continue to scrutinize administrative agencies to insure that they follow the literal mandates of the statutes which create them. 5
Under the second major topic-the exercise of administrative au6
thority-there were some significant cases concerning rule-making
and adjudications. 7 The highlight of the year in these two areas,
however, must be the legislative changes in the Uniform Licensing
Act,' which are given substantial treatment in the body of this article. 9 Under the third major topic-judicial review-the cases decided
during the Survey year demonstrate that the courts continue to struggle with the problems of standards,' 0 the construction of law in the
face of agency interpretation," and the appropriate application of
the substantial evidence standard.' 2 In addition, the court decided a
significant case applying the "legal residuum rule." 3 Finally, the
year was marked by some judicial discussion of the exhaustion doctrine'* as well as continued use of prerogative writs' 5 and declaratory
and injunctive actions' 6 in the administrative law context.
I. AUTHORITY OF AGENCIES TO ACT
A. Non-DelegationDoctrine
The first question which must be faced when considering the authority of an administrative agency to act, is to what extent the legislature could constitutionally delegate power to that agency. The nondelegation doctrine exists at both the federal and state levels in order
to restrain the legislature in delegating its legislative power to administrative agencies.'" The doctrine is founded on two principles which
5. See text accompanying notes 52-99 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 128-155 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 204-220 infra.
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§61-1-1 to -33 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
9. See text accompanying notes 156-179 and 221-237 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 346-362 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 363-400 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 401-426 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 257-269 and 418-422 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 448-476 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 478-493 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 494-513 infra.
17. Justice Rehnquist, concurring in Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607 (1980), articulated the three fundamental bases for the non-delegation doctrine:
First, and most abstractly, it ensures to the extent consistent with orderly governmental administration that important choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our government most responsive to the popular will (citations omitted). Second, the doctrine guarantees that, to the extent Congress finds
it necessary to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that authority with
an "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion (citations omitted). Third, and derivative of the second, the doctrine ensures that
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are embodied in our republican form of government. First is the notion, borrowed from agency theory, that the power of the legislature
is derived from an initial delegation of authority by the people
through the adoption of the Constitution,' 8 and cannot be further
delegated.I9 Second, and perhaps more important, is the principle,
rooted in separation of powers, 20 that powers which are constitutionally conferred on the legislature 2 may not be delegated by the
are part of and subject to the control
legislature to agencies, which
22
of the executive branch.
courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative discretion will
be able to test that exercise against ascertainable standards (citations omitted).
448 U.S. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
18. This compact theory of government derives from the 17th century thought of John
Locke:
The power of the legislature, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws and not to make legislators, the legislature
can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and place in in
other hands. . . .The legislature cannot transfer the power of making laws to
any other hands; for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who
have it cannot pass at once to others.
J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government 141 (1690).
19. Cf. Shankland v. Mayor of Washington, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 390, 393 (1831) ("a delegated
authority cannot be delegated").
20. The fear of centralized power in one department was a major concern of the National
Constitutional Convention of 1787. The notion of separation of powers, following the pattern
of pre-existing state constitutions, was the major device settled upon to protect against centralized power. See The Federalist Nos. 47-48 (J. Madison). The New Mexico Constitution is
more explicit than the federal model about the separation of powers, expressly mandating that
"no person . . . charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these deN.M.
partments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others .
Const. art. 3, § 1.
21. A correlative non-delegation principle is that the legislature has no power to confer
judicial or executive powers on other than the judiciary or executive, respectively. Delegations
of dispute-resolution authority to administrative agencies, however, have generally been
upheld when the power of enforcement is left to the courts or if sufficient judicial review is provided. See Brown, Administrative Commissions and the JudicialPower, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 261,
304 (1935). But see, State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prod. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d
1069 (1957); In re Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 492, 179 A. 344 (1935).
22. Unlike the federal Constitution, the New Mexico Constitution creates certain administrative agencies and confers upon them certain constitutionally mandated duties and responsibilities. See, e.g., N.M. Const. art. I I (State Corporation Commission); id. at art. 13 (Commission of Public Lands); id. at art. 12, § 6 (Department of Public Education); id. at art. 17, § I
(State Mine Inspector). With respect to these agencies, the non-delegation doctrine cannot apply. There is, however, another constitutional check on excessive legislative grants of power to
these agencies. Any legislation seeking to confer on these agencies authority inconsistent with
the constitutional provision creating the agency would be ultra vires, see text accompanying
notes 52-99 infra, and therefore unconstitutional. See San Juan Coal & Coke Co. v. Santa Fe,
S.J. & N. Ry., 35 N.M. 512, 516, 2 P.2d 305, 307 (1931). Even this principle ought not, however, preclude the legislature from conferring on a constitutionally created agency powers and
duties broader than, but not inconsistent with, the constitutionally conferred powers. Cf.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 90 N.M. 325, 341, 563
P.2d 588, 604 (1977) (retrospective regulation invalid because provided neither by applicable
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The non-delegation doctrine was recognized early in the history of
American jurisprudence, although the early federal cases resorted
to various verbal machinations to allow important Congressional
grants of power to stand.23 It was not until 1935 that the Supreme
Court struck down a congressional grant of power as violative of the
non-delegation doctrine. The two landmark cases, PanamaRefining
Co. v. Ryan 4 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 25 invalidated two legislative cornerstones of the New Deal,
and they remain as the high water marks of non-delegation law.
They also serve as historical indications of the legislative-judicial
battle of that era.26
The complexities of the post-New Deal era mandated the extension of governmental power beyond the scope of what Congress
could do directly. The courts, since that time, have therefore upheld
wholesale delegations of legislative authority to administrative agencies. 21 In the post-Schechter cases, the Court has consistently exconstitutional provisions nor the pertinent statutes). But see, Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. State Corp. Comm'n, 65 N.M. 365, 372, 337 P.2d 943, 948 (1959) (Commission as a constitutional body is limited to powers granted by the constitution and may only be enlarged by vote
of the people).
23. The early federal cases, in chronological order, were as follows: The Cargo of the Brig
Aurora v. United States, I I U.S. 240, 243-44, 7 Cranch 382, 387-88 (1812) (Act authorizing
President to terminate a foreign trade embargo under certain conditions did not delegate too
much discretion); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892) (power granted to President was not
legislative but merely power to "ascertain and declare the event" upon which legislation was to
become effective); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (statute authorizing
Secretary of Agriculture to protect against forest fires merely conferred power to fill up details
to carry out clear legislative policy); J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
409 (1928) (Tariff Act power to the President to adjust tariffs under certain conditions not
unlawful delegation because of an "intelligible principle" set by Congress to guide the exercise
of his discretion).
24. 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (Hughes, C. J.) Ryan struck down as an invalid delegation of legislative power Section 9(c) of National Industrial Recovery Act (NRA), which authorized the
President to prohibit shipment of oil produced in excess of law or regulations. Only Justice
Cardozo dissented, finding a sufficient legislative "standard" in the clause which limited the
President's power to prohibit shipment only to products produced in excess of state authority.
Id. at 433.
25. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Hughes, C. J.). In Schechter the legislative grant of code-making
authority under § 37 of NRA was held to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because of the lack of adequate standards. Even Justice Cardozo was constrained to
concur: "The delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this code is not
canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," Id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
26. See R. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 75-123 (1941).
27. One commentator states:
Whatever the doctrinal formulation-'"contingency," "ascertainment of a
fact," "power to fill up the details," "mere administrative functions," "primary standard," "intelligible principle," or otherwise-the fact of course is that
the power to make law has been lodged in non-legislative hands. The obvious
reason why the Supreme Court consistently sanctioned this practice is that the
necessities of government demanded delegation. The Court correctly perceived
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tended itself in search of validating standards. 28 The Court has held
that it will uphold delegations so long as it can find that "the will of
Congress has been obeyed." 29 In searching for that will, it will even
rely upon acceptance of prior administrative practices to find adequate standards for the exercise of the authority granted."
It may be argued that the non-delegation doctrine is all but a dead
letter at the federal level.' This is not the case, however, at the state
that to invalidate transferences of law making authority to executive and administrative officials would be to deprive the federal government of the only effective means of exercising powers delegated to it by the Constitution.
W. Gellhorn, C. Byse & P. Strauss, Administrative Law 55-56 (7th ed. 1979) (hereinafter referred to as W. Gellhorn).
28. Modern courts do not dispute the underlying principles upon which the delegation doctrine is based, see note 17 supra, but rather contend that the same governmental values may be
fostered by resort to more flexible control mechanisms. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters
& Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (three judge court) (Leventhai, J.) (other controls include legislative will, historical context, legislative history, and administrative standards).
29. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) (upholding Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942). This approach has been criticized as utilizing the ultra vires notion that the court
must be able to determine whether the agency has acted consistent with the power conferred,
thereby begging the non-delegation question. A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 160-161
(1962).
The later cases do link non-delegation with judicial review considerations. The concern for
judicial restraint, and deference to congressional judgment, has in some sense precluded application of the non-delegation doctrine. Compare the majority's opinion in Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 594 (1963) ("Congress still has broad powers over this navigable international stream [the Colorado River]. Congress can undoubtedly reduce or enlarge the Secretary's power if it wishes. Unless and until it does, we leave [it] in the hands of the Secretary,
where Congress has placed it ..
") with the dissenting opinion (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("Under the Court's construction of the Act, in other words, Congress has made a gift to the
Secretary of almost 1,500,000 acre-feet of water a year, to allocate virtually as he pleases in the
event of any shortage. . . . The delegation of such unrestrained authority to an executive official raises, to say the least, the gravest constitutional doubts.") Id. at 625-27.
30. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (Home Owners Loan Act upheld on basis of
well-known and generally acceptable standards in the regulation of banking). See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (Economic Stabilization Act upheld in light of substantial background of prior law and practice).
31. "[T]he steady course of Supreme Court decisions since the Schechter case underscores
the improbability that a federal statute regulating business practice and not threatening a fundamental personal liberty will be found defective on the ground that it violates the delegation
doctrine." W. Gellhorn, supra note 27, at 81. However, the debate continues among the commentators. Many of them call for a revival of the delegation doctrine as a meaningful control
mechanism against run-away government. E.g., J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, A Theory of
Judicial Review 131-34 (1980); J. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy, 78-94 (1978); Wright,
Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 Yale L.J. 575, 582-87 (1972). Others believe that the complexity of problems faced by modern agencies, coupled with the fluidity of the political process, which may preclude the crystallization of a firm legislative policy, often forecloses a clear
and specific standard. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv.
L. Rev. 1667, 1700-01 (1975). See also, Jaffee, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86
Harv. L. Rev. 1183, 1190, n. 37 (1973).
However, "so long as Panama and Schechter are not overruled, they serve as a warning that
there are some limits and they remain in the judicial armory against the day when some unusual

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

level. For a variety of complex and interrelated reasons,3 2 the nondelegation doctrine is more readily used by state courts as a tool to
control grants of unfettered discretion to administrative agencies.II
In New Mexico there has been some use of the non-delegation3
principle, because of our strong separation of powers tradition,
circumstances might call for their utilization." W. Gellhorn, supra note 27, at 68. Some compelling minority opinions invoking non-delegation principles have at least kept the doctrine
alive. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., 488 U.S. 607, 685-86
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 20 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
32. One group of commentators suggests the following reasons for greater use of the nondelegation doctrine at the state level:
(i) The typical paucity of legislative history of state laws makes resort to it less
promising, and more haphazard and unreliable when attempted. (ii) While
federal law is recognized to be almost wholly statutory, counsel and judges in
state courts tend to approach a public law case from a common law background
of practice and with common law rather than statute law methods of briefing
and argument. (iii) There may be a different degree of institutional respect and
deference toward the legislative branch and its products; in any event, state
courts are far less reluctant to hold that a legislature has misconstrued and exceeded its powers than federal courts are to hold that Congress has done so. (iv)
Similarly, state courts may have a different, and realistic, view of the professional capacity and impartiality of many agencies to whom power is delegated in
the states as compared with federal agencies. Often "excessive delegation" seems
to be employed by courts to strike down actions that they deem unreasonable impositions on private parties.
H. Linde, G. Bunn, F. Paff & W. Church, Legislative and Administrative Processes 477 (2d
ed. 1981) (hereinafter cited as H. Linde). Another commentator believes that the results in state
delegation cases can generally be explained in terms of the following factors:
(1) delegation sustained, where reference to established legal concepts has effect
of limiting discretion; (2) the tradition in a particular field may control decision;
(3) discretion must be more strictly limited where substantial property interests
are involved; (4) broad discretionary powers may be delegated, where judicial
review is available to correct abuses; (5) broad delegations sustained where
statute requires notice and hearing and fair administrative procedure; (6) broad
delegations are upheld where there is an obvious need for expertise; (7) delegation of power to private groups is frowned upon; (8) broad discretionary powers
may be delegated where public health, safety, or morals are significantly involved; (9) delegations of power to fix penalties are not favored; (10) courts insist
on preserving essential independence of the departments of government; (11)
broad discretionary powers may be delegated where proprietary functions are involved.
I. Cooper, State Administrative Law 73-91 (1965).
33. E.g., Allen v. California Bd. of Barber Examiners, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 102 Cal. Rptr.
368 (Ct. App. 1972) (Minimum price schedules held invalid delegation lacking in standards);
2d 404, 385 N.E.2d 699 (1979) (Bank regulation statute held inThygesen v. Callahan, 74 I11.
valid for lack of standards and clear expression of harm statute was intended to prevent); Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N.W.2d 227 (1960) (Act granting administrative
power to promulgate regulations governing milk production, violation of which resulted in a
criminal penalty held an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to set crime).
34. Several recent cases have struck down various attempts by the legislature to confer or exercise authority touching on the judicial power. E.g., Mowrer v. Rusk, 95 N.M. 48, 618 P.2d
886 (1980) (hiring court employee); Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 301,
551 P.2d 1354 (1976) (establishing rules of evidence); In re Sedillo, 66 N.M. 267, 347 P.2d 162
(1959) (admission to the bar).
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and the firm position of our court against conferring adjudicatory
power over private disputes on administrative agencies." In the
latest non-delegation case, Montoya v. O'Toole," the court incorrectly suggested, however, that the court had in the past "applied a
restrictive approach to the delegation doctrine." 3 7 In fact, the
modern New Mexico courts have consistently taken a liberal approach, and in federal-like fashion have used scanty statutory standards to uphold broad delegations.3"
Montoya involved a criminal charge under the Controlled Substance Act. Counsel for defendant creatively argued that the Act, 39
which allows the Board of Pharmacy to classify drugs resulting in
differing criminal penalties, is unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of legislative power to define criminal activity.' The court referred to a list of statutorily required considerations," and to the
statutory language, which requires scheduling if certain findings are
made.42
The court also referred to the Board's "expertise . . . and vigi-

lance in dealing with new and dangerous drugs," as well as the burden it would place on the legislature if it had "to consider each of the
35. State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prod. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957);
see note 21 supra.
36. 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190 (1980).
37. Id. at 305, 610 P.2d at 192.
38. Several of those decisions were cited as authority in Montoya: City of Albuquerque v.
Jones, 87 N.M. 486, 535 P.2d 1337 (1975) (upholding motorcycle helmet ordinance); State ex
rel. State Park and Recreation Comm'n v. New Mexico State Authority, 76 N.M. 1, 411 P.2d
984 (1966) (upholding power of bonding authority); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964) (upholding historical zoning code provision on size of
windows); Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P.2d 779 (1941) (upholding
Barbers Price-fixing Act). See also State v. Pina, 90 N.M. 181, 561 P.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1977).
39. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§30-31-1 to-40(1978).
40. 94 N.M. at 303, 610 P.2d at 190.
41.
(In determining whether a substance has the potential for abuse,] the board
shall consider the following:
(1)the actual or relative abuse of the substance;
(2) the scientific evidence of the pharmacological effect of the substance, if
known;
(3) the state of current scientific knowledge regarding the substance;
(4) the history and current pattern of abuse;
(5) the scope, duration and significance of abuse;
(6) the risk to the public health;
(7) the potential of the substance to produce psychic or physiological dependence liability; and
(8) whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled under the Controlled Substance Act.
Id. at 304, 610 P.2d at 191 (emphasis by the court), citing N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-31-3 (1978).
42. The statute also creates five schedules of controlled substances and requires scheduling
under the respective categories when the board finds that the drug meets the specific requirements of a given category. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-31-5 (1978).
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thousands of new substances that are marketed each year ...
.9 943
To this was added the consideration that the shortness of our legislative sessions would make legislative overseeing difficult, creating
critical gaps in effective drug control."
The court concluded that "[tihis legislative scheme . . . allows
the Board of Pharmacy only minimal discretion in its fact-finding
function and no discretion in enacting substantive law.'"4 5 The court
therefore held that "the legislature has not abrogated its responsibilities, but has defined and confined the role of the Board of Pharmacy to that of a fact-finder.""
Montoya does not represent a departure from prior New Mexico
case law.4 7 Prior cases spoke of the need for some legislative "standard," '9 8 or "intelligible principle ' 9 to guide the agency in the exercise of its powers. The delegation of power must provide a framework within which the agency can "determine facts upon which the
law makes its own action depend." 5 0 In Montoya, the scope of the
Board's power to schedule drugs is defined by its fact-finding expertise. Montoya therefore blends nicely into the liberal delegation
tradition of modern New Mexico jurisprudence."1
43. 94 N.M. at 305, 610 P.2d at 192, quoting State v. Edwards, 572 S.W.2d 917, 919 (Tenn.
1978).
44. Id.
45. 94 N.M. at 305, 610 P.2d at 192.
46. Id. The court also concluded that the scheduling scheme did not violate the fair notice
requirement of due process, in part because the Controlled Substances Act requires notice and
a public hearing prior to the scheduling of a new drug. Id. In addition to the other underpinnings of the non-delegation doctrine, see note 17 supra, the doctrine is supported by consideration of fair notice and legislative guidance which protects against arbitrary action. See H.
Linde, supra note 32, at 459.
47. It is the "restrictive approach" cases mentioned in Montoya-State ex rel. Sofeico v.
Heffernan, 41 N.M. 219, 67 P.2d 240 (1936) and State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936)
that depart from established New Mexico law. Heffernan struck down the authority of the
State Game Commission to define game animals, but it has been so undercut by later decisions
as to be of questionable validity. See e.g., cases cited at note 38 supra. Roy dealt with the inherent power of the court to establish its own rules. In discussing the statute, which apparently
conferred that power, the court concluded that the statute granting rule-making power to the
court was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Because the holding in the
case was based on the inherent power of the court, rather than the delegated power, Roy is
hardly firm authority for a restrictive application of the non-delegation doctrine.
48. Stateexrel. Lee v. Hartman, 69 N.M. 419, 367 P.2d 918 (1961).
49. State ex rel. State Park and Recreation Comm'n v. New Mexico State Authority, 76
N.M. 1, 411 P.2d 984 (1966).
50. Id. at 13, 411 P.2d at 993.
51. In State v. Dougall, 89 Wash.2d 118, 570 P.2d 135 (1977) the Washington Supreme
Court reversed, on non-delegation principles, a conviction for possession of the same controlled substance (valium) that was at issue in Montoya. In Dougall, however, the scheduling
did not take place by way of statutory procedure used in Montoya and available under the
Washington statute. The drug was scheduled through a provision of state law which allowed
for state acquiesence in future federal agency action resulting in the scheduling of drugs. The
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B. Statutory Authority
In light of our liberal tradition concerning non-delegation law,1 2 it
is clear that the crucial inquiry concerning agency authority is not
whether the legislature was able to confer the questioned power on
the agency, but rather, whether in fact it did so, and whether the specific exercise of authority was consistent with the legislative grant."
Last year's survey gave substantial treatment to statutory authority
and the ultra vires doctrine which provides the judicial check against
the exercise of authority outside the bounds of the conferring statute.5" The cases reviewed last year illustrate that the power conferred
may be general in nature, that the agency action is considered in light
of the purposes of the statute granting the authority and that, in considering the scope of authority, due regard is given to an agency's interpretation of its authorizing statute."
This year's cases provide some interesting variations on the same
basic themes. Two of the cases demonstrate how difficult the search
for legislative intent or policy can be without the benefit of a clear
legislative statement or a thorough legislative record.56 Another duo
of cases, involving the application of the ultra vires doctrine at the
local level, demonstrates how power conferred by the legislature
may be conditional in nature and subject to control, or even divestment, by subsequent administrative action. 7
In New Mexico Board of Pharmacy v. New Mexico Board of
OsteopathicMedical Examiners,58 the court considered the validity
of an Osteopathic Medical Examiners Regulation authorizing physireference to future federal agency action creates an even more seiious delegation problem as
the Washington court made clear: "While the legislature may enact statutes which adopt existing federal rules, regulations or statutes, legislation which attempts to adopt or acquiesce in
future federal rules, regulations or statutes is an unconstitutional delegation of power and thus
void." Id. at 138. New Mexico law does not allow federal scheduling to obviate state board
decision-making. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-31-3(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1980).
52. See text accompanying notes 34-51 supra.
53. In this regard, New Mexico law is similar to federal administrative law, and the advice
concerning the latter would also obtain here: "The issue that can be effectively litigated with
respect to federal administrative action . . . is not whether Congress could delegate authority
to take the action, but whether Congress did delegate such authority, and whether the action
taken was within the scope of the discretion granted." H. Linde, supra note 32, at 477.
54. Browde, Administrative Law, 11 N.M. L. Rev. 1, 2-5 (1980-81) [hereinafter referred to
as 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey].
55. Id.
56. Compare Katz v. New Mexico Department of Human Services, 95 N.M. 530, 624 P.2d
39 (1981) (see text accompanying notes 73-78 infra) with New Mexico Board of Pharmacy v.
New Mexico Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, 95 N.M. 780, 626 P.2d 854 (Ct. App.
1981) (see text accompanying notes 58-72 infra).
57. See Board of County Comm'rs. v. City of Las Vegas, 95 N.M. 387, 622 P.2d 695 (1980);
In re Horn, 95 N.M. 38, 618 P.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1980); text accompanying notes 79-99 infra.
58. 95 N.M. 780, 626 P.2d 854 (Ct. App. 1981).
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cian's assistants to prescribe drugs.5 9 The statute creating the Board
of Osteopathic Medical Examiners conferred upon the Board the
power to make "reasonable rules and regulations . . . provided,
however, the board shall not adopt any rule or regulation allowing
an osteopathic physician's assistant to dispense dangerous
drugs . . . . ""6The question before the court was whether the statute prohibiting the Board from enacting rules on the dispensing of
drugs by assistants included a prohibition on the authority to enact
rules governing the prescribingof drugs by assistants.
The court concluded that the rule exceeded the Board's authority
and set it aside as an ultra vires act. 6' The court reasoned that the
word "dispense" in the Osteopathic Physician's Assistant Act 62 was
to be interpreted by reference to the definition of that term contained in the pre-existing Controlled Substances Act.6 3 Because that
definition specifically included "prescribing," 6 the court was constrained to find that the limitation of the rule-making power of the
Board included a prohibition against prescription rules. The court
relied upon two related rationales: 1) that the legislature in enacting
the subsequent Physician's Assistant Act "is presumed to have enacted law with existing law [the Controlled Substances Act] in
mind," 6 5 and that the "court has the duty to construe a statute so as
to render it consistent with previously enacted statutes, if that is possible." '66 The court also found solace in the general policy behind the
Controlled Substances Act to control the drug abuse problem, and
the more specific policy of limiting the category of persons able to
dispense drugs.67 The court reasoned that to rule otherwise "would
59. The applicable rule reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
1. An osteopathic physician may delegate to a physician's assistant the
authority to prescribe any drugs controlled by the Schedules 1Ithrough V, of the
New Mexico Controlled Substances Act, provided that the physician's assistant
has worked for the supervising physician for at least 6 months. Such delegations
may be for all drugs in Schedules II through V, or only for certain drugs, or only
for drugs in one or more of the Schedules.
Id. at 781, 626 P.2d at 855, quoting Rules of N.M. Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners,
art. XIV, §M.
60. N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-10A-6(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1981) (emphasis added).
61. 95 N.M. at 782, 626 P.2d at 856.
62. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§61-IOA-I to -7 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
63. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-31-2(H) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
64. " 'Dispense' means to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, including the administering, prescribing,
packaging, labeling or compounding necessary to prepare the controlled substance for that
delivery." Id. (emphasis added).
65. 95 N.M. at 782, 626 P.2d at 856.
66. Id.
67. Nowhere in the Controlled Substances Act is the policy behind the Act expressly stated.
See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§30-31-1 to -40 (1978). A reading of the entire statute, however, clearly
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constitute an impermissible enlargement of the class of persons auAct to dispense those substances, whether 'dangerthorized by the
6
ous' or not."1

In deciding ultra vires questions generally, the court is probing for
the legislative intent or policy which can inform and define the scope
of the legislative mandate. Because there is no legislative record in
New Mexico, and often our statutes state no express intent or policy,
the court must turn to rules of construction, as illustrated in New
Mexico Board of Pharmacy. When there are competing rules of construction, however, the choice of the rule to be applied may in fact
dictate the result,6 9 and mask what is in reality a judicial policy
choice rather than a fair pursuit of legislative intent. When the legislative purpose behind the enactment is not expressed, 7" the court
demonstrates an overwhelming legislative concern about drug abuse, and the educational programs and research authorized under the Act address the problem of abuse directly. See Id. at
§§ 30-31-39, -40. The drug dispensing provisions may be read as relating primarily to the abuse
problem, although they could also be justified as assuring the competence and training of those
authorized to perform the tasks. See id. at §§30-31-2(H)(N), -12, -18(A).
68. 95 N.M. at 782, 626 P.2d at 856. The Osteopathic Physician's Act only prohibits the
Board from allowing assistants to dispense "dangerous drugs," see text accompanying note 60
supra. The rule struck down by the court only allowed the assistants to prescribe drugs controlled by Schedules II through V of the Controlled Substances Act. If the Board deemed those
drugs non-dangerous, they arguably fell outside the statutory limitation. In any event, the rationale used by the court-that the Controlled Substances Act was intended to narrowly define
who could dispense or prescribe drugs "whether dangerous or not"--is too broad a policy to
apply in light of the specific language of the statute which only sought to limit rule-making
power in the area of "dangerous drugs."
69. The problem of resorting to rules of construction in the absence of legislative history or
a clear statement of legislative purpose is most clearly displayed in the area of judicial review of
questions of law. There, for example, resort may be had to interpretive agency opinions only if
the statute is ambiguous. Even where the interpretive agency rulings are clearly one way, they
fail to come into play unless the court reads the statute as containing ambiguities. For a discussion of this year's cases which raise this problem, see text accompanying notes 363-400 infra.
See also, 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 24.
In New Mexico Board of Pharmacy the court could have viewed the statute as unambiguous
in limiting the prohibition on rule-making to dispensing, as opposed to prescribing, and then
only to dangerous drugs. It could then have coupled that with a reading of statutory purpose
behind the Osteopathic Physician Assistant's Act as being different from that in the Controlled
Substances Act. Because a specific later statute takes precedence over the general earlier
statute, the court could have then upheld the regulation as a valid exercise of the power conferred. See City of Albuquerque v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n., 93 N.M. 719, 721,605
P.2d 227, 229 (1979). This alternative analysis suggests the ways in which the choice of rules of
construction can control the result. Perhaps New Mexico Board of Pharmacyrelies on the notion that the policy behind drug abuse control must outweigh the convenience to doctors which
results from their supervised assistants' being able to prescribe certain drugs.
70. In the context of New Mexico Board of Pharmacy, it has already been suggested that it
is not altogether clear whether the drug dispensing/prescribing provisions of the Controlled
Substances Act were actually enacted as drug abuse control devices. See note 67 supra. The
question of the distinction between dispensing and prescribing also arose this year in a criminal
law case, State v. Carr, 95 N.M. 755, 626 P.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1981) which is discussed in Dabney, Holt, and Smith, CriminalLaw, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 229 (1982).
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may be left free to formulate a policy of its own in the guise of uncovering the policy of the legislature.7I
Complex federal regulatory schemes, are more likely however, to
contain declarations of underlying policy or purpose.72 Therefore,
New Mexico courts handle scope of authority questions in the federal administrative context much differently. This year in Katz v.
New Mexico Department of Human Services,73 that difference was
illustrated. In Katz the petitioner sought medicaid benefits for services provided by a chiropractor. She was denied the benefits, and
among the questions presented on appeal 4 was whether denial of the
71. If the use of rules of construction (in the absence of legislative history) can dictate a
result which deviates from legislative purpose, and, if the lack of a clear statement of legislative
policy opens the door for the court to choose its own, then the potential for the abuse of judicial discretion certainly exists. On the other hand, as with all areas of statutory construction,
the ultimate legislative check remains. If it is displeased with the court's interpretation, the
legislature can always clarify its meaning through amendatory language. Cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stare decisis less
honored in constitutional matters because "correction through legislative action is practically
impossible. ").
72. There may be other problems in attempting to understand the meaning or scope of
federal legislation. For example, the availability of a transcript of proceedings on the floor of
Congress means that legislative compromises at the federal level may play themselves out over
agreed-upon colloquies concerning the "intent" of the sponsor of a bill, rather than clear intent or purpose language in the statute. See e.g., Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S.
141, 147-48 (1979) (intent of bill to reach the New Mexico Electrical Energy tax despite unclear
language). The result may be that the "intent" of Congress found in the comments made during debates on the floor often fails to provide firm ground upon which to stand. For example,
in Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), the issue was
whether Congress had mandated the application of cost-benefit analysis in the drafting of
regulations under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA). Given the mammoth legislative record, the Justices were able to find various portions of the legislative record
to support their differing views. Compare, id. at 646-652 (opinion of Stevens, J.), and id.
676-82 (Rehnquist, J. concurring in judgment) with id. at 691-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See generally, F. Newman and S. Surrey, Legislation 158-78 (1955).
In many instances resort to federal legislative history is nothing more than makeweight for
judicial policy-making or policy-choosing. E.g., compare Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7
(1980) (Brennan, J.) with, id. at 15 (Powell, J., dissenting). This use of federal legislative
history may result in the same exercise of unbridled judicial discretion which can come from
the New Mexico approach of resorting to rules of construction in the absence of legislative
history. See note 69 supra.
At least one noted authority has suggested that the judiciary ought to make the policy decisions that were unresolved by a congressional statement of purpose. See Dworkin, How to
Read the Civil Rights Act, 26 N.Y. Rev. of Books 37 (December 20, 1979). Professor Dworkin
believes these questions are appropriately left for the courts in their application of the underlying principles of the particular statute. In his view the compromising nature of the legislative
process often does not allow for the deliberative decision-making which some tough policy
questions require. If Congress disagrees with the policy choice made by the Court, it can reverse or alter it by amending the statute. See, id. at 37.
73. 95 N.M. 530, 624 P.2d 39 (1981).
74. The claims on appeal were whether the denial of benefits violated the federal Act and
regulations, see text accompanying notes 117-23 infra; whether the denial violated equal protection, and whether the appellant had been given adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard as required by due process. Id. at 534-35, 624 P.2d at 43-44.
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benefits was "inconsistent with congressional intent and the pur-

poses and policies of the [Medicaid] program."I 5
The court rejected petitioner's argument that the statutory reference to "necessary medical services" included all necessary services.
The court concluded that the "necessary medical services" found in
the statement of legislative purpose referred only to the five mandatory categories of service specified in the Act, 76 which did not include
chiropractic services. In the federal medicaid program, therefore,
the scope of legislative authority for administrative action is not resolved by resort to rules of construction.7 7 Rather, it is determined
by judicial analysis of the statutory scheme in light of its expressly
stated purposes, as well as its extensive legislative history."
In two cases decided during the Survey year, the courts also dealt
with the application of the ultra vires principle at the local level. 9 In
Board of County Commissioners v. City of Las Vegass ° San Miguel
County enacted an ordinance regulating land use,8 ' and then sought
75. Id. at 533, 624 P.2d at 42.
76. Id. at 532, 624 P.2d at 41. The federal medicaid program, established under Title XIX
of the Social Security Act, has as one of its stated purposes: "[to enable] each State, as far as
practicable . . . . to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to
meet the costs of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C. §1396 (1976). The court read the
precatory purpose language as only applying to the specific categories which the statute requires the state to fund. See id. at §1396a(a)(l 3)(B), and §1396d(a)(l)-(5).
77. The Katz court also supported its reasoning by resort to one rule of construction. The
court found that Katz's position would have obliterated the statutory distinction between mandatory and optional categories of medical services. The court's reasoning maintained the distinction in part on the ground that "[a] statute must be construed so that no part . . . is rendered surplusage or superfluous." 95 N.M. at 534, 624 P.2d at 43.
78. The medicaid program is one with some clear mandates and a very full legislative
history. See e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 101 S.Ct. 2633 (1981); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980).
79. There was a third case decided during the Survey period in which the court applied the
ultra vires doctrine to an administrative action by a local body. In Mitchell v. Hedden, 94 N.M.
348, 610 P.2d 752 (1980), the appellants challenged the legality of the City's approval of a subdivision adjacent to their property. The approval came by way of a summary proceeding of the
City Planning Commission. Because "[tihe Planning Commission is a creature of the City
Council," id. at 349, 610 P.2d at 753, and because the city council had limited the power of the
planning commission to enact procedures subject to the approval of the council, the court held
that the commission had no authority to enforce a procedure not approved by the council. The
court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for a determination of the fundamental
fact question of whether the city council had approved the summary procedure. 94 N.M. at
349, 610 P.2d at 753.
80. 95 N.M. 387, 622 P.2d 695 (1980).
81. A substantial issue in the case was whether the ordinance was enacted pursuant to the
zoning authority of the county, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-21-1 to -6 (1978 & Supp. 1981) or under
the county's general police power, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§4-37-1 to -9 (Repl. Pamp. 1980 & Supp.
1981). This issue was critical to the remainder of the case because the governmental powers to
be exercised and the enactment procedures of the two statutory schemes differ greatly.
The court viewed the ordinance as falling within the hornbook definition of zoning adopted
by the court in a previous decision: "Zoning is defined as 'governmental regulation of the uses
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to apply it to the City of Las Vegas Landfill. The landfill existed outside of the city, but within the county. The state zoning statute confers extraterritorial zoning power on the city for an area which
includes land within one mile of the city limits, thereby precluding
zoning by the county in that area.8 2 As to that portion of the city's
landfill lying within the one-mile zone, the court quite easily found
that "[tihe statute does not grant zoning authority over this one mile
area to the County . . ."3 and struck down that portion of the zon84
ing ordinance on ultra vires grounds.
More interesting, however, was the court's consideration of the
area of the city landfill which fell outside the one-mile zone. The
court found that another portion of the state zoning law requires
that zoning regulations must be adopted in accordance with a "comprehensive plan." 8 Because the county had not adopted such a
plan, 6 the court concluded that the ordinance must fail for lack of
compliance with the requirements of the statute.8"
of land and buildings according to districts or zones.' " Miller v. City of Albuquerque, 89
N.M. 503, 505, 554 P.2d 665, 667 (1976), quoting 8 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25.01 at 12 (3d ed. 1965). The court concluded that the ordinance was enacted pursuant to the county's zoning authority, and analyzed the authority question in the context of
the state zoning statute.
82. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-21-2(B) (1978) provides, in pertinent part, that:
a municipal zoning authority may adopt a zoning ordinance . . . within its extraterritorial zoning jurisdiction which is within:
(3) one mile of the boundary of any municipality having a population of one
thousand five hundred or more but less than twenty thousand persons, provided
such territory is not within the boundaries of another municipality ...
Other subsections of this statute define differing areas of extraterritorial zoning authority depending on the size of the municipalities involved. See id. at § 3-21-2(B)(1) -(5).
A previous section of the same statute specifically limits the zoning authority of a county to
"territory within the county that is not within the zoning jurisdiction of a municipality." N.M.
Stat. Ann. §3-21-2(A) (1978).
83. 95 N.M. at 390, 622 P.2d at 698.
84. The court found support for its conclusion in the statutory construction principle that:
"[sitatutes are to be read and given effect as written, with the words used to be given their ordinary and usual meaning, unless a contrary intent is clearly shown." Id.
85. Id. at 390-91, 622 P.2d at 698-99.
86. The court noted that comprehensive plans serve to prevent isolated land use determinations of small pockets of a given community without consideration of the impact on the whole.
Id. at 390, 622 P.2d at 698. The court read a host of specific requirements into the statutory requirement. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §3-21-5 (1978). Borrowing from a noted treatise in the area,
the court adopted the common definitional requirements of a master or comprehensive plan to
include "a verbal and graphic statement of (1) the physical and human resources of the community, (2) the goals sought by the community, (3) plans for the mobilization of the resources
to achieve the goals, and (4) means for implementing the plans." 95 N.M. at 390, 622 P.2d at
698, citing 3 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 21.03 (2d ed. 1976).
87. The court conceded that the comprehensive plan could be self-contained or contained
within the particular zoning ordinance itself. The court found that "the county did not formally adopt a comprehensive plan," and that "[tihere was no evidence before the court demonstrating that the ordinance included a comprehensive plan." 95 N.M. at 391, 622 P.2d at
699.
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In effect, then, the zoning statute as interpreted in Board of
County Commissioners may place a critical ultra vires question in
the hands of the very body exercising the questioned authority. Local zoning authorities can only act consistently with state law governing zoning. That law, as interpreted by the Board of County
Commissioners court, places upon the county a comprehensive planning responsibility as a pre-condition to a zoning action. The county
may therefore have ultimate control over whether its zoning actions
would be subject to attack. Failure to follow the comprehensive plan
requirement may render actions of the county invalid on ultra vires
grounds just as certainly as did the violation of the one-mile limit
provision of state law. 8
Board of County Commissioners may be viewed as a case in which
the local body controls, to some extent, its own authority to act. In
re Horn89 presents another situation in which the actions of an administrator may govern the authority of the agency. In Horn the
owners of a shopping center protested the assessor's valuation of
certain land.9" The protest hearing was set before the Valuation Protest Board in accordance with the law. 9 ' Prior to the hearing, and
pursuant to state law and regulations,92 an informal conference was
88. The extraterritorial authority question represents the more traditional ultra vires question. See B. Schwartz, Administrative Law 143 (1976). The Board of County Commissioners
court, however, saw that issue in jurisdictional terms: "[The... zoning statutes [do not] give
the County jurisdiction to adopt a zoning ordinance within one mile of the Las Vegas City
limits." 95 N.M. at 390, 622 P.2d at 698.
The master plan question can be viewed as a matter of process-the law requires that A be
done as a precondition to enacting B, and the county's failure to do A renders B invalid for
failing to follow the required procedure. This view of the comprehensive plan issue can also be
found in Board of County Commissioners: "We find no statute which prohibits the County's
authority to zone that area. However, any such zoning ordinance must be properly enacted."
Id.
The master plan question can also be viewed in ultra vires terms. Because the statute seems to
require a master plan as a precondition to zoning, that requirement can be seen as conferring
power or jurisdiction to zone only after or contemporaneously with creation of a master plan.
Zoning in the absence of the precondition may exceed the power conferred and is therefore
ultra vires.
89. 95 N.M. 38, 618 P.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1980).
90. The protest involved the assessor's valuation of the land and not his valuation of improvements associated with the shopping center. Also at issue in the case was whether testimony of the value of vacant land is competent evidence to establish the value of land upon
which there are improvements, but this question was not reached. Id.
91. The assessor's statutory duty is to value property in accordance with the Property Tax
Code and regulations thereunder. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§7-35-1 to -38-93 (1978). A landowner
has the right to protest the valuation by the assessor. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §7-38-24 (1978).
When the landowner does so, the authority to hear the protest is conferred by law on the
County Valuation Protest Board. N.M. Stat. Ann. §7-38-25(D) (1978).
92. The statute allows the assessor to hold an informal conference "after setting a hearing
on the protest but before the date of the hearing." N.M. Stat. Ann. §7-38-24(D) (1978). The
regulation promulgated under that statute by the property tax division of the Taxation and
Revenue Department recites the statutory language and provides for withdrawal of the protest
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held during which protester and assessor agreed to a settlement.
When the settlement was presented to the Board for approval, pursuant to regulation, the Board refused to accept it and mandated a
protest hearing.93 On appeal, the court concluded that "[n]either the
regulation nor §7-38-25 authorize the Board to reject the assessor's
agreement as to value." 9 The court found that the Board acted in
excess of its authority, and reversed and remanded for entry of the
stipulation.
In Horn the court focused on the authority of the Board with respect to the stipulation. In so doing, the court may have been led to
the right result for the wrong reason. The court suggested that
neither the law nor the regulation confers authority on the Board to
reject the settlement when the regulation is reasonably subject to a
contrary reading.9 5
Judge Sutin, in a concurring opinion, would have reached the
same result by finding that the settlement agreement vitiates the initial protest, thereby depriving the Board of jurisdiction.9 6 The case is
if the protest is fully resolved with no reduction in the taxpayer's notice of valuation. The
regulation then goes on to contemplate the reverse whereby the assessor rather than the taxpayer relents:
If the protest is resolved with the assessor agreeing that the taxpayer's notice of
valuation is incorrect, then this settlement must be implemented by presenting to
the county valuation protests board a proposed order agreed to in writing by
both the assessor and the protesting taxpayer and presenting to the board an explanation of the settlement.
Property Tax Dep't. Regulation 31-24(D): 1.N.M. Tax. Rep. (CCH 1981) 25-730.
93. The board rejected the stipulation, ordered an evidentiary hearing, and in support of its
ruling upholding the original valuation, concluded that the "stipulation placed an 'unreasonably low' value on the land on the basis of [a] comparable sales approach." 95 N.M. at 39, 618
P.2d at 383.
94. 95 N.M. at 40, 618 P.2d at 384.
95. The regulation expressly requires the presentation of the settlement and an explanation
of the settlement to the Board. See note 92 supra. It is at least implicit in these two requirements that the Board has authority to consider the merits of the settlement and to reject it if the
Board concludes that it fails to meet statutorily approved methods of valuation. Any other
reading of the regulation would mean that the explicit requirements of the regulation have little
or no meaning. If the Board has no power to consider and reject the stipulation, there is really
no reason to require the proposed order and explanation to the Board.
96. Judge Sutin said: "An agreement having been made with the protestant, the protest
ended and was no longer in existence. Without a protest, the Board lacked jurisdiction to hold
a hearing." 95 N.M. at 40, 618 P.2d at 384 (Sutin, J., concurring). The lack of jurisdiction
resolved the matter for Judge Sutin, but he felt constrained to discuss two additional issues
raised by the appeal.
First, in support of his jurisdictional reading of the statute, Judge Sutin argued that any
other result would create a conflicting and improper role for the assessor. Having agreed with
protestant as to the valuation, he was required by the Board to abandon his own agreement and
become the protestant's adversary. Borrowing from the ethical constraints placed on lawyers
involved in the representation of clients in the adversarial system, Judge Sutin would have held
that "it was his [the assessor's] duty as a public official to abide by the sanctity of the agreement." 95 N.M. at 41, 618 P.2d at 385.
Second, Judge Sutin would have struck down the regulation on void-for-vagueness grounds.
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most clearly viewed in jurisdictional terms-whether the Board had
the power to consider the case at all in light of the agreement. If,
however, the Board did not have jurisdiction, then it seems that the
regulation must fall on ultra vires grounds. The only fair reading of
the regulation which would not render it meaningless would be one
which views it as conferring review power on the Board. If the fact
of a settlement renders review beyond the power (jurisdiction) conferred by statute, then the regulation must fall as an ultra vires act of
the Department of Taxation and Revenue. 91
In choosing not to follow the Sutin lack-of-jurisdiction approach,
the court avoided striking down the regulation on ultra vires
grounds." In doing so, however, it failed to follow a coherent rationale. The opinion did not explain what purposes are served under
a reading of the regulation which would preserve its validity,99 although such an explanation should have been an important underpinning of the court's decision.
C. FederalAuthority in State Administered FederalPrograms
Last year's Survey outlined the principle of "cooperative federalism"' ° and explained how, in the administration of federally created programs, the authority of state administrators must ultimately
be judged, under principles of federal supremacy,' ° ' by reference to
Id. at 41-42, 618 P.2d at 385-386. For a discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and its
application to administrative regulations, see 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note
54, at 12-13.
97. See note 92 supra.
98. See note 96supra.
99. Notice may be a purpose for the statute which would be consistent with the majority
position. The mere placing of the stipulation and the explanation on the public record before
the Board serves a valid purpose of insuring that the assessor's agreements with protesting
property owners will not be hidden from public scrutiny. The court did not take that approach.
The court conceded that its decision vitiated any check on assessor discretion which the regulation may have served, but relied on other official checks on the assessor's authority: "This
does not mean that there is no check on stipulations by the assessor. The assessor is supervised
by the property tax division, §7-35-3, and may be suspended for failure to comply with the
...
95 N.M. at 40, 618 P.2d at 384.
Property Tax Code or regulations.
100. This term was first coined by the United States Supreme Court in King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309 (1968) to describe the nature of federal-state programs. See 1979-80 Administrative
Law Survey, supra note 54, at 5-6. This year, in Katz. v. New Mexico Dep't. of Human Serv.,
95 N.M. 530, 532, 624 P.2d 39, 41 (1981) the court described the nature of "cooperative federalism," with particular reference to the Model Assistance Program, better known as Medicaid:
The New Mexico Medical Assistance Program is operated by the DHS (the Department of Human Services] as part of a joint federal-state program established
by Title XIX of the Social Security Act. Compliance with the federal requirements is a condition to the receipt of federal funds. . . . [it is therefore required] that the DHS must operate the program consistent with the federal act.
101. Emanating from the supremacy clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, the doctrine mandates that
state laws or regulations must fall to conflicting or pre-emptive federal law and regulations.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
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the authority conferred by federal law and regulations. ' °2 In two
companion welfare cases decided this year, I3 the court made explicit
that while federal supremacy may require the invalidity of state administrative regulations for some purposes, it does not affect the
validity of those state laws for other purposes. Another welfare
case,' 04 which upheld a state administrative practice against a federal
challenge,'0 5 illustrates how a question of controlling federal law
may, at times, come full circle to be decided by reference to state
law, thereby reducing federal supremacy to a matter of state statutory authority.
Harper v. New Mexico Department of Human Services06 and
Duran v. New Mexico Departmentof Human Services'0 7 held invalid
the Department's community property regulation, which conclusively presumed that one-half of a non-adoptive parent's income was
available to meet the needs of his or her welfare-eligible stepchildren.'10 The Harper court stated the constitutional principle to be
applied: "Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, if federal regulations have preempted an area and there are
conflicting state regulations, the federal regulations prevail."' 9 The
court found "a clear conflict between the state and federal regulations."'' 0 The court further found that the federal regulation "was
intended to preempt state law and control the determination of
102. See 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 5-7.
103. Harper v. New Mexico Dep't. of Human Serv., 95 N.M. 471, 623 P.2d 985 (1980);
Duran v. New Mexico Dep't. of Human Serv., 95 N.M. 188, 619 P.2d 1232 (1980). For a further discussion of these cases, see Kelsey and Montoya, Domestic Relations, 12 N.M. L. Rev.
325 (1982).
104. Katz v. New Mexico Dep't. of Human Serv., 95 N.M. 530, 624 P.2d 39(1981).
105. No specific state law or regulation was under attack in Katz. Rather the challenge was
to an administrative practice of not reimbursing claims for chiropractic services under Medicaid. Another way of characterizing the challenge, however, is to say that the state regulations
were being challenged on federal supremacy grounds for failure to include reimbursement for
chiropractic services.
106. 95 N.M. 471, 623 P.2d 985 (1980).
107. 95 N.M. 188, 619 P.2d 1233 (1980).
108. New Mexico Dep't. of Human Serv. Manual §221.832(A)(1) (Rev. March 3, 1977).
The holdings in Harper and Duran, merely followed the precedent of two earlier cases which
dealt with the same subject. See Nolan v. C. de Baca, 603 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); Barela v. New Mexico Dep't. of Human Serv., 94 N.M. 288, 609
P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1979). See generally, 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54,
at 5-7. The holdings in these cases have been superseded by a change in the controlling federal
law. See note 116 infra.
109. 95 N.M. at 473, 623 P.2d at 987.
110. The then existing federal regulation, 45 C.F.R. §233.90(a) required a showing that the
income is actually available to the children and if the "parent" is not legally obligated to support the children there must be "proof of actual contributions." . . . The state's regulations
conclusively presume that the community income earned by the non-adoptive stepfather is
available to the children, without a showing of actual contributions. Id.
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AFDC benefits.'" The court held the state regulation invalid "to
the extent that . . . [it] create[s] a conclusive presumption that the
non-adoptive stepfather's income is available to the children. ''1 2
The Harper court took great pains to reaffirm New Mexico's
"long standing and constitutionally mandated commitment to the
community property concept, that a spouse has a present and vested
property interest in one-half of the community income, and that this
income can be used to meet that spouse's obligations.'"" 3 The court
explained that it struck down the application of the regulation only
because of its conflict with the controlling federal regulation.'' 4 As
succinctly put in the companion Duran case: even "correctly stated
community [property] law principles . . . could not be applied
where the result conflicts with a controlling federal regulation.'"' 5
Thus, even when state administrative regulations are accurately tailored to valid provisions of state law, if the application of those
regulations would conflict with controlling federal law, the principle
of federal supremacy requires that the state regulations give way." 6
IIt. Id.
112. Id.at 471, 623 P.2d at 985. The court found that the conflict arose because of the conclusive nature of the regulation's presumption. The court expressly reserved the question of
whether a rebuttable presumption-one that placed the burden of proving lack of "actual
availability" on the recipient-would be inconsistent with the federal regulation. Id. at 473,
623 P.2d at 987.
113. Id. at 472, 623 P.2d at 986.
114. The unstated rationale, again rooted in principles of federalism, is that in enacting the
federal program and conferring rule-making power on the federal agency, Congress also delegated the choice of regulatory means to that agency. So long as the regulatory choice is not inconsistent with the statutory mandate, it remains a question for the agency and must be upheld
even if considered "illogical or unreasonable" in the face of state law. Federal supremacy in
this instance dictates that the judgment of the federal agency must be accorded supremacy over
the judgment of state lawmakers and administrators-at least with respect to the administration of the federal program. See, e.g., Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
115. 95 N.M. at 189, 619 P.2d at 1233. This principle is, of course, not limited to the welfare
context. Most recently the United States Supreme Court held that federal law governing military retirement benefits precludes state courts from dividing those benefits in divorce proceedings pursuant to state community property laws. McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S.Ct. 2728 (1981).
See Kelsey and Montoya, Domestic Relations, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 325 (1982).
116. The principle is so fundamental to the administration of federal-state programs that
the state statutes which implement those programs often specifically adopt the principle as a
matter of state law as well. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §27-2-12 (1978). As both Harperand Duran
seek to make clear, the particular requirement cannot invalidate the state law in general. The
requirement can only preclude the application of the particular state regulation when that application conflicts with controlling federal law.
The court in both Harper and Duran was careful to reaffirm the general community property law principles upon which the offending state regulation was premised. 95 N.M. at 473,
623 P.2d at 987; 95 N.M. at 189, 619 P.2d at 1233. The logic of Harperwould clearly allow the
application of community property principles in the attribution of step-parent income if the
federal regulation had been permissive rather than mandatory. The federal statute on this subject has now been changed to require the attribution of some amount of step-parent income to
the non-adopted welfare-eligible stepchildren. See 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(3 1) (Supp. 1981).
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In Katz v. New Mexico Department of Human Services,"7 the
court considered a challenge to the state administrative denial of
Medicaid benefits for chiropractic services. Petitioner challenged the
denial, in part, on the theory that chiropractic services fell within the
category of "physician services" mandated by the federal act as one
of the five basic services to be provided by each state." 8 The court
rejected this argument on two grounds. First, it read the provision of
federal law as having "explicitly excluded chiropractors.""''' Second, it read the implementing federal regulation, which referred
back to the definition of the practice of medicine contained in state
law,' 20 to exclude chiropractic practices.' 2 ' On the basis of both
reasons the court concluded "that chiropractors' services are not
physicians' services under the Medicaid program." ' 2
Katz, therefore, brings full circle the matter of state administrative compliance with federal program directives. The state administrator must act in conformity with the authority conferred by federal
law. Where the federal authority conferred is defined by reference to
state law, however, the question of conformity with federal law can
again become a question of state law, not unlike a traditional state
law ultra vires question. I2
117. 95 N.M. 530, 624 P.2d 39(1981). For a discussion of the ultra vires aspect of Katz, see
text accompanying notes 73-78 supra.
118. "Participating states are required to provide financial assistance to qualified individuals in five general categories of medical services: inpatient hospital services; outpatient hospital services; other laboratory and X-ray services; skilled nursing facility services, specified
screening services and family planning services; and physicians' services. 42 U.S.C. Section
1396(a)(13)(B), 1396d(a)(l)-(5)." 95 N.M. at 532, 624 P.2d at 41.
119. Id. The court pointed to the fact that "Physician's Services" as used in the section listing the five required categories, is "limited to those services furnished by a physician," and
that "physician" is elsewhere defined as "a doctor of medicine or osteopathy . . ." Id. The
court therefore relied on the lack of any specific mention of chiropractors in the definition of
physician to exclude these services for coverage. Such an exclusion seems more implicit than
explicit.
120. The applicable federal regulation defined physician's services as those provided
"[w]ithin the scope of practice of medicine or osteopathy as defined by State law.
Id.
(quoting 42 C.F.R. §440.50(a) (1979)).
121. Here the court found a clear and explicit section of the state statute which excluded
chiropractic from the definition of the practice of medicine. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-6-16
(1978).
122. 95 N.M. at 532, 624 P.2d at 41.
123. There are, in reality, two ways to perceive the matter. When the controlling federal law
refers back to state law definitions, it could be viewed as an incorporation by reference of state
law. Under this analysis, the state law, for purposes of the federal program, has become engrafted upon and therefore, is part of, the federal law which controls. On the other hand, such
a federally mandated practice recognizes the potential for different results in different states.
The law represents, therefore, a federal deference to state policy choices. In that sense,
reference to state law returns the matter to what is authorized by state law. Under this approach, inconsistency of the administrative regulation with the federal law is measured by
reference to state law, thereby coloring the matter with traditional ultra vires considerations.
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Federalism principles add additional dimensions to traditional
questions of agency authority in the context of federal state programs. First, federal supremacy adds a higher level of statutory authority against which state administrative actions must be measured.
Harper and Duran make it clear, however, that the federal scheme
controls only the federal program involved and leaves state law principles intact for other non-federal program purposes. Second, as illustrated in Katz, if federal provisions incorporate by reference state
standards or definitions, the question of federal authority again becomes a consideration of the authority conferred by state law.
II. THE EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY
A. Rules and Rule-Making
Rule-making is one of the two basic functions of administrative
agencies.' 24 The promulgation of rules and regulations is a legislative-like function by which the agency lays down substantive requirements, which are general in nature and prospective in application.' 2 5
This year there were two cases of particular interest in the area of
rule-making.' 2 6 Perhaps more important, there were statutory
changes during the 1981 legislative session which will have a significant impact on the rule-making practices of several state agencies.' 27
1. The Cases.
In State v. Joyce'28 the Court was confronted with the question of
what steps beyond actual promulgation' 29 a state agency must take
124. The other basic function of administrative agencies is the application of agency rules
and regulations to particular parties which come before the agency. This adjudicatory function
is discussed in the immediately following subsection. See text accompanying notes 196-237 infra.
125. For a general discussion of rule-making as distinguished from adjudication, and the
consequences which flow from each, see W. Gellhorn, supra note 27, at 147-210. See also,
1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54 at 11.
126. State ex rel. Edwards v. City of Clovis, 94 N.M. 136, 607 P.2d 1154 (1980); State v.
Joyce, 94 N.M. 618, 614 P.2d 30 (Ct. App. 1980).
127. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §9-8-6 (Supp. 1981) (rule-making by the Department of Human
Services); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§61-1-29, 30, 32 and 33 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) (rule-making by the
Professional Licensing Boards); N.M. Stat. Ann. §60-4B-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) (rule-making
by the Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control).
128. 94 N.M. 618,614 P.2d 30 (Ct. App. 1980).
129. In any challenge to agency rule-making, the initial question is often whether the agency
followed proper procedures in the promulgation of the challenged rule or regulation. See
Bokum Resources Corp. v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm'n, 93 N.M. 546, 603
P.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1979). See generally, K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 137 (3d ed. 1972).
Procedural requirements may vary from agency to agency. Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. §9-1-6
(1978) (cabinet department rule-making requires notice and public hearing unless otherwise
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to give force and effect to its regulations. The case arose when Joyce
was charged with criminal trespass' 3 ° for seeking to occupy space to
sell his wares under the portal of the Palace of the Governors in
Santa Fe in violation of a written policy of the Museum of New Mexico.3' Defendant was convicted. On appeal,' 32 he challenged the
validity of the written policy on the ground that the Museum had
failed to file it with the state records center as required by the State
Rules Act.' 33
The court reversed the conviction and ordered the defendant
discharged, holding that the Museum's failure to file the policy with
the state records center as required by the State Rules Act rendered
the policy unenforceable for lack of "compliance with a State procedural requirement."' 34 In so holding, the court cursorily rejected
arguments that the policy was not a rule, within the meaning of the
Act,' 3 5 and that because the policy predated the statute, its enprovided by law), and N.M. Stat. Ann. §9-8-6 (Supp. 1981) (Department of Human Services
may promulgate interim rules without hearing), with N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-4 (1978) (State
Administrative Procedures Act requires only notice and comment). No matter what the particular procedural requirements imposed by law, failure to follow those requirements in promulgating a regulation renders the regulation invalid. See id. § 12-8-22(A)(3) (1978). See generally, K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, §6.01-4 at 182 (1976).
130. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-20-13(c) (1978).
131. The written policy of the Board of Regents of the Museum of New Mexico reserved the
area of the portal in front of the Palace of the Governors exclusively for Indian merchants selling genuine handmade Indian arts and crafts. Defendant Joyce, a non-Indian, was informed of
the policy and when he refused to leave the area, he was arrested. 94 N.M. at 619-620, 614
P.2d at 31-32.
The Museum policy had previously withstood a federal constitutional claim that it discriminated against non-Indians. See Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825 (D.N.M. 1978), aff'd,
601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979). The Joyce court made clear
that "substantive lawfulness" did not dispel "the necessity of procedural compliance" with
state law. 94 N.M. at 621, 614 P.2d at 33.
132. The procedural claim here discussed was made for the first time on appeal. When the
case reached the appellate court, however, for the first time, the defendant successfully moved
for summary dismissal of his own appeal without prejudice. He then moved for a new trial in
the trial court on the procedural claim. On the subsequent appeal, the court deemed the point
to have been preserved by the motion for new trial and also considered it to be a "question of
fundamental error" which could be raised at any time. Id.
133. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-4-1 to -9 (1978). Defendant claimed that if the policy was unenforceable for failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules Act, violation of the policy
could not validly form the basis for a criminal trespass charge.
134. 94 N.M. at 621,614 P.2d at 33.
135. The court stated that: "The state's argument that the policy established by the Board
of Regents is not a "rule" within the meaning of the Act is frivolous. It is without question that
the statement of policy by the Board of Regents was a 'rule.' "Id. at 620, 614 P.2d at 32.
The court could have explained this portion of its ruling by reference to its detailed discussion of the broad definitional scope of the Rules Act in Bokum Resources Corp. v. New Mexico Water Quality Comm'n, 93 N.M. 546, 603 P.2d 285 (1979). See 1979-80 Administrative
Law Survey, supra note 54 at 11-12.

Winter 19821

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

forceability was grandfathered under the current Rules Act. 3
More difficult for the court was the fact that defendant Joyce had
actual notice of the content of the policy prior to his arrest. The
court agreed "that the purpose of the State Rules Act is to provide
notice and that the defendant did have actual notice," 3 7 but rejected

the actual notice exception argument of the State by resort to a rule
of construction. The court reasoned that the current law excluded an
actual notice exception contained in the prior law. "We must assume
that the legislature understood the effect and significance of the
amendment."' 3 8 If, however, the purpose of the Act is to provide
notice, and the defendant had actual notice, it is hard to see why the
Act should be read to protect him.'3 9 The court must have found
some other purpose in the law. The court must have read the Rules
Act to have some prophylatic value, requiring strict adherence to its
provisions even with respect to those individuals who do not need its
protection. This reading of the Act is justified by the societal value in

ensuring that all state policies, rules and regulations are collected in
one repository open and available to the public.'

0

An actual notice

136. The court refused to imply a grandfather clause: "Any argument that there is a 'grandfather clause' is without merit, since no such clause exists in the State Rules Act. The fact that
the policy was of ancient lineage does not exempt it from the State Rules Act." 94 N.M. at 620,
614 P.2d at 32. In these few cryptic words the court seems to have resolved a significant issue:
All state agency rules and regulations, whenever they may have been passed, are subject to the
current State Rules Act, and, if not filed in compliance therewith, are invalid and unenforceable. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-4-5 (1978). Joyce indicates to the litigant challenging any state
agency regulation that the first avenue of inquiry (after a determination of whether it was
validly promulgated) ought to be whether the regulation was properly filed under the State
Records Act.
The Joyce court was careful to couch the issue in terms of the enforceability of the policy as
distinguished from the validity of its promulgation. The court could have reached the same
result by considering the Rules Act filing requirement as part of the promulgation process.
Under the court's analysis, the policy need not be re-enacted by the Museum Board. The regulation will be enforceable once it is filed in accordance with the Act.
137. 94 N.M. at 620, 614 P.2d at 33.
138. Id.
139. Federal administrative filing requirements provide an exception for cases in which the
party has actual notice, See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976). The federal law also includes a publication requirement, and if there were not actual notice exception, the federal government would
be hamstrung by the printing delay in the Federal Register system when emergency regulations
are required. See e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 33,389 (1979) (emergency regulation grounding all DC-10
aircraft after Chicago crash given effect without publication but on actual notice to airlines).
This problem might arise at the state level, but could be easily cured. The need for enforceable emergency state regulations may at some time be hampered by the inability to file the regulation, but nothing in the State Rules Act precludes the opening of the records center for the filing of emergency regulations in the middle of the night or on weekends.
140. A policy which encourages the central filing of every state agency "rule, regulation,
order, standard [and] statement of policy," N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-4-2(C) (1978), is an important first step toward the efficient reporting of governmental rule-making. Publication and
codification of those rules in some systematic and generally available format are the next essential steps. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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exception would allow agencies to undermine that value so long as
they are willing to run the risk of being unable to enforce their rules

against individuals who do not have actual notice.
State ex rel. Edwards v. City of Clovis'' also involved the application of a state law principle collateral to the rule-making process. In
Edwards the appellant sought a writ of mandamus in the district
court to compel the city to enforce its swine ordinance which precluded the keeping of swine within 300 feet of a residence.' 2 The
lower court denied the writ because it deemed the keeping of the
swine at issue in the case to be a legally protected "nonconforming
use.''' 3 On appeal the court rejected that position,'" and held that
the writ requiring the city to enforce its ordinance' 5 should issue.
The court also decided that the amendment to the swine ordinance' 6-allowing the keeping of swine close to residences in petitioner's neighborhood' 7 and passed by the Clovis City Council after
the initiation of the action' 4 8-could not constitutionally be applied

141. 94 N.M. 136, 607 P.2d 1154 (1980). This case was decided at the end of the last survey
year. It is treated here because it merits treatment and was overlooked last year.
142. There was some confusion concerning the history of swine regulations by the City of
Clovis, but the supreme court determined that at all times pertinent to the lawsuit, the keeping
of swine near residences had always been prohibited. 94 N.M. at 138, 607 P.2d at 1156.
143. A nonconforming use is a lawful use existing on the effective date of the new zoning ordinance, but which does not conform to the new ordinance. See Ferris v. Las Vegas, 620 P.2d
864 (Nev. 1980). Such use is constitutionally protected and will be permitted to continue notwithstanding contrary provisions of the new ordinance. See Dolomite Products v. Kipers, 42
Misc. 2d 11,247 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
144. See note 142 supra. The court's conclusion that the swine were never "lawfully" kept
under any prior city ordinances allowed the court to reject the argument that it was inequitable
to permit petitioner, a latecomer to the neighborhood, to complain of the preexisting land use.
See 94 N.M. at 138-39, 607 P.2d at 1156-57.
145. Id. at 139, 607 P.2d at 1157. The court also concluded that mandamus was proper because the city had a clear ministerial (nondiscretionary) duty to enforce its own ordinance
which is "subject to enforcement by mandamus." Id. See generally, DuMars and Browde,
Mandamus in New Mexico, 4 N.M. L. Rev. 177-84 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Mandamus in
New Mexico).
146. The court indicated that the passage of the amendment to the ordinance was irrelevant
to the trial court's decision. 94 N.M. at 138, 607 P.2d at 1156. Reversal was compelled by the
supreme court's disagreement with the district court over the early status of swine regulation
within the City. See note 142 supra. Although not necessary to the decision, the applicability of
the amended ordinance had been raised on appeal. Resolution of the question allowed the
court to order the lower court to afford relief to plaintiff, rather than merely remanding the
case. See 94 N.M. at 139, 607 P.2d at 1157.
147. The ordinance in effect at the time the case was filed precluded the keeping of swine
within the corporate limits of the city, except in the "J zone" (the stockyards area of the city).
In the -J zone" swine were permitted, but not within 300 feet of any residence. The new ordinance lifted the 300-foot limitation in the "J zone." See 94 N.M. at 138, 607 P.2d at 1156.
148. The new ordinance (No. 1120-79) had been proposed two months after the filing of the
suit, and was adopted by the City Commission one day prior to the entry of the district court
order. See 94 N.M. at 137, 607 P.2d at 1155.
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to petitioner's case.' 4 9 The court applied art. 4, §34 of the New Mexico Constitution, which provides that: "No act of the legislature
shall effect the right or remedy of either party . . . in any pending

case.'' ° The court's application of §34 to the facts of this case
clearly extended the language of the provision. The language of the
constitutional provision applies on its face only to an "act of the
legislature." Edwards, however, sub silentio extends its application
to the rule-making function of any governmental body.' "
A second difficulty arises in the application of § 34 to the particular facts of Edwards. The court's decision may make sense with respect to normal, retrospective adjudication.' 5 2 Edwards, however,
149. The court stated:
[lit is our opinion that a City cannot, by enacting an ordinance, affect or
change what would be the result of a pending action before the City Council or
Commission or the result of a pending case in court, based upon valid ordinances
existing at the time of the application or suit. N.M. Const., Art. IV §§24 and 34.
. . .Article IV, §34 of the New Mexico Constitution prohibits the application of
any such newly enacted legislation or ordinance so as to affect the outcome of a
pending action.
94 N.M. at 138, 607 P.2d at 1156.
150. The full provision reads: "No act of the legislature shall affect the right or remedy of
either party, or change the rules of evidence or procedure, in any pending case." N.M. Const.,
art. 4, § 34. Edwards deals only with the first clause of the provision. The case does not apply
to the amendment of procedural or evidentiary rules. See Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya,
80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176 (1969). Nor is there any doubt that this was a "pending case"
within the meaning of the Constitution, although the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that
the filing of a complaint does not necessarily create a "pending case." Rutherford v. Buhler,
89 N.M. 594, 555 P.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7,558 P.2d 619 (1976).
The Edwards court also cited art. 4, §24, the constitutional prohibition against special legislation, as authority for its conclusion that the amended ordinance could not be enforced.
Under an alternative analysis, §24 could have disposed of the case. Section 24 could have been
cited to say that allowing the keeping of swine near residences only in the i zone was accomplishing something by special legislation which could have been accomplished through general
legislation. See e.g., Keiderling v. Sanchez, 91 N.M. 198, 572 P.2d 545 (1977); Vigil v. State, 56
N.M. 411, 244 P.2d 1110 (1952). Had the court followed that line of reasoning, the amendment
to the ordinance would have been declared void, obviating the § 34 question of whether it could
be applied to the pending case. See e.g., Keiderling v. Sanchez, 91 N.M. 198, 572 P.2d 545
(1977); Lucero v. New Mexico State Highway Dept., 55 N.M. 157, 228 P.2d 945 (1951).
151. Perhaps a distinction could be made between the City Commission's acting in a "legislative" capacity as distinguished from its acting in a rule-making "administrative" capacity.
The logic of the court's extension of art. 4, §34 to the former, however, certainly compels the
same result in the latter circumstance as well.
152. Clearly, art. 4, §34 seeks to ensure that substantive law and rules of procedure which
are to apply must remain fixed for purposes of "pending" cases, and therefore judgment
should be rendered in accordance with those fixed principles. In actions for damages based on
some statutory entitlement, the result could not, consistent with art. 4, §34, be altered by a
change in the statutory entitlement during a pendency of the case.
This provision of the Constitution applies only to legislative acts. The provision does not
come into play when the change in right or remedy is occasioned by judicial rather than legislative action. The court has discretion concerning the applicability of those changes. Compare
Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975) (abolished doctrine of sovereign immunity
prospectively) with Scott v. Rizzo, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 77 (March 12, 1981), (adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence with "compromise retroactivity").
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concerned a prospective ruling. The result of the court's decision is

that swine may not be kept within 300 feet of petitioner's residence.
The new legislation however, would have allowed them. Under Ed-

wards this particular petitioner could keep swine from his door, but
other similarly situated residents of his neighborhood could not. The
result of this "pending" adjudication, therefore, has been to require
the prospective readjustment of a legal relationship in a way which is
not in accordance with existing law.' 5 3 Such a precedent could be
used to avoid following agency rules. In other cases involving prospective rulings, Edwards can provide authority to exempt parties
from following newly promulgated rules. Under Edwards, art. IV,
§ 34 of the Constitution could be used to hold litigating parties immune from the amendment of laws or rules which are changed during litigation concerning those laws or rules. This result is far
broader than the purpose of the constitutional provision.' I It would
153. In Edwards the result of the supreme court order was that the lower court issued the
writ, and the city, pursuant to that writ, enforced its prior ordinance against swine-keeping
neighbors of the petitioners. Conversation with Richard N. Snell, attorney for Petitioners, on
October 1, 1981. This result obtained despite the fact that other residents in the "J zone" can,
under the presently effective ordinance, keep swine within 300 feet of residences. The question
is now whether another close neighbor of the petitioners could, under the new ordinance, keep
new swine within 300 feet of petitioners. It is at least petitioner's view that §34, as applied to
this case, means that no one can keep swine within 300 feet of petitioner's residence. In effect,
pendency of the case at the time of the change in the ordinance would, under his argument,
grant him immunity from the application of the new ordinance.
Perhaps, the answer should lie in a N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) motion for relief from judgment on the ground that "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application."
154. The purpose of art. 4, § 34 was to preserve the integrity of the adjudicative process so
that litigants may be confident that the dispute resolution process of the court will not be externally tampered with during the process of the case.
This provision of the Constitution was inserted for the purpose of curing a wellknown method, too often used in the days when New Mexico was under a territorial form of government, to win cases in the courts by legislation which
changed the rules of evidence and procedure in cases which were then being adjudicated by the various courts of the state.
Stockard v. Hamilton, 25 N.M. 240, 245, 180 P.2d 294, 295 (1919). To the extent that the ultimate result of the Edwards case was to control prospective activities of a swine-keeping resident in the J zone, in a manner inconsistent with the new ordinance, the application of § 34
seems more an encroachment on legislative rule-making than the intended check on legislative
encroachment on adjudications.
This constitutional provision also serves to insure that the legislature performs its essential
function of enacting generally applicable prospective rules of law and prevents it from seeking
to impact specific, retrospective adjudications. In that sense this provision of the Constitution
is an operational correlative to the separation of powers provisions contained in art. 3, § 1.
The federal Constitution creates no such legislative power limitation. With respect to federal
law, the Supreme Court has indicated a preference for the application of newly enacted statutes
to pending cases except where to do so would infringe upon a vested or unconditional right. See
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974): "a court is to apply the law in
effect at the time it renders.its decision unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or
there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary." 416 U.S. at 711.
One New Mexico federal case decided just last year demonstrates the contrast between the
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undermine the rule-making function, and undercut principles of fair
administration of the laws. II
Joyce and Edwards both demonstrate that collateral considerations can significantly affect the rule-making process. An agency
seeking to create legally enforceable rules must, according to Joyce,
pay close attention not only to its internal rule-making procedure,
but must also assiduously follow the dictates of the State Rules Act.
Edwards makes clear that when litigation is pending which may
amend an existing rule or regulation, an agency may have difficulty
enforcing the actual rule.
2. Statutory Changes
During the Survey year the legislature passed a series of amendments to the Uniform Licensing Act.' 5 6 Most of those changes affected the adjudicative provisions of the Act, '" and will be discussed
in the next section of this article. Some changes were also made on
the rule-making side. The first of the rule-making changes requires

greater agency attention to the rule-making process. ' The second
adds a new method of initiating agency rule-making.' 59 The third
allows for the promulgation of declaratory rulings.' 6 ° Although
these alterations to existing law may ultimately lead to meaningful
change, each represents only a tentative step. As with most tentative
process changes, much will depend on implementation and how far
the affected agencies choose to go.

federal and state approaches to changes in the law during litigation. In State ex rel. New Mexico State Highway Dep't. v. Goldschmidt, 629 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1980), the district court
granted relief against the Secretary of Transportation, ordering him to allocate previously
withheld federal highway funds. The court of appeals held that a subsequent act of Congress
rendered the challenge moot, as the appellate court review "must be in the light of the law as it
now stands, not as it stood when the judgment below was entered." Id. at 667. The opposite
rule would obtain in New Mexico state court under principles of state law as articulated in Edwards.
155. The end result in Edwards seems to create a troublesome example of the unequal application of the laws, which does little to enhance respect for the process of the law.
156. SeeN.M. Stat. Ann. §§61-1-1 to -33 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
157. See text accompanying notes 221-237 infra.
158. SeeN.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-29 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
159. See id. §61-1-32.
160. See id. §61-1-33. A fourth rule-making change relates to the promulgation of emergency regulations. The amendment to §61-1-30 allows an emergency regulation to remain effective beyond the previous 45-day limit if the agency begins the process of permanent adoption prior to the expiration of that period. In that event, the emergency regulation may remain
effective until "a permanent regulation takes effect or until the procedures are otherwise completed," but the emergency regulation may not "remain in effect for more than one hundred
twenty days." Id.
161. The Uniform Licensing Act applies to a number of independent boards, see N.M. Stat.
Ann. §61-1-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1981). The application of the statutory changes, however, could
differ significantly from board to board. Uniform legal counsel from the Office of the Attorney General may mitigate against conflicting procedures, but some deviations are bound to occur.
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The rule-making amendments to the Licensing Act make explicit
what was only implicit in the prior law,' 6 2 that all of the procedures which touch upon rule-making in the Act,

63

1

apply to all "pro-

ceedings by a board to adopt, amend or repeal rules or regulations .... .. "64 The amendments require that, in addition to public
notice of rule-making by publication, boards must "make reasonable efforts to give notice of any rule-making
proceedings to licen65
sees and to members of the public." '
The statutory purpose of encouraging additional notice to licensees is clear.' 6 6 The "reasonable efforts" language, however, adds
some confusion. Due process arguably requires reasonable notice of
rule-making to affected individuals.' 67 Furthermore, because prior
law provided for notice by publication, it was clearly the position of
162. The old statute explicitly required only notice of the time, place, and subject of the
hearing, with a reasonable opportunity for "interested persons to submit their views." N.M.
Stat. Ann. §61-1-29 (1978).
163. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§61-1-29 to -31 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
164. Id. §61-1-29. The rule-making procedures are not applicable to internal policies, declaratory rulings, rulings made in the context of disciplinary adjudications, and attorney
general opinions. Id. §61-1-29(A)(1) - (4). The third category-rulings made in the course of
disciplinary proceedings-presents potential problems for future litigants. Under this exception to formal rule-making procedures, a board may be able to make a ruling in the context of
a particular case and then apply that ruling in subsequent proceedings against other licensees.
The effect of such a practice would be the formulation of rules without following the formal
rule-making requirements. There is, of course, some safeguard in the fact that a subsequent licensee can relitigate the question in the context of his hearing, but the problem points out the
almost inevitable confluence of rule-making and adjudication in some contexts. See e.g., W.
Gellhorn, supra note 27, at 147-210. See generally, Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the
Rulemaking Versus Adjudication Problem in Agency Lawmaking, 1980 Duke L. J. 103;
Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 345.
The better approach when rulings or interpretations of general applicability arise in the context of adjudications, would be for the agency to make its ruling for purposes of the particular
case, and then set the matter for formal rule-making pursuant to §61-1-29. Some further problems may result if the subsequently adopted rule differs from the adjudicatory ruling. In that
event, the licensee in the original adjudication may be aggrieved at having had a different rule
applied against him. In the context of the prior adjudication, however, the licensee would have
had the right of judicial review as a check against an erroneous ruling. See e.g., Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association v. New Mexico Board of Pharmacy, 86 N.M. 571, 525 P.2d 931
(Ct. App. 1974) (agency interpretation will be overturned only if clearly erroneous). See generally, 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 23-25.
165. N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-29(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
166. "The board shall make reasonable efforts to give notice of any rule-making proceedings to its licensees and to the members of the public." N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-29(C) (Repl.
Pamp. 1981).
167. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974); cert. denied,
922 U.S. 1026; Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see, Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
See generally, Comment, Due Processin FTCRulemaking, 1979 Ariz. St. L. J.543.
As a matter of policy, notice and comment should always be required as a precondition to
rule-making. Attorney General's Report on Administrative Procedures 101-02 (1941).
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the state before the 1981 amendments, that notice by publication met
the "reasonable" due process standard. The 1981 amendments mandate publication as a minimum,' 6 8 and in so doing suggest that more
may be necessary with respect to some individuals. By leaving any
additional notice to the discretion of the respective boards, however,
the legislature may have opened the door for litigation concerning
the adequacy of notice. Under the new law if an agency does nothing
more than publish its rule-making notice, it is now subject to question whether its failure to specifically notify a licensee was "reason'
able" within the meaning of the Act. 69
allows "[a]ny interamendments
The second of the rule-making
7
ested person""' to initiate rule-making consideration by a board.
This provision is in harmony with the growing sentiment that agency
processes should be open to citizen input.' 7 ' The provision is premised on the theory that those being regulated, as well as those being
protected by the regulation, may meaningfully inform regulatory decisions by licensing boards. This section provides only a small step in
the direction of citizen input in the decision to conduct rule-making.
Favorable action on the petition results in a full-blown rule-making
proceeding, but unfavorable action only requires a statement of reasons, and "Itihe denial of such a request is not subject to judicial review." 7 2
The result of the citizen petition provision is to open the agency
door to public ideas about subjects for rule-making. By allowing unreviewable agency discretion on the matter of whether or not the
agency must proceed,' 3 however, the law encroaches very little on
past practice. If the decision is unreviewable, the requirement of "a
168. "The notice of the public hearing shall include but not necessarily be limited to pubN.M. Stat. Ann.
lishing the notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the state.
§61-1-29(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
169. This problem may not arise if all licensees request notice, because the statute requires
notice "to all persons who have made a written request to the board for advance notice." Id.
170. The "interested person" provision would most likely be given a liberal interpretation
by reference to the "[any person who is or may be affected" standard contained in the judicial
review provision of the Act. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-1-31 (Repl. Pamp. 1981). See generally,
Utton, Through a Glass Darkly: The Law of Standing to Challenge Governmental Action in
New Mexico (or) All You Wanted to Know About Standing But Were Afraid to Ask, 2 N.M.
L. Rev. 171 (1972).
171. See e.g., 21 U.S.C. §371(e)(B) (1976) (F.D.A. citizens petition procedure). See generally, Ogden, Analysis of Three Current Trends in Administrative Law: Reducing Administrative Delay, Expanding Public Participation, and IncreasingAgency Accountability, 7 Pepperdine L. Rev. 553 (1980); Chambers, Increasing Citizen Participation in Administrative
Proceedings:Can FederalFinancing Bridge the Costs Barrier?, 30 Case West Res. L. Rev. 33
(1979).
172. N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-32 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
173. See text accompanying note 172 supra.
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concise written statement of its reasons for denial of the request"' 74
is a hollow requirement.' 5
The 1981 amendments also add a provision allowing for declaratory rulings by the board to provide licensees guidance in the conduct of their affairs. This provision may avoid the problem of licensees' acting at their own peril with respect to questionable
conduct.' 76 The declaratory ruling must be in writing and it must
concern the applicability of a law or rule "to a particular set of
facts."' 7 7 The statute is oddly unclear on whether the declaratory
rulings will have precedential effect in later cases,' 78 and, if they will
have precedential effect, how potential litigants are to gain access to
the rulings in a systematic way which would facilitate their use. 7 9
These rulings are not formally reported, and so are not practically
accessible. The language of the new provision suggests that boardinitiated declaratory rulings are of general precedential effect, but
does not answer the question of whether rulings initiated by licensees
are binding on later licensees. The language could be read to imply
that while the board is forever bound by its declaratory rulings, declaratory rulings initiated by a licensee cannot be given precedential
effect as against another licensee.
The rule-making changes in the Uniform Licensing Act may be
tentative steps in the direction of a more formal and yet a more accessible rule-making process. More formalized rule-making is the inexorable result of growing societal complexity. As the rule-making
174. N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-32 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
175. It may be possible to obtain judicial review by attacking the adequacy of the statement.
If a citzen's petition for a new rule is not granted, and a writing is issued by the agency which,
in the citizen's opinion, does not fulfill the statutory requirement of a "statement," he may sue
to compel a statement which meets the requirement of the law. The writing might be inadequate because it fails to state reasons for rejecting the rule, or because the reasons it states are
improper or illegal. In either case, the board's reasons could be reviewed by a court under its extraordinary writ power, opening the door to potential review of the merits of the reasons given.
176. Solving this problem may create others. For example, if good faith was ever of use as a
defense to a statutory charge or as a defense to the imposition of a sanction after the finding of
a violation, this section may obviate that defense, at least where the licensee failed to seek a
declaratory ruling. The existence of the declaratory ruling procedure makes it difficult for a
licensee to assert that he was in good faith when he engaged in questionable conduct. He could
have cured any questions by going to the board for a ruling.
177. N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-33 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
178. The procedure is available to licensees, id. §61-1-33(A) and "[t]he board may also issue
declaratory rulings on its own motion." Id. §61-1-33(B). The provision then goes on to say
that the effect of such rulings "shall be limited to the board and to the licensee, if any, who requested the declaratory ruling." Id. §61-1-33(C) (emphasis added). This could be read to mean
that where the licensee requests the ruling, it is only binding on the board with respect to that
licensee, which would then undermine its utility.
179. If the board is to be bound in future cases, then it is absolutely essential that access to
the rulings be made available to future litigants so that the applicability or non-applicability of
the prior rulings can be made the basis for argument.
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processes become more formalized, alternate avenues for public input become more important. Because rule-making can take place in
the context of adjudications, mechanisms for open rulings become
essential to sound policy-setting actions. The boards must accept
their new responsibilities and seek to make the new mechanisms
work, recognizing that the benefits to them may be better processes,
and better rules.
The 1981 legislature also altered the rule-making power of the Department of Human Services. Under prior law the Department could
only promulgate rules and regulations after a public hearing.' 0 The
1981 amendment retained the bulk of that law,' 8 ' but added a subsection which allows the Secretary, under certain limited circumstances, to promulgate interim regulations without a hearing.
The interim regulation provision can only be used in the event that
there is a need for the promulgation of a regulation because of "a
cancellation, reduction or suspension of federal funds or order by a
...
"I82 When this happens, the
court of complete jurisdiction.
Secretary may resort to an interim regulation, but only if "he is notified by appropriate federal officials or court less than sixty days
prior to the effective date" of the federal agency or court action.' 83
The interim regulation procedure requires: 1) "written notice twenty
days in advance [of promulgation] to . . . providers . . . and
beneficiaries of department programs," and. 2) notice of formal
180. N.M. Star. Ann. §9-8-6(E) (1978). This statutorily imposed rule-making procedure was
similar to that imposed on all of the departments, which under state governmental reorganization were headed by members of the Governor's cabinet. See id. § 9-2-5(E) (Commerce and Industry Dept.); Id. §9-3-5(E) (Corrections Dept.); Id. §9-5-6(E) (Energy and Minerals Dept.);
Id. § 9-6-5(E) (Dept. of Finance and Admin.); Id. §9-7-6(F) (Health and Environment Dept.);
Id. §9-10-5(E) (Natural Resources Dept.); Id. §9-11-6(E) (Taxation and Revenue Dept.); Id.
§9-12-5(E) (Transportation Dept.).
Public hearings may be the exception rather than the rule in traditional rule-making. See 5
U.S.C. §553(c) (1976). Prior to state government reorganization, however, the cabinet departments were headed by policy-setting public boards. These boards held that rule-making power
and the adoption of rules and regulations could only be done at a public meeting. See e.g., 1953
N.M. Laws ch. 39. When, under reorganization, the policy-setting role was transferred to the
Department Secretaries and the public boards were abolished, the public hearing rule-making
requirement was added as a means of maintaining some level of face-to-face public input into
official decision-making.
181. The normal rule-making process for cabinet departments requires thirty days' prior
notice by publication, which includes the time, place, and subject matter of the hearing, and a
public hearing at which interested persons may make their views known. See e.g., N.M. Stat.
Ann. §9-8-6(E) (1978).
182. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 9-8-6(F) (Supp. 1981). Prior to this amendment the department had
no power to promulgate emergency regulations. After this change, its emergency power is
limited only to loss of federal funds on short notice, while the other state cabinet departments
continue to operate without the power to promulgate any emergency regulations.
183. N.M. Stat. Ann. §9-8-6(F)(2) (Supp. 1981).
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rule-making on the final regulations at the time of promulgation of
the interim regulation. I'"
The cabinet departments may need authority to promulgate emergency rules and regulations under certain limited circumstances.' 85
This issue surfaced, however, in only one department, when a seeming emergency arose over the potential loss of federal funds. The
procedure may be inappropriate to that kind of "emergency." Cutbacks inevitably come either with sufficient notice to proceed with
normal rule-making, or with a federally authorized grace-period.
The language used in the amendment makes it clear that the legislature intended the interim regulation power to be narrowly circumscribed. Only the most exigent of circumstances can justify the failure to conduct deliberative rule-making under statutorily mandated
public hearing procedures. The safeguards normally built into federal cut-backs mean that they will rarely amount to an emergency. If
future inroads are made into normal rule-making it can only be
hoped that it will be for true emergencies concerning health and
safety, rather than for unfounded concerns about the protection of
the state fisc. ,86
Finally, some rule-making changes were made in the new Liquor
184. Id. While the law seems to require a two-stage process-notice followed by promulgation-the Department, in its first use of the statute capsulated the process into one step by promulgating regulations which were to take effect after the expiration of twenty days. See 4 N.M.
Human Services Register No. 70 (August 28, 1981) (Interim Regulation on Gross Income Eligibility for food stamps).
185. Emergency conditions involving the health and safety of citizens are the most appropriate uses for emergency regulatory authority. Under the federal APA, circumscribed emergency
authority is conferred on administrative agencies. See 5 U.S.C. §553(d) (1976). There is a
greater state legislative concern, however, that the granting of emergency powers to agencies
will lead to agency abuse and the circumvention of normal process of rule-making. See I F.
Cooper, State Administrative Law 200-03 (1965).
186. The October 1981 federal cut-backs in public assistance which occasioned the first use
of the interim regulation procedure is a case in point. The federal legislation mandating the cutbacks effective October 1, 1981 was enacted into law on August 13, 1981. The federal notice to
the states was therefore received less than 60 days prior to the effective date, allowing the Secretary of Human Services to use the interim regulation provision. However, the federal act also
contained an escape clause for states which could not comply by October 1, 198 1:
If a State agency . . . demonstrates, . . . that it cannot, by reason of State

law, comply with the requirements of an amendment made by this chapter . . .
[by October 1, 1981] the Secretary may prescribe that, in the case of such State,
the amendment will become effective beginning with the first month beginning
after the close of the first session of such State's legislature ending on or after
October 1, 1981.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 at 860 (August 13,
1981).
Thus, the use of interim regulation procedure was unnecessary. Furthermore, it may have
done harm, in that federal funds were cut off sooner than they would have been if the federal
escape clause had been used. Had there been no interim regulation provision, the state could
have proceeded more deliberately under normal rule-making, at no cost to the state, and under
circumstances which would have preserved for a time the flow of additional federal funds to
needy state recipients.
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Control Act. 8'7 The new statute altered the rule-making power of the
director of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC).
The statute established a commission responsible for agency policy, '8 and specifically required commission review and approval of
all rules and regulations.'"" The statute further provided that the
ABC must hold public hearings before regulations are finally promulgated.' 90 Under the new law, the promulgation of ABC regulations'is a four-stage process: 1) issuance of a proposed regulation by
filing in the office of the director sixty days in advance of a public
hearing;' 9 ' 2) the holding of a public hearing;' 9 2 3) review and approval of the regulation by the commission and the Attorney General; 93 and 4) filing as required by law.' 94 These steps appear more
9
cumbersome than those placed on other departments. ' The added
complexity, however, necessarily flows from a system where responsibility for the promulgation of regulations is split between the department director and a board or commission.
B. Adjudication
Adjudication is the second of the two basic functions of adminisThe adjudicative function is often referred to as
trative agencies.' 96
"quasi-judicial''' 9 7 and has been described as one which "investi187. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§60-3A-1 to 60-8A-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
188. Id. §60-4C-3.
189. Id. §60-4B-5(C) and 60-4C-3(B).
190. N.M. Stat. Ann. §60-4B-5(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
191. Id.
192. Section 60-4B-5(D) also requires distribution of the proposed regulation "to interested
persons" together with an invitation for comments. The statute does not define interested persons and does not specify a specific method of notice. Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-29(C)
(Repl. Pamp. 1981) requiring reasonable notice of licensing board rule-making to be given to
"licensees and to members of the public").
193. This approval must be indicated on the face of the regulation. N.M. Stat. Ann. §604B-5(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
194. This final requirement of the law incorporates filing in accordance with the State
Rules Act into the promulgation procedure of the Department. See State v. Joyce, 94 N.M.
618, 614 P.2d 30 (Ct. App. 1980), and text accompanying notes 128-140supra.
The statute does not make clear whether the commission must approve a proposed regulation, and, if it does, whether it must reconsider the regulation if any changes result from the
hearing process. Perhaps the best way to assure that the statute is followed and the commission's essential role is preserved is to involve the commission at both stages. Certainly it is hard
to argue against a policy-setting board's being closely involved in the process of rule-making
when that process leads to the carrying out of its essential policy-making role.
195. See text accompanying notes 180 & 181 supra.
196. See note 125 supra.
197. The "quasi-judicial" label was arrived at as a means of avoiding what would otherwise
be deemed the unconstitutional conferring of judicial power on an executive agency in violation of separation of powers. See B. Schwartz, Administrative Law § 11 at 32 (1976). But see,
State v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957). Similarly, the rule-making function of
administrative agencies has been deemed "quasi-legislative" to avoid the limitations of the
non-delegation doctrine. See B. Schwartz, supra, §25 at 59 and §56 at 148.
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gates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or
past facts and under laws supposed already to exist .

..

"98

The

distinction between adjudication and rule-making is a definitional
one which has significant impact.' 99 The distinction controls the
nature of the notice and hearing requirements which must precede
agency action,2"' the nature of the decision-making process which
must be used2"' and the principal responsibilities for supervision
over agency action.2 02
Many, if not most, administrative cases which reach the appellate
courts arise in the adjudicative context, and yet little is said in them
about the nature and scope of the adjudicative function. This Survey
year was no exception in that regard, although one important case
involved the notice requirement in licensing adjudications. In addition, there were some significant changes in the Uniform Licensing
Act which governs adjudications in the professional licensing
area. 203
198. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
199. See 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54 at 11.
200. There are clear due process problems which surround hearing questions in the context
of adjudication. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 297 U.S.
254 (1970); McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate Comm'n., 94 N.M. 602, 614 P.2d 14 (1980).
Due process does not require a hearing in the rule-making process. See B. Schwartz, supra note
197 at §55 at 143-44.
201. Rule-making hearings tend to be informal and investigative in nature, while adjudicatory hearings are more formal and require more trial-like safeguards. See B. Schwartz, supra
note 197 at §55 at 143-44.
202. Agency rule-making is generally supervised by the legislature in that the legislature has
ultimate control over substantive rules by its power to amend the statutory authority under
which the rules are promulgated. See generally, W. Gellhorn, supra note 27 at 103-26. Some
jurisdictions have toyed with the notion of a direct legislative veto of administrative agency
rules. See Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981) (statute which vests power to veto
administrative regulations in a legislative committee violates separation of powers); Opinion of
the Justices, 431 A.2d 783 (N.H. 1981) (statute granting veto power over administrative regulations to legislative committee an unlawful delegation of legislative power). But see, Wis. Stat.
13.56(1) (1980-81) (statute providing for legislative veto by whole legislature). Adjudications,
by contrast, are generally supervised by courts in appellate review, using a sufficient evidence
standard.
203. Also during the last session of the legislature, the powers and duties of the Oil Conservation Commission were amended in ways which affected the adjudicative process within that
agency. First, the 1981 amendments limit appellate rights from initial hearing examiner decision. See §§70-2-25(B), and 71-5-19(B). In support of that change the new statute removes the
preponderance of the evidence test, and limits the exercise of district court power. The district
court may now only affirm or vacate the commission order. Id.
Second, and most important, the 1981 amendments maintain de novo review of hearing examiner decisions by the commission, but strike the de novo language in the judicial review section, transforming district court review to a review on the record developed before the commission. See id. at §§70-2-25(B), and 71-5-19(B). In support of that change the new statute
removes the preponderance of the evidence test, and limits the exercise of district court power.
The district court may now only affirm or vacate the commission order. Id.
The effect of these amendments is to enhance commission power by limiting appeals to the
parties of record before the commission. The amendments also limit appellate rights so that
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1. The Cases
In McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate Comm"n,2 the court dealt
at some length with the nature and extent of the notice required in
classic administrative adjudication. The Commission had revoked
McCoy's real estate broker's license for one year based on her convictions for conspiracy to import marijuana."' The Notice of Contemplated Action charged her with violating the Real Estate Brokers
and Salesmen Act. This Act allows revocation based on a felony
conviction "which is related to dealings as a real estate broker or a
real estate salesman." 2 6 McCoy argued that this Act could not apply, because the felony was not in the course of her dealings as a
broker. On appeal to the district court, the Commission successfully
argued that, regardless of the validity of its decision under its governing statute, the action should be affirmed on the basis of the
Criminal Offender Employment Act. 20 7 The latter Act permits, under certain circumstances, the revocation of a license for a felony
conviction unrelated to the regulated business.2 "' On appeal to the
supreme court the Commission conceded that it revoked the license
persons who might be aggrieved by actions of the agency must now become parties of recordas
a precondition to any appeal.
The new Liquor Control Act enacted during the 1981 Legislative Session made a number of
minor changes in its adjudicative processes. See e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §60- 6C-3 (Repl. Pamp.
1981) (change in hearing officer disqualification language); id. §60-6C-4 (eliminates language
stating hearing officer need not make findings of fact); id. §60-6C-6 (eliminates language
specifically denominating specific law rulings district court should make).
One adjudicative provision of the new law which may have substantial effect authorizes the
director to suspend a license when he finds: 1) probable cause to believe "deliberate and willfull" violation of the Act or regulations has occurred, or 2) "that the public health, safety or
welfare requires emergency action." N.M. Stat. Ann. §60-6C-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1981). Apparently, the legislature is more willing to provide emergency adjudicatory power than it is to
grant comparable emergency rule-making power. See text accompanying notes 180-186 supra.
204. 94 N.M. 602, 614 P.2d 14 (1980). See Schowers, ConstitutionalLaw, 12 N.M. L. Rev.
191 (1982) for a substantive review of this case.
205. The court stated: "IT]he only evidence taken concerned McCoy's entry of a plea of
nolo contendere to the felony charge and whether this constituted grounds for revocation.
. . . The Commission concluded that it did .... " Id. at 602-03, 614 P.2d at 14-15.
206. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-29-12(F)(Repl. Pamp. 1979).
207. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§28-2-1 to -6 (1978) (hereinafter the COEA). The trial court was apparently convinced by the argument. The appellate court noted that the trial court's order affirming the decision "included a reference to the applicability of the COEA despite the facts
that the Commission's decision had not been based on the COEA, that McCoy had not been
given notice or a hearing on its relevance to her case, and that the court's decision made no
pretense of complying with . . . [the COEAJ." 94 N.M. at 603, 614 P.2d at 15.
208. Under the COEA an agency may revoke the license of someone engaged in a regulated
trade or business for a felony "not directly relate[d]" to the trade or business, but only if the
". .. agency determines, after investigation, that the person so convicted has not been sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant the public trust," N.M. Stat. Ann. §28-2-4(A)(2) (1978). Upon
such finding the agency "shall explicitly state in writing" the reasons for a decision which prohibits the licensee from engaging in business. Id. § 28-2-4(B). Neither of these requirements was
complied with in McCoy.
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under the wrong statute, 2°9 but claimed that the charge under the
wrong statute was not prejudicial and therefore its action should be
affirmed.
The supreme court reversed the trial court's affirmance of the
Commission, holding that the Commission failed to follow the procedures required by the Criminal Offender Employment Act, 2 ' and
that the failure was prejudicial error.2 In addition, the court held
that the action of the Commission "fail[ed] to conform to the funda-

mental requirements of due process.'

'212

The due process violation stemmed from the fact that a legally
protected right-maintenance of one's professional license-was implicated by the adjudication . 2 13 The first tenet of procedural due process mandates the assurance of adequate notice and opportunity to
be heard before such a right or interest is governmentally deprived.21 4
209. 94 N.M. at 603, 614 P.2d at 15.
210. Under the COEA the Commission would have had to have held a hearing on whether
McCoy "had been rehabilitated," and an adverse decision would have had to have been explained in writing. See note 208, supra.
211. The court correctly concluded that sufficient prejudice is found in the fact that had a
proper hearing been held "[ilt is possible that McCoy could have demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation to warrant her retention of her broker's license." 94 N.M. at 603, 614 P.2d at 15.
212. Id.
213. McCoy's license is a legally protected property interest. See e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535 (1971); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968). Deprivation of a license because of past
criminal conduct which may affect one's fitness for a position of "public trust," see N.M.
Star. Ann. § 28-2-4(A)(2) (1978), also implicates a constitutionally protected "liberty" interest.
See Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Mack v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971). See also, Board of Educ.
of Alamogordo v. Bryant, 95 N.M. 620, 624 P.2d 1017 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd. on other
grounds sub nom, State Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ. of Alamogordo, 95 N.M. 588, 624
P.2d 530 (1981) (tenured teacher has legally protected property and liberty rights).
In ruling on the due process point the court relied on Matter of Guardianship of Arnall, 94
N.M. 306, 610 P.2d 193 (1980) a case begun as a custody dispute and transformed into a termination of parental rights proceeding without adequate notice to the parent involved. McCoy's interest in her license, is, by way of Arnall, afforded the same protection as a mother's
interest in her parental status.
214. "Embodied in the term 'procedural due process' is reasonable notice and opportunity
to be heard and present any claim or defense." 94 N.M. at 604, 614 P.2d at 16. In McCoy no
notice was given at all because the COEA was not even suggested as a basis for revocation until
the appeal to district court.
In another case decided this term an appellant claimed lack of "adequate" notice to allow
for the preparation and presentation of her case. Katz v. New Mexico Dep't. of Human Servs.,
95 N.M. 530, 624 P.2d 39 (1981). Katz is discussed in other contexts at text accompanying
notes 73-78, and notes 117-123 supra. The court in Katz brushed aside the claim, finding that
"Katz has had adequate opportunity to present her case for financial assistance," 95 N.M. at
535, 624 P.2d at 44. The case illustrates that procedural due process includes both notice and
adequacy of the notice, and that both are critical in the context of being able to prepare and
present a claim or defense. In Katz the issue was the adequacy of notice, while in McCoy the
procedure was so defective as to afford virtually no notice of the charge, thereby foreclosing
any defense.
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McCoy makes it clear that in the adjudicative context an adequate
opportunity to be heard can be had only where agency charges are
made under the appropriate statute. When an agency is in doubt
about the application of more than one statute, charges under all
relevant statutes should be brought. It is not appropriate for an
agency to recognize its error and then seek to sustain a charge
brought under one statute by reference to another which was never
at issue in the beginning. That kind of agency conduct ought always
be dealt with harshly by our courts, and McCoy serves as a model
for such strong judicial action.
Notice problems also arise when a statutory scheme requires a
claimant to take certain steps to protect his or her statutory rights in
the context of an adjudication. Where an agency fails in its duty to
give notice to the claimant of the required steps, the claimant will not
be penalized for that failure. 2 5 This principle was illustrated, during
the survey year, in a case involving a personnel dispute.
In Hernandez v. Home Education Livelihood Program, Inc.,' 6
the plaintiff sued a private non-profit corporation for damages resulting from her discharge from employment. The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiff
had not exhausted her remedies. She had failed to seek a reconsideration of the decision as required by the applicable personnel
manual.2"' The court of appeals reversed, concluding that "[pilaintiff did not avail herself of any of the grievance or appeal procedures
of her rights. The fault lies with
because she was not notified
2 18
H.E.L.P., not plaintiff."
The district court may have improperly characterized the matter
as requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies. 2 9 The court
of appeals, however, focused on the threshold matter of notice. The
lack of notice in Hernandez foreclosed the exhaustion defense just as
certainly as the lack of notice in McCoy established the due process
claim. The concept of "notice" underlies the exhaustion doctrine as
certainly as it does due process. 220
215. See Hillman v. Health and Social Servs. Dep't., 92 N.M. 480, 590 P.2d 179 (Ct. App.
1979), discussed in 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54 at 14-15.
216. 95 N.M. 281,620 P.2d 1306 (Ct. App. 1980).
217. The personnel manual specifically provided that a notification of an adverse personnel
action "will contain all particulars of the adverse action, including the rights of the employee
to request reconsideration and the right to submit evidence in support of the request."
H.E.L.P. Grievance Appeals Procedure §XIXB(2). The termination letter did not comply with
this provision. 95 N.M. at 282, 620 P.2d at 1307.
218. Id.
219. See text accompanying notes 473-76 infra.
220. The comparison of these cases illustrates that due process and exhaustion may represent two sides of the same coin. Lack of notice defeated an exhaustion defense in Hernandez.
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2. The Statutes
Several amendments to the Uniform Licensing Act will affect the
adjudicative process in professional licensing and disciplinary proceedings. These amendments relate to the hearing requirement. The
amendments concern when a hearing is required, 22' how the hearing
mechanism is initiated, 222 and post-hearing considerations prior to
full judicial review. 23 None of these changes alter adjudicatory
hearings in any fundamental way. They do, however, address various practical problems which had arisen under the old law.
The first change removes a limitation on hearing rights which existed in the prior law. The old statute expressly excluded applicants
for reinstatement from the definitions of "licensee or applicants for
a license" who must be afforded notice and an opportunity for a
hearing prior to board action.2 "' By removing this limitation, the Act
requires a hearing in reinstatement cases as well as in cases of
denials, suspensions, and revocations. This amendment removes
what was a major element of unfairness 2 5 under modern equal protection22 and due process22 principles.
The 1981 Licensing Act Amendments alter the method of initiating hearings in certain circumstances. The new law imposes for the
first time a statute of limitations on the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. 2 This assures that the licensing board will not be troubled
221. N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) (hearings now required in applications
for reinstatement).
222. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§61-1-3.1, 4 & 5 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) (providing a statute of limitations, new service rules and additional notice requirements).
223. N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) (requiring notice to the Board of judicial
applications for stays pending appeal).
224. Every licensee or applicant for a license, except applicantsfor reinstatement after revo...
N.M. Stat. Ann. §61cation, shall be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.
1-3 (1978).
225. It is hard to fathom how a board could function equitably, if, after having revoked a license from someone, after a hearing it need not afford a hearing to the same person as an applicant for reinstatement. Certainly the subjective, post-revocation considerations are equally
susceptible to the truth-testing mechanism of an adjudicatory hearing as the facts and circumstances giving rise to the revocation in the first instance. See McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate
Comm'n, 94 N.M. 602, 614 P.2d 14 (1980) (license revocation based upon Criminal Offender
Employment Act requires hearing on sufficiency of rehabilitation).
226. If an initial applicant is afforded hearing rights when denied a license, N.M. Stat. Ann.
§61-1-3(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1981), it is hard to see a rational basis for denying a reinstatement
hearing to one who has had his license revoked on similar grounds. The two are in a sufficiently
similar situation to invoke an equal protection analysis.
227. Similarly, if the initial applicant has a legally protected property or liberty interest in
the denial of a license, see note 213 supra, then an applicant who has suffered a revocation
ought to be similarly protected by due process.
228. The two-year statute of limitations does not apply to initial licensing proceedings, but
only to actions by the board which suspend or revoke a license. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-3.1
(Repl. Pamp. 1981).
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with stale claims, which are often hard to investigate and difficult to
prove. 229

The amendments change the nature of providing notice of contemplated agency action. 230 The rather quaint notion of "giv[ing] to
the applicant [or licensee] a written notice ... '23 which implies

in-hand service, gives way in the amendments, to the modern notion
of service of process. 232 This provision insures that disciplinary acavoided by a licensee who can successfully dodge intion cannot be
233
hand service.

Finally, the amendments to the 1981 Licensing Act mandate the
use of the Rules of Civil Procedure motion practice when a licensee
seeks a judicial stay of a board order. 234 This has the effect of requiring notice to the administrative agency concerned. The provision
seeks to assure fair notice to the board of any judicial action, although avenues may still remain whereby ex parte stays are available. 23 To assure a balanced and fair approach, the courts would do

well to strengthen the new provision by affording it exclusivity of

229. The limitation reads "no action . . . may be initiated by a board later than two years
after the conduct which would be the basis of the action." Id. § 61-1-3.1 (A). It is tolled by any
civil or criminal action "arising from substantially the same facts, conduct, [or] transaction.
S
I."Id. §61-1-3.1(B).
The statute of limitation does not preclude board action with respect to continuing violations
which began more than two years prior to board action. It is unclear, however, whether evidence of conduct which took place more than two years prior to the initiation can be used for
any purpose.
230. In addition, the amended notice provision requires that the board, in response to a request for a hearing "shall . . . notify the licensee or applicant of . . . the name or names of

the person or persons who shall conduct the hearing ... ,." N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-4(D)
(Repl. Pamp. 1981). This requirement expedites appropriate disqualifications. See text accompanying notes 284-295 infra.
231. N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-4 (1978).
232. The new statute reads: "When a board contemplates taking any action . . . it shall
serve upon the applicant, [or licensee] a written notice." N.M. Stat. Ann. §§61-1-4(A) and (B)
(Repl. Pamp. 1981). N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1981), however, requires that service be made either in person "in the same manner as is provided for service by the Rules of
Civil Procedure . . ."or "by certified mail."
233. The service by certified mail provision places a burden on the applicant or licensee to
keep the board apprised of his current address if he wishes to receive actual notice. Even if the
board serves by way of certified mail, and the receipt is returned showing non-delivery, there
may be due process problems if the board overlooked some other readily available means of effectuating actual notice. Cf. City of Albuquerque v. Juarez, 93 N.M. 188, 598 P.2d 650 (Ct.
App. 1979); see 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey supra note 53 at 18-19. Also, the personal
service provision of the Rules of Civil Procedure includes means other than in-hand service.
See N.M. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
234. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
235. An alternate writ of mandamus, which is obtainable ex parte while setting the petition
for hearing on the entry of a preemptory writ, could also stay the board order pending the
hearing. See Mandamus in New Mexico, supra note 145 at 161-62.
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remedy status when litigants seek to avoid notice to the board by use
of extraordinary remedies. 2 3 6
The provisions of the 1981 Licensing Act Amendments which affect the right of applicants and licensees to adjudicatory hearings, 237
represent small adjustments which seek to close loopholes for unfairness and abuse in the prior law. They may add more formality to
the process, but added formality which serves to ensure fairer proceedings is always to be applauded.
C. The Process of Proof
Last year's survey touched upon "the process by which information is assembled to form the record upon which a final administrative decision must rest." 23 This year in one major case, the court of
appeals grappled rather unsuccessfully with this question in the context of the burden of proof.239 In another significant opinion the
supreme court reaffirmed its requirement that in certain kinds of adjudicatory hearings, the proof required will be measured by standards of legal admissibility.2"' In a third case the court ignored
strong policy considerations to the contrary and permitted the consideration of evidence of illegal conduct to support the granting of a
license. 24
In Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board,24 2 the court considered the evidence necessary to
support the granting of a variance from air quality control regulations. The applicable statute allows the granting of a variance when
two things are found. It must be shown that the imposed limitation
would "result in an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of property
or will impose an undue economic burden . . . and . . . the
granting of the variance will not result in a condition injurious to
health and safety. ' 2 3 On appeal the court was faced with the suffi236. To the extent that N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) can be read as a
statute allowing for a stay pending appeal, it may provide an adequate remedy at law which
would preclude the granting of an extraordinary writ. See Mandamus in New Mexico, supra
note 145 at 173-77.
237. Other provisions of the amendments affect the process of proof at the hearing, see note
267 infra, and the process of decision-making itself. See text accompanying notes 284-296 infra.
238. 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54 at 13.
239. Duke City Lumber Co. v. N.M. Environmental Improv. Bd., 95 N.M. 401, 622 P.2d
709 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 426, 622 P.2d 1046 (1981).
240. Trujillo v. Employment Security Comm'n., 94 N.M, 343, 610 P.2d 747 (1980).
241. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 94 N.M. 496, 612 P.2d
1307 (1980).
242. 95 N.M. 401, 622 P.2d 709 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 426, 622 P.2d 1046
(1981).
243. N.M. Stat. Ann. §74-2-8(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1981) (emphasis added).

Winter 19821

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ciency of the evidence on both prongs of the statutory standard because the Board had denied the variance on the vague and general
ground24that "the hearing record does not support the variance petition.'
With respect to the first element of the statutory test-arbitrary
and unreasonable taking or undue economic burden-the court easily concluded that the applicant had met its evidentiary burden. The
court found that the company had made a prima facie showing of
undue economic burden sufficient to meet its initial burden of going
forward, 24 5 thereby shifting the burden to the Board.2" 6 Thus, when
the court concluded that the Board's rebuttal evidence on that point
consisted of "surmise and conjecture" the court was able to conclude that the Board's evidence was insufficient to "rebut appellant's showing of undue economic burden." ' 7
The second prong of the statutory standard-proof that granting
the variance would not injure health or safety-was more difficult
for the court. First, the court concluded that the factors of amount
of smoke and percentage of opacity, taken alone, could not establish
danger to health and safety. 4 8 Second, the court examined the proof
of the absence of danger to health and safety. The court acknowledged that in negative averment situations it is sufficient for the proponent to introduce evidence which renders the existence of the negative probable in the absence of proof to the contrary.24 9 Also, the
court noted that where the other party has special knowledge " 'the
burden rests on the latter to produce such evidence. If the expert
party fails to produce affirmative evidence, the negative will be presumed to have been established.' "25 Rather than working through
this analysis to reach a reasoned conclusion, however, the court left
these principles dangling and merely remanded the case to the Board
244. 95 N.M. at 402, 622 P.2d at 710. The board also grounded its denial on community objections to emissions from the Espanola sawmill, and because the record showed "that other
alternatives are available." Id. Under the statutory standard, it is hard to see how either of
these grounds were relevant considerations.
245. An applicant for a variance has the burden of proving an entitlement to the variance.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §74-2-8(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1981); see International Min. & Chem. Corp. v.
New Mexico Public Serv. Comm'n., 81 N.M. 280, 466 P.2d 557 (1970).
246. 95 N.M. at 402-03, 622 P.2d at 710-11, citing with approval Willingham v. Secretary
of HEW, 377 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Fla. 1974). See Ambrose v. Wheatly, 321 F.Supp. 1220 (D.
Del. 1971); Goodman v. Brock, 83 N.M. 789, 498 P.2d 676 (1972).
247. 95 N.M.at 405, 622 P.2d at713.
248. The court stated: "Smoke, in a given situation, may be composed of elements which at
a given density or opacity may be 'injurious to health or safety' but something more than the
percentage of opacity must be shown." Id. at 406,622 P.2d at 714.
249. Id. at 405,622 P.2d at713.
250. Id. at 405-06, 622 P.2d at 713-14, quoting Allstate Finance Corp. v. Zimmerman, 330
F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1964).
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"to determine whether the wood smoke . . . is injurious to health
and safety." 2 5'
The court's lack of reasoning confused an already difficult area of
the law25 2 in three important respects. First, the opinion is unclear
where the burden on the negative averment really lies, thereby providing little guidance to the Board on remand. Second, if the court
meant to say, as its opinion suggests, that the burden is on the
Board, then its result was inconsistent with its conclusion. If the burden is on the Board to establish that granting the variance will result
in injury to health and safety, then its failure to meet that burden
should, according to authorities cited by the court, presume the establishment of the negative-i.e., that the granting of the variance
would not endanger health and safety.2 53 This conclusion, coupled
with the court's conclusion that economic burden was established,
logically should have led the court to reverse the denial of the variance and order the Board to grant the variance, rather than to remand for further fact-finding.
Finally, there is no indication why burden-shifting ought to take
place in the context of this case merely because the health and safety
issue happens to be a negative averment. The court fails to explain
why, in the context of this case, the Board "has particular knowledge or control of the evidence" such that the burden of proof ought
to shift. It is just as likely that in the context of this case, the company, which has special knowledge of emissions of its plant, and at
least equal access to general data about the Espafiola air quality,
ought to retain the traditional burden of proof of any proponent
seeking a variance.254
It may be that proper regard for the role of the court in reviewing
251. 95 N.M. at 407, 622 P.2d at 715. Judge Sutin dissented, claiming that "the order of the
Board should be reversed and vacated because it was not rendered in accordance with law." Id.
His opinion would be more appropriately labeled a concurrence, because the majority reached
the same result, albeit on a question of substantial evidence rather than an error of law. Judge
Sutin questioned the authority of the Board, the process used by the Board, as well as the sufficiency of its findings. His opinion also reiterates the familiar Sutin lament over the inapplicability of the state APA:
[u]ntil the legislature makes the [Administrative Procedures] Act applicable to
every agency, the conduct of state agencies will continue to be . . . an affront
to persons, firms and corporations subjected to the whim and caprice of those
who administer. . . [them)."
Id. at 410, 622 P.2d 718 (Sutin, J.,dissenting). See e.g., Hawthorne v. Dir. of the Revenue
Div., 94 N.M. 480, 485, 612 P.2d 710, 715 (Ct. App. 1980) (Sutin, J., dissenting); J. W. Jones
Construction Co. v. Revenue Division, 94 N.M. 39, 45, 607 P.2d 126, 132 (Ct. App. 1979)
(Sutin, J., concurring); Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass'n. v. New Mexico Board of Pharmacy, 86 N.M. 571, 578, 525 P.2d 931,938 (Ct. App. 1974) (Sutin, J., dissenting).
252. See generally, Jones on Evidence § 178 (1972).
253. See95N.M.at405-06,622P.2dat713-14.
254. See generally, B. Schwartz, supra note 197 at § 121; 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise, at § 6.15 (1958).
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an agency decision warranted the remand in this case. The applicable
appellate review statute gives the court express power only to "set
aside" the denial of a variance. 2" This statute arguably precludes
the court from taking on the task of making the complex variance
decision delegated by the legislature to the Board. 56 In remanding
the case, however, the court seemed at odds with the logical consequences of its own analysis.
In Trujillo v. Employment Security Commission2" the supreme
court also considered an evidentiary question in the context of an adjudicatory hearing. Trujillo involved the denial of unemployment
compensation benefits2 58 on grounds of emloyee misconduct. The
only evidence to support the charge was hearsay testimony which
was controverted by appellant.25 9 Confronted with the issue of
whether such evidence was sufficient to support the charge of misconduct, the court reversed the denial of benefits holding that "controverted hearsay
under these facts does not qualify as substantial
26 0
evidence."
The Trujillo court applied the legal residuum rule to reverse the
denial of benefits. The rule requires that an administrative finding
must be set aside under the substantial evidence test if it is not supported by "at least a residuum of evidence competent under the exclusory rules." '2 6' The court acknowledged that the rule is of questionable validity in many circumstances, 262 but it expressly retained
255. N.M. Stat. Ann. §74-2-9 (1978).
256. Cf. Singleterry v. City of Albuquerque, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 453, 632 P.2d 345 (1981);
Coe v. City of Albuquerque, 76 N.M. 771, 418 P.2d 545 (1966) (reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning authority).
The judicial review authority in §74-2-9 provides the best rationale for the court's decision.
Had such a route been taken and coupled with clear direction to the board on how to handle
the negative averment burdens, Duke City Lumber could have become a model of the appropriate tension between the court and agency-the former deferring to the latter on substantive
decisions while affording guidance on how the law is to be applied and by what processes.
257. 94 N.M. 343, 610 P.2d 747 (1980).
258. The benefits were granted initially but the Employment Security Commission (ESC)
Appeals Tribunal reversed the award. The district court affirmed the tribunal and Trujillo appealed from that court decision. Id.
259. The charge of misconduct for which benefits were denied was that "Trujillo conspired
to align members of an advisory council against his Superior .... " Id. at 344, 610 P.2d at
748. The only evidence on the charge was the supervisor's testimony of what members of the
council had told him. Id.
260. Id.
261. Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 81 N.M. 5, 8, 462 P.2d 139, 142 (1969). See K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 14.10 (1958). See also, 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey,
supra note 54, at 29-30, n. 200.
262. The court acknowledged Professor Davis' criticism that rigid application of the residuum rule undercuts administrative flexibility, and that rejection of the rule would not preclude
the use of the substantial evidence test to overturn findings not supported by reliable evidence.
94 N.M. at 344, 610 P.2d at 748, quoting K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 14.10 (1958).
See also, Utton, The Use of the Substantial Evidence Rule To Review Administrative Findings
of Fact in New Mexico, 10 N.M.L. Rev. 103, 109-17 (1979-80).
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the rule as the law in New Mexico "in those administrative proceedings where a substantial right, such as one's ability to earn a livelihood, is at stake." 26' 3 In retaining the rule, Trujillo seems to require
more than a mere residuum of evidence to support the verdict.
The decision is significant on several levels. First, while affirming
the validity of the legal residuum rule in certain circumstances, it implicitly rejects it in others. Second, in one stroke the court establishes
both workmen's compensation benefits and "one's ability to earn a
livelihood" as "substantial right[s] as a matter of [the] public policy" of the state of New Mexico.26 Finally, for those circumstances
where "substantial rights" are involved, Trujillo transforms the rule
from a "residuum" rule to one of requiring as much "substantial
evidence as would support a verdict in a court of law." 263
Trujillo reemphasizes that in adjudicatory hearings involving the
potential deprivation of rights and entitlements, administrative informality and flexibility must give way to the more structured and
formal configurations normally associated with courtroom trials.
When limited to those circumstances where important personal
rights are involved, the added formality and structure properly
serves to insure that more attention is paid to the protection of those
important rights. Added formality, however, has negative implications for bodies such as professional licensing boards which are comprised of lay persons unfamiliar with the law. Additional trial-like
elements which require rulings on complex issues of law make administrative adjudication increasingly more difficult for lay-person
adjudicators.26 6 The Trujillo ruling and the new provisions of the Licensing Act,267 are only two examples of this trend. The trend may
result in a need for state administrative law judges 68 to handle at
least those trial-like adjudications involving the potential depriva263. 94 N.M. at 344, 610 P.2d at 748.
264. Id. Such a conclusion necessitates that the full panoply of due process rights must be
afforded to individuals threatened with state-sanctioned termination. See e.g., Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1978); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1977).
265. 94 N.M. at 344, 610 P.2d at 748, quoting Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 81 N.M. 5, 9,
462 P.2d 139, 142 (1969).
266. For example, Trujillo requires that lay person hearing officers make decisions about
whether certain evidence is legally admissible under the Rules of Evidence.
267. The Licensing Act allows for the taking of depositions in accordance with the Rules of
Civil Procedure, N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1981), and, in addition to the requirement of making complex evidentiary rulings, see id. §§61-1-9 & 11,the board or hearing officer now has power to impose "appropriate evidentiary sanction[s]," id. §§61-1-9(C), not
unlike a trial judge's power under N.M. R. Civ. P. 37.
268. Liquor Control Act violations have for many years been heard by private attorneys appointed independently of the department. That same procedure has been retained in the 1981
Act. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §60-6C-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
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entitlements. Such a develtion of important state created rights and
269
opment would have some advantages.

In Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. New Mexico State Corporation Commission,270 the court was confronted with a challenge by Greyhound
to a certificate of public convenience and necessity awarded to Trailways Bus Lines to operate intrastate bus service between Las Cruces
and the New Mexico-Arizona border. The district court upheld the
Commission's award of the certificate to Trailways and the supreme
court affirmed, finding substantial evidence to support the award.2 '
In reaching its conclusion, the supreme court considered the issue
of "whether Trailways can rely on its prior illegal operations over
the subject route as a basis for establishing a need for its proposed
services. ' The court noted the persuasive authority precluding
consideration of such evidence. There are strong policy reasons for
the agency, as a regulator of competitive business, not to reward unfair or illegal business practices by allowing their use as evidence. 27
The court merely slapped Trailways on the wrist, however,2 7 and
then ruled that such evidence is not barred as a matter of law.2" 5
Concluding that there was no evidence that the illegal operations
269. Those advantages lie especially in the context of professional disciplinary proceedings
and the threatened deprivation of statutory entitlements. Where fault related fact-finding is
critical much can be said for independent, legally trained professional hearing officers. Disciplinary cases do not normally depend on agency expertise, and they are often fraught with serious questions about unfairness and bias. In statutory entitlement cases, bias in favor of the
agency by agency hearing officers is a constant complaint. See, e.g., Cruz v. Schweiker, 645
F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1981). Professional boards, comprised of professionals sitting in judgment
on their peers, also raise concerns about personal bias and pecuniary interest. See, e.g., Gibson
v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Reid v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 92 N.M. 414, 589
P.2d 198 (1979). For a discussion of this problem in the context of the decision-making process, see text accompanying notes 279-296 infra.
270. 94 N.M. 496, 612 P.2d 1307 (1980).
271. The substantial evidence aspects of the case are discussed in note 431 infra.
272. 94 N.M. at 499, 612 P.2d at 1310. "It is undisputed that Trailways had been operating
illegally and that the witnesses' preference for and reliance on Trailways arose as a result of
those illegally provided services." Id.
273. The barring of the consideration of evidence gained from the carrier's illegal activity
assures I) that the wrongdoer does not benefit from his wrongdoing, 2) that the opposing party
is not penalized for abiding by the regulations, and, perhaps most important, 3) that the agency
responsible for seeing that the rules of the game are adhered to does not itself sanction wrongdoing. See Donahue v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 145 Colo. 499, 359 P.2d 1024 (1961). See also,
Dutchland Tours, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. Comwlth. 1,337 A.2d 922 (1975).
274. "We agree with Greyhound in this regard. We strongly condemn such [illegal] activities." 94 N.M. at 499, 612 P.2d at 1310.
275. The court had stated the issue in evidentiary terms, see text accompanying note 272,
supra, and then misstated the question in ruling that illegal operations cannot be a per se bar to
the granting of a certificate because "the primary consideration is the public welfare." Id.
Greyhound's argument was not that illegal operations barred the issuance of the certificate,
but only that it barred consideration of evidence favorable to Trailways which stemmed from
illegality.
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were "deliberate and willful,''" 6 the court held that the Commission
had properly "weighed the evidence of illegal acts against the need
for the service and decided that the public welfare would be served
by granting the certificate to Trailways."I"
The Greyhound Lines court seriously undermined the illegal conduct doctrine. 278 The rule is prophylactic in nature, and rooted in an
administrative necessity to insure that the regulatory process is fair
and equitable. By establishing a prerequisite of proof that the illegal
operations were deliberate and willful before applying a per se bar,
the court invited illegal conduct. Deliberate and willful conduct is
difficult or impossible to prove. Therefore, common carriers may
now be able to compete without a certificate, and when they feel they
have a competitive advantage, file for the certificate. Illegality will
be then "weighed . . . against" the need for their service. Such a
result undermines the integrity of the regulating process.
D. The Decision-MakingProcess
Last year's survey discussed the need for an impartial decisionmaker as an essential element of due process in the adjudicative context.279 In the professional licensing area, the boards are made up of
276. Id. The court failed to explain how the establishment and maintenance of a bus line
without an authorizing certificate can be anything but willful and deliberate.
277. Id.
278. The illegal conduct doctrine precludes the use of evidence derived from illegal conduct
to support the illegal actor's claim, See note 273 supra.
279. See 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54 at 15-16. The problem may
also exist in rule-making, but in that context the bias questions are more limited. Impartiality is
not a prerequisite for a rule-maker in the same sense that it is required in an adjudicator, because the rule-making function is not aimed at any particular individual. See e.g., B. Schwartz,
supra note 197 at §§ 107-08; W. Gellhorn, supra note 27 at 763-67.Therefore, greater bias is
necessary to disqualify a rule-maker than is required to disqualify an adjudicator. Compare
Ass'n. of National Advertisers v. F.T.C., 627 F.2d 1151, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (disqualification in rulemaking required "only when there has been a clear and convincing showing that
[the official] has an unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the proceeding), with, Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (potential for economic gain from adjudicatory result grounds for disqualification).
Hearing officer bias generally falls into three categories: personal (including pecuniary) interest, personal antagonism to a party, and prejudgment bias. Personal interest bias is particularly insidious because it "produces a distinction in judgment not readily correctable by persuasive evidence in the hearing." W. Gellhorn, supra note 27 at 765. As a result this kind of
bias readily leads to disqualification. See e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (optometrist board members stood to gain from enforcement of rule restricting competition); Ward v.
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (mayor, who was responsible for fiscal affairs of
city, disqualified from hearing traffic cases where city gained substantially from court fines).
In this area the appearance of impropriety may be a significant factor governing disqualification. See Ried v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 92 N.M. 414, 589 P.2d 198 (1979).
Personal antagonism to a party may also raise due process concerns, but in order to serve as
grounds for disqualification such antagonism must have arisen outside the hearing process. See
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members of the professions. This results in peer-review for both
licensing and disciplinary decisions. Thus, charges of bias and
pecuniary interest against board members are easily made,2"' resulting in successful challenges to the impartiality of the decisionmaking.2 8 ' The problem is confused by appellate court's sporadic
use of the Doctrine of Necessity282 to allow a board to sit despite the
presence of an otherwise valid ground for disqualification. 283
e.g., United States v. Wolfson, 558 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Haldeman, 559
F.2d 31, 131-34 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Prejudgment bias is perhaps the most difficult to establish, especially in the rule-making
context. Strong convictions or crystallized points of view on questions of law and policy are
not grounds for disqualification. Prejudgment bias, in order to serve as grounds for disqualification, must rise to the level of preferred opinions as to the facts. See American Cyanamid Co.
v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
280. See e.g., Seidenberg v. New Mexico Bd. of Medical Examiners, 80 N.M. 135, 452 P.2d
469 (1969).
281. Reid v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 92 N.M. 414, 589 P.2d 198 (1979). In Reid a
disciplinary complaint was brought against the appellant. Pursuant to applicable law, he disqualified two of the five Board members. At the hearing he sought to disqualify a third member of the Board, alleging prejudgment bias. The motion was denied and Reid's license was revoked.
The supreme court reversed the district court's affirmance of the Board's order, holding that
the Board's failure to honor Reid's motion for disqualification violated his right to due process. Finding that there were acknowledged statements indicating the Board member's "bias
and prejudgment of the issues," id. at 416, 589 P.2d at 200, the court concluded that there was
sufficient appearance of bias or predisposition to meet the applicable test: "[Wihether, in the
natural course of events, there is an indication of a possible temptation to an average man sitting as . . . [a Board member] to try the case with bias for or against any issue presented to
him." Id. The court went on to emphasize that the principle of having a decision-maker free
from bias and the appearance of bias, which developed in the judicial context, must apply even
"more strictly to an administrative adjudication where many of the customary safeguards affiliated with court proceedings have, in the interest of expedition and supposed administrative
efficacy, been relaxed." Id.
282. Under the doctrine of necessity, an otherwise valid ground for disqualification must be
rejected if to honor it would destroy the only tribunal with the power to make the decision:
The Rule of Necessity had its genesis at least five and a half centuries ago. Its
earliest recorded invocation was in 1430, when it was held that the Chancellor of
Oxford could act as judge of a case in which he was a party when there was no
provision for appointment of another judge. Y. B. Hil. 8 Hen. VI f. 19, p. 1, 6.
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1980). Similarly, the doctrine required Chancellor
Kent to continue to act in Moers v. White, 6 Johns. Ch. 360 (N.Y. 1822), despite the fact that
his brother-in-law was a party, because New York law made no provision for a substitute chancellor. 449 U.S. at 214, n. 15.
283. The New Mexico Supreme Court in Seidenberg used the doctrine to overcome a charge
of bias resulting from the fact that the hearing board was also the charging party, but failed to
apply it to overcome an appearance of prejudgment in Reid. The Reid court did not deal with
the doctrine directly. Instead, it rejected a claim under the doctrine's statutory equivalent.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) which provides that disqualification may not be
allowed to defeat a quorum. In rejecting this rule of law, the Reid court concluded that due
process considerations outweighed that statutory mandate. To the extent that all disqualifications for cause implicate due process rights in the adjudicatory context, the logic of Reid
would abolish the doctrine of necessity.
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This year, the legislature attempted to solve the problem of decision-making bias in the professional board context. The Licensing
Act Amendments of 1981 authorize the use of hearing officers. 84 In
cases to be heard by the board where a number of disqualifications
for cause2 85 results in the lack of a quorum, the board may designate
a hearing officer to hear the entire matter,28 ' or can request the
Governor to appoint sufficient temporary board members to decide
the matter."5 7
The general hearing officer provision contained in §61-1-7(A) 8 8
anticipates that the hearing officer would conduct the hearing and
provide his findings of fact to the board, for ultimate decision by the
board. 89 The provision does not, by itself, solve the bias problem. 9 '
Taken in conjunction with the provision which requires notice to the
applicant or licensee concerning the identity of the hearing and
deciding officers,"' however, it allows for early identification of any
bias problems. If such problems arise, and are of such magnitude as
to threaten the ability of the agency to render a decision, then alternative methods may be used. A hearing officer may be appointed to
decide the entire case or the governor may appoint temporary board
members.
The temporary board member alternative appears the more cumbersome, 92 but may prove to be more politically appealing.29 3 From
the point of view of administrative efficiency, an independent, legally trained hearing examiner, not unlike that used as a matter of
statutory compulsion in alcoholic beverage control hearings, 94
. . shall be conducted either by the board or, at the election of the
284. "All hearings
board, by a hearing officer who may be a member or employee of the board or any other person designated by the board in its discretion." N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-7(A) (Repl. Pamp.
1981).
285. Automatic disqualification by affidavit is allowed "as in the case of judges," Id. at
§61-1-7(C), but disqualifications which would result in less than a quorum must be "for good
cause shown to the board." Id. It is unclear whether the kind of appearance of bias referred to
in Reid, see note 281, supra, would satisfy the good cause requirement of the statute.
286. Id. at §61-1-7(E).
287. Id. at §61-1-7(D).
288. See note 284 supra.
289. N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-7(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
290. If so many disqualifications for cause were granted that there remained no quorum of
the board to act, allowing a hearing examiner, who could only do the fact finding, would not
solve the problem.
291. N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-4(D)(Repl. Pamp. 1981).
292. The appointment of "temporary" board members adds new and inexperienced persons
to the process in midstream. They too may be subject to disqualification for cause, thereby
raising the spectre of having to appoint temporary board members for the temporary board
members.
293. The possibility of distributing political largess by way of further gubernatorial appointments is always an attractive alternative to those in a position to make the appointments.
294. N.M. Stat. Ann. §60-6C-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
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would be the most attractive approach. Liberal use of such hearing
officers could become costly, 295 however, and nothing in the 1981
amendments suggests that the budgets of the licensing boards have
been increased to cover such expenditures.
Again, as with the Licensing Act amendments affecting the pro' the statutory amendments concerning hearing excess of proof, 96
aminers may lead to increased formality. If such formality results in
increased fairness to those threatened with the deprivation of important rights or entitlements, then the benefit to everyone may prove
worth the additional costs.
E. Enforcement of Agency Rules and Rulings
The enforcement of agency action is often a troublesome issue
when other laws or other governmental processes overlap with an
agency action. Two cases decided this year highlight some of the
problems created for the enforcement of agency action by laws and
processes outside the normal scope of agency procedures.
In State v. Joyce... the court held that failure of the agency to file
its regulations in conformity with the State Rules Act rendered those
rules invalid and unenforceable.2 98 Because the criminal trespass
conviction involved in the case was based on the regulation which
prohibited Joyce as a non-Indian from selling his wares on the Portal in Santa Fe,299 the court also concluded that the conviction based
on the substance of the regulation could not stand, even though the
defendant had actual notice of the substance of the regulation. 300
Thus, valid promulgation and adequate notice are necessary, but not
sufficient, conditions for agency enforcement of its rules and regulations. In addition, the filing process of the State Rules Act must be
strictly observed. This requirement transforms that Act into a miniAdministrative Procedures Act. Under Joyce, the Rules Act is applicable to all agency rule-making; it controls the enforcement of
agency rules as directly as the statutes under which those rules are
promulgated.
* The second case imposing external constraints on the enforceability of agency rules also arose in the criminal context. In State v.
295. Independent attorney hearing examiners appointed in Liquor Control Act cases are
compensated at the rate of $100 per day. See id. It is hard to imagine that licensing boards
could obtain similar services for less.
296. See text accompanying note 267 supra.
297. 94 N.M. 618, 614 P.2d 30 (Ct. App. 1980).
298. Id. at 621, 614 P.2d at 33. The rulemaking aspects of Joyce are dealt with in a prior section of this survey. See text accompanying notes 128-140 supra.
299. See text accompanying notes 130 & 131 supra.
300. See text accompanying notes 137-139supra.
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30 the defendant became the target of an investigation conGardner,
cerning another crime while he was on probation. The conditions of
his probation included consent to a search "of his car, person or
residence at anytime upon the request of his probation officer." 3" 2
During the investigation defendant was reminded of the probation
conditions and, as a result, allowed a search of his car. Stolen items
were found in his trunk which led to his being charged with receiving
stolen property. The district court granted a motion to suppress the
evidence on the ground that probation office regulations prohibited
probation officers from conducting any search without a warrant. 0 3
The conditions of Gardner's probation were in direct conflict with
this agency rule.
On appeal by the state,3" ' the court of appeals reversed the suppression order and remanded the case for trial. The court reasoned
that, while the court has a duty to enforce agency regulations when
compliance with the regulation is mandated by law,3" 5 the relevant statutes "do not . . . require a court to enforce the provision
of the manual concerning abstention from searches by probation
officers." 0 6 The court concluded that the specific provisions of probation imposed by the court "overrode [the] manual provisions directing that probation officers abstain from searches of probation-

ers. "307
The court read the applicable state law as authorizing courtimposed conditions of probation "which override any general administrative regulations." 3 8 The state law, however, states the converse of this proposition. Rather than giving the court power to override agency regulations, the law states that the general agency regulations or conditions of probation only apply "in the absence of spe301. 95 N.M. 171,619 P.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1980).
302. Id. at 172, 619 P.2d at 848.
303. The Manual of Instructions for Officers issued by the Probation Department provides:
"Officers will not search the person, vehicle or home of clients ...
If a search is necessary, then we should take our information to local law enforcement officials and they have their own procedures for securing and executing search warrants."
Id. at 173, 619 P.2d at 849.
304. Appeal of such orders by the state are authorized in N.M. Stat. Ann. §39-3-3(B)(2)
(1978).
305. 95 N.M. at 173, 619 P.2d at 849.
306. Id.
307. 95 N.M. at 174, 619 P.2d at 850. The court of appeals also concluded that the search
was reasonable and did not violate the fourth amendment. This aspect of the case is treated in
that portion of this year's survey dealing with criminal procedure. See, Stelzner, CriminalProcedure, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 271 (1982).
308. 95 N.M. at 174, 619 P.2d at 850.
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cific conditions imposed by the court." 3 9 The Gardner result may
have been the same under either approach because the probation
condition in Gardner had already been imposed. A question will
arise, however, when a court is considering its power to act in conscious defiance of agency regulation. The Gardner court's
characterization of the law may lead to a misimpression about court
authority to disregard agency regulations in general. The Gardner
court's approach clearly implies that a court may disregard agency
regulations whenever statutory or constitutional law does not require it to follow the regulation. That is not the law. Agency rules
which are within the scope of agency authority3" ' and are validly
promulgated 3t ' are a part of the law which must be followed and applied by the courts.
The proper analysis for the Gardnercourt should have begun with
the specific language of the authorizing statute.3" 2 Under a correct
reading of this statute, the suppression order did not override the
regulations. The authorizing statute merely clarified that the regulations did not apply under the conditions of Gardner. Had the Gardner court taken the correct analytical approach the result would have
been the same, but the court could have avoided the erroneous suggestion that courts may "override" agency regulations when state or
federal law does not specifically require that they be followed. Gardner can be used, however, to support such a suggestion, and it
thereby stands as a potential device to undermine the enforceability
of agency regulations. 3 ,3
309. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-21 (1978). The problem is similar to that of an agency seeking
to exercise authority beyond that which is conferred on it by law. See text accompanying notes
52-99, supra. If the probation department were seeking to impose its regulation as a limitation
on the court's discretion, that would clearly be in excess of the authority conferred upon it.
310. See text accompanying notes 52-99supra.
311. See note 129 supra.
312. See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
313. One further development during the year touched upon the enforcement of adjudicatory decisions by agencies. In Davis v. New Mexico Bureau of Revenue, 95 N.M. 218,
620 P.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1980), the pro se appellant successfully challenged an audit assessment
of $199.13 plus penalty and interest. All of the members of the court found that the facts
favored appellant's entitlement to the tax credit at issue. See id. (opinion of Sutin, J.) and id. at
221,620 P.2d at 379 (opinion of Wood, C. J., concurring, joined in by Andrews, J.).
In the face of controlling contrary authority, N.M. Stat. Ann. §71-1-25(B) (1978); New
Mexico Bureau of Revenue v. Western Electric Co., 89 N.M. 468, 553 P.2d 1275 (1976) Judge
Sutin awarded costs to the appellant. According to Judge Sutin:
A case can arise where a taxpayer has won a battle over a refund of $199.13
and lost the war if the expense of the transcript is in excess of the amount saved.
The burden of "expense" in each case must be decided according to principles of
equity and fair play exercised by the Bureau and the taxpayer in a determination
of tax liability.
95 N.M. at 220, 620 P.2d at 378. While Judge Sutin alone subscribes to this reasoning, the fact
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III. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWER

A. Invoking JudicialReview- Timeliness
To seek judicial review of an administrative decision should be a
relatively easy process.3" ' The law, in its wisdom, however, has a
way of making complex and confusing that which ought to be simple
and straightforward. So it is with the manner and timeliness with
which judicial review must be invoked. Two cases decided during the
survey year illustrate the difficulties which inevitably arise when different mechanisms are provided for the entry of administrative decisions and the invocation of judicial review.
In Town of Hurley v. New Mexico Municipal Boundary Commission, 315 the town sought judicial review of a denial of an annexation
request by the New Mexico Boundary Commission.I 6 The final decision3' 7 of the Commission was received by the municipal clerk about
December 21, 1978 but was not immediately recorded in municipal
records. The applicable statute required the filing of a notice of appeal "within 30 days of the filing of the final order." 3 I On February
that the other judges joined his result means that Judge Sutin's equitable award of costs stands
as the action of the court. Davis, therefore, may stand as authority for the award of costs when
taxpayers are inequitably forced to establish and enforce their administratively denied statutory entitlements by resort to appellate courts.
314. Under the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act, any party who has exhausted
all administrative remedies may invoke judicial review upon the filing of a simple petition. See
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-16 (1978). Professor Davis has long supported this approach and protested against the use of antiquated and prolix methods of seeking judicial review. See K.
Davis, Administrative Law Text at 458-59 (1972).
315. 94 N.M. 606, 614 P.2d 18 (1980). For a discussion of this case in the context of civil
procedure, see Occhialino, Civil Procedure, N.M. L. Rev. 97 (1982).
316. A three-member Municipal Boundary Commission appointed by the governor determines whether territory may be annexed to a municipality. The Commission, within 60 days of
receipt of a petition, must hold a public hearing in the municipality to which the territory is
proposed to be annexed. At the hearing, two criteria for annexation are considered: 1) whether
the territory proposed to be annexed is contiguous to the municipality; and 2) whether the
municipality will be able to provide the territory with municipal services. If these conditions are
met, the Commission must order annexation. A commission order is final unless a landowner
in the territory proposed to be annexed obtains timely review of the order in the district court.
See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-7-11 through 3-9-16 (1978).
317. The finality doctrine is as much a part of judicial review considerations in administrative law as it is in traditional civil litigation. See generally, K. Davis, Administrative Law
Text §29.02 (3d ed. 1972). Finality may be of even more serious concern in the administrative
context, because there are policies other than the avoidance of piecemeal appellate review
which obtain. The special concern for finality in admininistrative law has been embodied in
several doctrines. The doctrine of exhaustion comes into play to preclude non-final adjudication where the agency processes have not been fully used. See text accompanying notes 448460 infra. The doctrines of mootness and ripeness, which, like exhaustion, may limit the right
to invoke judicial review, are also intertwined with notions of finality. See generally, W. Gellhorn, supra note 27, at ch. 9, §§4.a & 4.b; B. Schwartz, Administrative Law 497-527 (1976).
318. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-7-15(E) (1978). The statute required the filing of the order in the
offices of both the county and municipal clerks. Id. § 3-7-16(A). The county clerk received the
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1, more than 30 days after the receipt of the order, but within 30
days of the recordation in the county records, the town filed its
notice of appeal. 3 19 The district court dismissed the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction. On appeal, the town argued that the "filing" required by the statutes is synonymous with recordation, and that,
therefore, the 30-day period did not begin to run until January 2.
The supreme court disagreed, and affirmed the trial court.
The court reasoned that the purposes of the filing requirement had
been met in the case. 320 The court decided that to require "recording" for fulfillment of the statutory requirement of "filing" would
impose an unjustifiable responsibility on the person filing. If the
time for appeal ran from the recording, rather than from the filing,
the person filing might be penalized if a municipal employee happened to fail to record, leaving the final order subject to appeal for
longer than the law intends. 3 2' The court adopted a literal definition
'
The
of filing: "delivery to the proper offices to be kept on file." 322
court found that the statutory "filing" requirement was met on December 21, and upheld the dismissal of the appeal for failure of the
town to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in a timely fashion.
The court went on to rule that receipt by the municipal clerk was
actual notice to the town, which rendered the constructive notice of
recordation unnecessary. 2 ' Thus, under Town of Hurley, when the
body which serves as a repository of the decision is also the potential
order on December 21, 1978 and placed it in an appropriately marked file folder. A new county
clerk recorded the order January 2, 1979. The municipal clerk received a copy of the same
document at or about the same time as did the county clerk, but failed to date it and apparently
did not record it. 94 N.M. at 607, 614 P.2d at 19.
319. Id.
320. The court correctly noted three distinct purposes for the filing requirement of the
statute: "1)to provide public and accessible repositories . . . 2) to give constructive notice to
the world and 3) to fix commencement of the time within which an appeal . . . may be
taken ..
" Id. at 608, 614 P.2d at 20.
321. Id., quoting Thorndale v. Smith, Wild, Beebe & Cades, 339 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1965).
An appealing party has a duty to be on notice that the document has been filed, even if the filing official fails to notify him. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d); see also In re Morrow, 502 F.2d 520
(5th Cir. 1974).
322. 94 N.M. at 608, 614 P.2d at 20 quoting Gallagher v. Linwood, 30 N.M. 211, 217-18,
231 P. 627, 629 (1924). The court also concluded that to read a recordation requirement into
the law . . . indulges in an "impermissible inference never intended by the legislature." 94
N.M. at 608, 614 P.2d at 20.
323. But see State v. Joyce, 94 N.M. 618, 614 P.2d 30 (Ct. App. 1980) (Rule invalid and unenforceable until filed in compliance with State Rules Act irrespective of actual notice). Town
of Hurley may be distinguishable from Joyce in that the purpose being served in Town of
Hurley involved only the timing of appellate review-a factor uniquely suited to actual notice.
Joyce involved broader policy considerations in need of a prophylatic rule. See text accompanying notes 137-139supra. On the other hand, if actual notice was deemed adequate substitution for recordation for all purposes, then the other policy purposes behind the statute would
not be served. See note 320 supra.
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appellant, its receipt of the decision starts the running of the time for
the filing of a notice of appeal.324

Butcher v. City of Albuquerque32 5 involved judicial review of a

zoning decision, which was triggered under the applicable law by a
petition for certiorari to the district court.3 26 To invoke judicial
review of a zoning decision, the petition for certiorari must be filed
within thirty days of the filing of the decision with the appropriate
authority. The zoning statute also requires, however, that the petition be "presented to the Court." 3'27 The petition in Butcher was
filed within thirty days, but the district court dismissed the writ on
the ground that the writ had not been personally presented to the
district judge within 30 days, and therefore the court did not have
jurisdiction to consider the appeal.3 2
The supreme court reversed, holding that the term "present" in
'
The court reathe statute "requires only filing with the court." 329
soned that its prior cases had not required anything more than filing,
and that a contrary ruling would run counter to legislative intent33 °
and would violate the principle of construction that additional language will not be read into a statute which makes sense as written.3 3 '
Butcher and Town of Hurley demonstrate a consistent solution to
different aspects of the same problem. Because our statutes provide
324. The actual notice analysis was a necessary component of the court's ruling. Indeed, the
actual notice analysis could have stood as a sufficient ground for the decision, making the filing vs. recording analysis unnecessary. See Occhialino, Civil Procedure, 12 N.M. L. Rev.
97(1982).
325. 95 N.M. 242, 620 P.2d 1267 (1980).
326. The zoning law reads: "Any person aggrieved by a decision of the zoning authority
. . . may present to the district court a petition, duly verified, setting forth that the decision is
illegal, in whole or in part, and specifying the grounds of the illegality." N.M. Stat. Ann.
§3-21-9(A) (1978).
327. Id.
328. 95 N.M. at 243, 620 P.2d at 1268. The district court also ruled that the nine-month delay from filing to the personal presentment to the judge could bar the petition under the doctrine of laches. Id.
329. Id. at 244, 620 P.2d at 269.
330. The court concluded that the intent of the legislature was to allow 30 days for the bringing of the appeal, and that to require personal presentation within that time would, in effect,
shorten the legislatively intended time frame. For example, filing on the 29th day when a judge
was unavailable could result in dismissal of the petition. "It is inconsistent with legislative intent or good reason to make a party's right to petition a court dependent upon the availability
of a judge on the final day of the statutory period." Id.
331. The court correctly reasoned that the statute made sense as written, and that adding the
personal presentment requirement would raise more questions than it would solve: "we would
then need to decide whether presentment to the judge can be oral or written, formal or informal, to only the assigned judge hearing the matter or to any district judge." Id.
The Butcher court recognized that "presentment to the court" should be in a reasonable
time but that unreasonable delays "can be dealt with adequately under the existing rules of civil
procedure and the equitable doctrine of ]aches." Id. at 244-45, 620 P.2d at 269-70. See e.g.,
N.M. R. Civ. P. 41. The court also ruled that laches did not bar this case because of the lack of
any prejudice to respondent. 95 N.M. at 245, 620 p.2d at 270.
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so many different routes to judicial review of administrative decisions, the courts are confronted with numerous technical arguments
challenging the invocation of judicial review. By applying a common
sense approach, the court in both Town of Hurley and Butcher
helped overcome two minor differences in statutory judicial review
language. To the extent that "filing" now means official receipt
(Town of Hurley) and "present to the court" means filing with the
court (Butcher), the court helped simplify a process which is confusing because of unnecessarily divergent statutory language.
B. Scope of Review
As pointed out in last year's Survey,33 2 most administrative cases
which reach the appellate courts raise some questions concerning the
scope of review which should be afforded. Invariably the cases involve confusion about what standard of review is applicable, or how
that standard should be applied in a given case. This Survey year is
no exception. The New Mexico courts continue to confuse the standard of review which ought to apply.3 3 Further, the cases reviewing
questions of law appeared rather mechanistic and result-oriented,33 '
although there was at least some movement toward clarification of
the standard of review when questions of fact are at issue.335
One case which arose in the civil context highlighted the distinction between the plenary consideration given by courts of original jurisdiction and the standard of review to be applied by the same
courts in reviewing final administrative action. State v. Clayton3 36
involved a state challenge to the authority of the district courts to
issue orders containing specific habilitation plans as part of the residential commitments of developmentally disabled adults. The court
orders were issued pursuant to the state's Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code.3 3 ' This statute requires court approval
332. 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 19.
333. See text accompanying notes 347-362 infra.
334. See text accompanying notes 363-400 infra.
335. See text accompanying notes 401-426 infra.
336. 95 N.M. 644, 625 P.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1981). This case involved consolidated cases concerning two mental patients, Clayton and Martinez.
337. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§43-1-1 to -25 (1978). In Clayton, because the State Health & Environment Department's plan for the patients recommended commitment, the law required the
petition to be filed with the court for its approval of the plan. Id. §43-1-13(C). The law also imposed a fact-finding duty on the court, N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-13(E), and gave ultimate authority over the placement of the patients to the court: "The court shall order the placement
which is least restrictive to the client, and may order attendance and participation as a nonresident in rehabilitation programs conducted at residential or nonresidential facilities." Id. §431-13(F). For a procedural discussion of how the code operated, see Ellis & Carter, Treating
Children Under the New Mexico Mental Health and Developmental DisabilitiesCode, 10 N.M.
L. Rev. 279, 284-95 (1980).
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of extended residential placement of mentally disabled patients. The
petition must be brought in the district court,3 3 with normal appellate review in the court of appeals.339 Because the State Health
and Environmental Department had fashioned a plan for the patients involved, the state in Clayton argued that the district court
decision was nothing more than judicial review of administrative
acts. Under the Department's view the appropriate scope of review
was a narrow one, and the different plans promulgated by the district court orders went beyond that narrow scope.
The appellate court, however, rejected the state's contention, concluding that "judicial review of administrative action is not involved." 3 " The court reasoned that commitment proceedings are
not merely a review of "whether the administrative action . . . was

permissible and reasonable under the administrator's authority." 34 '
Instead, such proceedings were brought under the district court's
original jurisdiction. The court found support for this in the statutory hearing requirements. The commitment procedures provide for
an adversary hearing,3 '2 which may give rise to trial court orders
based on "clear and convincing evidence.""'
Clayton highlights the similarities and distinctions between initial
court jUdgments and court review of agency actions. In the former
the court has control over the litigants, and can exercise plenary
judgment within the bounds prescribed by law.344 In the latter, the
legal question is generally more limited-the court may decide only
whether the agency acted lawfully in making its decision.34 5 Clayton
also clarifies that when an agency takes actions in an adversarial
context which requires it to petition the court for an order, the
agency may not act and then hide behind administrative law principles of limited review. Rather, as an adversarial litigant, it must
338. N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-13(C) (1978).
339. N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-24 (1978).
340. 95 N.M. at 647, 625 P.2d at 101.
341. Id.
342. N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-13(D) (1978) provides for representation by counsel, presentation of evidence, cross-examination of witnesses, a right to be present, a trial by jury, if requested, a complete record, and an expedient appeal.
343. Id. §43-1-13(E).
344. The Clayton court stated: "We agree with the State that the trial court's powers are
those given by the applicable statutes." 95 N.M. at 648, 625 P.2d at 102. The court concluded
that the trial court had authority to order the specific placement for the patients in both cases
before it. With respect to patient Martinez it also concluded that language in the Martinez
order which required the Department to provide an adequate program for Martinez, who was'
mentally retarded, was also proper. The court reversed that case however, because the language of the order did not make it clear that it was limited to Martinez and not all "mentally
retarded persons at the New Mexico State Hospital." Id. at 649, 625 P.2d at 103.
345. See text accompanying notes 363-400 infra.
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prove its case under applicable legal standards just as must any civil

litigant.
1. Standard of Review-Which Standard to Apply?

Last year's Survey discussed the courts' confusion about the difference between the substantial evidence standard of review and the
arbitrary and capricious standard. The question is how much deference should be given to administrative agency decisions, in the
absence of a clear statutory standard. Some courts have held that an
agency ruling will be upheld if there is "substantial evidence" in the
record to support it, while other courts have held that the ruling will
be upheld unless it is "arbitrary and capricious."+46 The difference,
if any, between these standards, and which of them to apply, has
been the subject of much controversy."4 ' The confusion between
these standards was evidenced this term ii Black v. Bernalillo

County Valuation ProtestsBoard,148 a case involving an appeal from
a county assessment decision. Black also added further confusion to

the standard of review question by implicating the "hard look" docsurrounding the scope of
trine,3" 9 which has muddled the questions
0

review in federal administrative law.35

346. See Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process,the Limits of JudicialReview, 59
Corn. L. Rev. 375 (1974).
347. See 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 21-22. The confusion is not
limited to this jurisdiction. The confusion on the federal level is even more extreme. In Abbot
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), the Supreme Court suggested that substantial
evidence affords "a considerably more generous judicial review than the 'arbitrary and capri" Id. at 143. This was the accepted statement of the relationship between the
cious' test ..
two tests until, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971),
the Court suggested that in reviewing a question of evidence a court must consider "whether
there has been a clear error of judgment." The Court then seemed to come full circle in a later
case in concluding that even though "an agency's finding may be supported by substantial
evidence . . . it may nonetheless reflect arbitrary and capricious action." Bowman Transportation Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284 (1975).
Judge J. Skelly Wright continues to see the two standards as distinct. See Wright, The
Courts and the Rulemaking Process, the Limits of Judicial Review, 59 Corn. L. Rev. 375
(1974). Judge Leventhal now sees them as converging, see Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 448
F.2d 1127, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and Judge Friendly suggests that we cannot be sure. See Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Labor, 487 F.2d 342,
349-50 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally, K. Davis, Administrative Law in the 1970's at 129.0029.01 (1976).
348. 95 N.M. 136, 619 P.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1980).
349. 95 N.M. at 142, 619 P.2d at 587. The doctrine eminated from historic language in
Overton Park:
Section 706(2)(A) requires a finding that the actual choice made was not 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.' [Citation omitted.] To make this finding the court must consider whether
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment. [Citations omitted.] Although this in-
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In Black, property owners protested the Bernalillo County assessor's refusal to allow them the favorable assessment rate for lands
used primarily for agricultural purposes. The Bernalillo County
Valuations Protests Board upheld the assessor. The Board found
that the application for special valuation was based on grazing use,
but grazing was only a subordinate use of the land. The Board thus
found that the land was being held for speculation with agricultural
use being incidental to the primary use. 3 5 ' Therefore, the property
owners were not entitled to the assessment rate for agricultural use.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that "the lands were used primarily for agricultural use and are subject to this special method of
taxation."'
Unfortunately, the reasoning of the judges in Black takes us in
several directions at the same time. 5 3 Judge Sutin, writing only for
quiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review
is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency.
401 U.S. at 416. Judge Leventhal labeled the doctrine in Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
Federal Communications Comm., 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971):
Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in case of
procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative charter,
but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of
danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a "hard look" at the salient
problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making.
Judge Leventhal would apply the doctrine to assure that agencies 1) abide by fair and reasonable procedures, 2) give good faith consideration to matters assigned to them, and 3) produce
results that are definable in reason. Leventhal, Environmental Decision-making and the Role
of the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509, 515 (1974). The doctrine has been applied most consistently in the environmental law field. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873 (W.D.
Tenn. 1972), rev'd. 494 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974) (on remand from the Supreme Court); Kennecott v. EPA, 149 U.S. App. D.C. 231, 462 F.2d 846 (1972).
The "hard look" doctrine can be applied in two ways. As applied by Judge Leventhal in
Greater Boston Television Corp,, it refers to a standard of review whereby the court assures
itself that the agency took a "hard look" at the matter before it. 444 F.2d at 851. In making
that inquiry, however, the court itself must take a hard look at the facts and circumstances
before it. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1972). Judge
Sutin, in Black, would have applied the doctrine both ways. "[Tihe duty of the Board, like that
of the Court, is to take a hard look at the facts and the law to arrive at the result." 95 N.M. at
142, 619 P.2d at 587.
350. See generally, W. Rodgers, Handbook on Environmental Law 19-23 (1977).
351. 95 N.M. at 139, 619 P.2d at 584.
352. Id. at 142, 619 P.2d at 587.
353. There is no opinion for the whole court in this case. Judge Sutin announced the result.
Judge Hernandez concurred only in the result, and Judge Walters dissented in part and concurred in part.
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himself3 5 ' while announcing the judgment of the court, explained
several bases for the result. Judge Sutin first concluded that "there is
no substantial evidence to support any of the Board's findings."' 5
Throughout his substantial evidence discussion, however, Judge Sutin
used language suggesting the arbitrary and capricious test. " 6 Second, he demonstrated that a statutory presumption in favor of the
correctness of the assessor's valuation did not apply and could not
help sustain the decision of the Board. 3I Third, he explained that the
protestants' application need not fail merely because its use description was inaccurate. The protestants should not be bound by the
technical wording of their administrative appeal.' 8 Finally, in Judge
Sutin's view, the actions of the Board and the assessor could not
withstand scrutiny under the "hard look" doctrine, which he would
apply to the review process of valuation decisions of the assessor.",
354. The lack of an opinion of the court has become all too common in our Court of Appeals. See e.g., Emery v. Univ. of N.M. Medical Center, 94 N.M. 144, 628 P.2d 1140 (Ct. App.
1981); Martinez v. Teague, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 587, 631 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1981); State v.
Lopez, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 847, 631 P.2d 1324 (Ct. App. 1981); Gonzales v. Bates Lumber
Co., 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 791, 631 P.2d 328 (Ct. App. 1981); State v. Santillanes, 20 N.M. St.
B. Bull. 163, 632 P.2d 359 (Ct. App. 1980). Perhaps more determined efforts at fashioning a
majority without rigid adherence to initial assignments would help rectify matters. See Occhialino, Civil Procedure,12 N.M. L. Rev. 97 (1982).
355. 95 N.M. at 140, 619 P.2d at 585. Judge Sutin's review of the record is persuasive in
support of his substantial evidence conclusion, and he is correct in stating that, on an appeal to
the board, the assessor may not win by remaining silent "[wihen a taxpayer makes a prima
Id. at 142, 619 P.2d
facie case that a ranch is used primarily for agricultural purposes.
at 587.
356. The substantial evidence discussion is confused by Judge Sutin's accusation that the assessor and the board failed to "exercise an honest judgment based upon the information they
possess or are able to acquire." Id. at 140, 619 P.2d at 585. This language is from an earlier
case, First National Bank v. Bernalillo County Valuation Board, 90 N.M. 110, 114, 569 P.2d
174, 178 (Ct. App. 1977), where the court of appeals held that the lack of honest judgment'
meant that the board's decision was arbitrary and capricious. Judge Sutin seems to use the
same reasoning in Black.
357. Judge Sutin correctly pointed out that the statutory presumption, see N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 7-38-6 (1978), and the applicable regulatory presumption, P.T.D. Reg. 29-9:1 (c), dealt only
with the valuation of the land by the assessor, not with what method of valuation the assessor
may use. 95 N.M. at 141,619 P.2d at 586.
358. The protestants' application alleged that all of the tracts in question were used for
"grazing," whereas, in fact, five of them were put to non-grazing agricultural use. Judge Sutin
concluded that "[a]determination of agricultural use is not made by a technical oversight of an
applicant made in a protest; it is determined by the evidence presented at the hearing." 95
N.M. at 141, 619 P.2d at 586.
359. 95 N.M. at 142, 619 P.2d at 587. It is clear from the context of the discussion that
Judge Sutin was applying the doctrine to the second of Judge Leventhal's concerns-that the
agency give good faith consideration to matters assigned to it. See Leventhal, supra note 349,
at 515.
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Judge Hernandez concurred in the result only. Judge Walters,
while dissenting in part, apparently using a "substantial evidence"
standard of review, concurred with respect to most of the parcels of
land using an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. 3"'
Black in all its dimensions unnecessarily compounds the existing
confusion over standards of review. Based on the portions of the record cited by Judge Sutin, the result in the case could be supported on
traditional substantial evidence grounds. On the other hand, the
Board's improper use of the presumption of the correctness of the
assessor's valuation and the attempt by the Board to limit the application for special valuation to grazing purposes, are both subject to
question under an arbitrary and capricious standard. The solution
might be to use both standards, without confusing them. The two
standards can be understood to serve different purposes and to apply
to different questions on appeal. The sufficiency of the evidence
issue is uniquely suited to substantial evidence review, and the arbitrary and capricious standard is most appropriately used when improper legal standards or improper and unfair procedures are employed by the agency.36I
The Black court's mention of the federal "hard look" doctrine is
not helpful. The federal administrative law example in this area is
not one to be followed. The federal cases also confuse the substantial
evidence and the arbitrary and capricious standards, and the "hard
look" doctrine merely multiplies the confusion. If "hard look" has
any utility at all, it is in very complex administrative decisionmaking,3" 2 not in normal state administrative adjudications. In360. Judge Walters' conclusion is a clear example of telescoping the substantial evidence test
into the arbitrary and capricious standard. She bases a finding of capriciousness on the lack of
substantial evidence: "I would agree that the Board was capricious in denying all of the pro95 N.M. at 142, 619 P.2d at 587
tests thereafter filed, in view of the evidence produced.
(emphasis added).
Judge Walters agreed that the Board's ruling was "capricious" despite her conclusion that
the assessor made an "honest judgment based on his observations of land use in the area." Id.
She argued that it was permissible for the Board to base its ruling on the assessor's conclusions
even though they were not the result of extensive observation, and only went to to the question
of whether there was "grazing." To allow the Board to base a holding on such sketchy
evidence puts a burden on the property owners to prove affirmatively agricultural use of the
land. Judge Walters saw nothing improper in imposing that burden, and only found the Board
"capricious" in refusing to hear the evidence that was presented. Id.
361. See 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 22, n. 142.
362. In terribly complex administrative decision-making, the "hard look" doctrine insures
that judicial review actually goes on, and that judges do not abrogate that function in the guise
of restraint:
Our obligation is not to be jettisoned because our initial technical understanding
may be meagre when compared to our initial grasp of FCC or freedom of speech
questions.
The substantive review of administrative action is modest, but it cannot be car-
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stead, the court ought to take our existing standards, recognize their
separate purposes, and seek to apply them in a balanced and evenhanded way.
2. Questions of Law-Interpreting the Statutes
The scope of review afforded to questions of law falls somewhere
on the spectrum between plenary exercise of independent judgment
by the court, and total judicial deference to the particular agency's
interpretation of law.363 The fundamental thrust of the New Mexico
cases seems to favor the independent judgment standard.36 After a
cursory bow toward agency interpretation, 6 ' the New Mexico courts
take a two-step approach. First, the courts apply the plain meaning
of the law when it is clear and unambiguous. 6 6 Second, if the law is
unclear or ambiguous, 6 7 the courts resort to a search for legislative
intent as evidenced by extrinsic factors3 6 and rules of construcried out in a vacuum of understanding. Better no judicial review at all than a
charade that gives the imprimatur without the substance of judicial confirmation
that the agency is not acting unreasonably ...
On issues of substantive review, on conformance to statutory standards and
requirements of rationality, the judges must act with restraint. Restraint, yes, abdication, no.
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (Leventhai, J. dissenting). On the other hand, there is a concern that the "hard look" could lead to
judgment by inexpert judges rather than trained administrators. Judge Bazelon has suggested a
way to avoid this evil:
'. . in cases of great technological complexity, the best way for courts to
guard against unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is not for the
judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each decision. Rather, it is
to establish a decision-making process that assures a reasoned decision that can
be held up to the scrutiny of the scientific community and the public.'
Because substantive review of mathematical and scientific evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable, I continue to believe we will
do more to improve administrative decision-making by concentrating our efforts
on strengthening administrative procedures ...
Id. at 66-67 (Bazelon, C. J., concurring).
363. See 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 23-24.
364. Id. at 24-25.
365. See e.g., Perea v. Baca, 94 N.M. 624, 627, 614 P.2d 541, 544 (1980); Strebeck Properties, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 93 N.M. 262, 268, 599 P.2d 1059, 1065 (1980).
366. See Perea v. Baca, 94 N.M. 624, 627, 614 P.2d 541, 544 (1980).
367. The ambiguity question is a threshold question which must be determined by the inquiring court as a matter of law. See Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California, 90
N.M. 620, 567 P.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 4, 569 P.2d 414 (1977).
368. Some of those factors extrinsic to the law in question are: the object sought to be accomplished or the wrong to be remedied, see Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 87
N.M. 327, 533 P.2d 100 (1975), the interpretation given to other similar legislation, see State v.
Gonzales, 78 N.M. 218, 430 P.2d 376 (1967); New Mexico Mun. League, Inc. v. New Mexico
Envt'l. Improvement Bd., 88 N.M. 201, 539 P.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 88 N.M.
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tion. 369 The cases decided during the Survey period clearly illustrate
New Mexico's application of the independent judgment standard.
The cases further demonstrate how the use of this standard may
mask the courts' exercise of a fundamental policy-making role.
The New Mexico approach was illustrated in the litigation surrounding the dismissal of tenured teacher Sharon Bryant from the
Alamogordo School System. Ms. Bryant had been employed by the
school system for four years, gaining tenure with her 1978-79 school
year contract. When her father was elected to the school board in the
Spring of 1979, she was not re-employed for the following year on
the basis of the anti-nepotism statute.3 7° The state Board of Education reversed that decision under its long-standing interpretation of
the law "that the words 'employ or approve the employment' means
'initial hiring' and 'initial approval of employment.' "37
On appeal by the local board, the court of appeals, in Board of
Education of Alamogordo Public Schools v. Bryant,372 reversed the
state board, and upheld the local board's dismissal of Bryant. The
318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975), the interpretation of the statute by the agency given the authority to
carry out its dictates and the duration and consistency of that interpretation. See Board of
Educ. of Alamogordo Public Schools v. Bryant, 95 N.M. 620, 624 P.2d 1017 (Ct. App. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., New Mexico State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ. of
Alamogordo Public Schools, 95 N.M. 588, 624 P.2d 530 (1981), as well as the nature of the
prior law. See Human Rts. Comm'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico, 95 N.M.
576, 624 P.2d 518 (1981).
369. The rules of construction used in the search for legislative intent have been: I) a statute
will not be interpreted so as to lead to inconsistencies or conflicts with other statutes, see New
Mexico Mun. League, Inc. v. New Mexico Envt'l Improvement Bd., 88 N.M. 201, 539 P.2d
221 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975); 2) a statute is presumed
to be constitutional, see City of Albuquerque v. Jones, 87 N.M. 486, 535 P.2d 1337 (1975); 3)
when a statute is subject to two constructions, only one of which would be constitutional, the
court should adopt the constitutional construction, see Huevy v. Lente, 85 N.M. 597, 514 P.2d
1093 (1973); 4) a statute must be interpreted as it was understood by the legislature at the time
of passage, see Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 82 N.M. 193, 477 P.2d 827
(1970); and 5) a statute must be read in such a way as to prevent absurdity, see State v. Hernandez, 89 N.M. 698, 556 P.2d 1174(1976).
370. The statute read in pertinent part: "No local school board shall employ or approve the
employment of any person in any capacity by a school district if the person is related by consanguinity or affinity within the first degree to any member of the school board governing the
district. N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-5-6 (1978). The statute was amended in 1981 and now reads:
N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-5-6 (Repl. Pamp.
"No local school board shall initially employ.
1981).
371. Board of Educ. of Alamogordo Public Schools v. Bryant, 95 N.M. 620, 624 P.2d 1017
(Ct. App. 1980), rev'd sub. nom., New Mexico State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ. of
Alamogordo Public School Dist. No. 1, 95 N.M. 588, 624 P.2d 530 (1981). In addition the
record in the case showed "that the Attorney General's office has consistently interpreted the
statute to apply only to the initial hiring of teachers and that there has been widespread reliance
upon this interpretation of the statute by school boards throughout the state." Id. at 622, 624
P.2d at 1019.
372. 95 N.M. 620, 624 P.2d 1017 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'dsub. nom., New Mexico State Bd.
of Educ. v. Board of Educ. of Alamogordo Public Schools, 95 N.M. 588, 624 P.2d 530 (1981).
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court held that the statute was clear and unambiguous,3 73 that it
precluded Ms. Bryant's continued employment,37 ' and that her dismissal did not violate due process.375 Bryant and the State Board had
argued that the statute was ambiguous and that the state board's interpretation was correct under four canons of statutory construction: 1) consistency with the statutory purpose, 2) due deference to
the administrative interpretation, 3) avoidance of the constitutional
problem, and 4) consistency with other statutes.3 7 6 In ruling that the
statute precluded Bryant's further employment, the court did not
quarrel with the proffered rules of construction, but rather concluded that "[t]hey are not applicable . . . until there has been a
valid determination of ambiguity, and appellees have not successfully met the local board's challenge to the State Board's finding that
the statute was ambiguous.""'
On certiorari the supreme court, in New Mexico State Board of
Education v. Board of Education of Alamogordo PublicSchool District No. 1, "1 reversed the court of appeals, and affirmed the ruling
of the State Board of Education. The court held "that the meaning
and applicability of the nepotism statute in the present context is un'
clear" 379
and "that the intent of the Legislature is best reflected by
construing the words . . . [of the statute] to relate only to the initial hiring of teachers." 3 '
373. Id. at 622, 624 P.2d at 1019.
374. Id. at 623, 624 P.2d at 1020.
375. Because the court construed the statute to preclude the rehiring of Bryant, it had to
deal with her constitutional claim that the application of the statute to her as a tenured teacher
deprived her of protected property and liberty interests without due process. See Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). While recognizing that Bryant had protectable property
and liberty interests, the court concluded that the deprivation of those interests did not offend
due process because, prior to the deprivation, she had been afforded a full and fair hearing and
because the nepotism statute was "good and just cause" for her dismissal. 95 N.M. at 624, 624
P.2d at 1021. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-10-15(D) (1978). For a full discussion of the constitutional issues in this case, see Schowers, Constitutional Law, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 191 (1982).
376. 95 N.M. at 622, 624 P.2d at 1019.
377. Id. Although the court expressly indicated that rules of construction were inapplicable
because the statute was unambiguous, it justified its conclusion by resort to the very rules of
construction it said did not apply. The court reasoned that the legislative failure to adopt the
bills introduced in 1977 and 1979 to limit the meaning of the statute evidences "an intent that
the statute means what the Alamogordo Board read it to mean .... ." Id. Furthermore, the
court looked to the abuses which could flow from a reading of the statute and concluded that
"[liegislation to restrict the likelihood of such undesirable consequences cannot be said to be
absurd." Id. at 623, 624 P.2d at 1020. Finally, the court read the nepotism statute as being consistent with the previously enacted tenure laws. The court relied in part on the presumption in
statutory construction that "the Legislature was informed regarding the existing tenure laws
when it enacted the nepotism statute." Id. at 624, 624 P.2d at 1021.
378. 95 N.M. 588, 624 P.2d 530(1981).
379. Id. at 591,624 P.2d at 533.
380. Id. at 592, 624 P.2d at 534.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

The supreme court found ambiguity precisely where the court of
appeals found none. The court of appeals stated expressly that tenure laws were not implicated by the nepotism statute.3 8 ' The supreme
court, however, based part of its finding of ambiguity on an analysis
of the consistency of the statute with the tenure laws, 382 as well as on
"[t]he history of uncertainty as to the meaning of the nepotism statute."38' 3 The difference between the two courts' holdings on the ambiguity question demonstrates the disingenuousness of this threshold
inquiry. The ambiguity issue seems to be used as a result determining
label and not as a standard for the resolution of the inquiry.3 8 In the
Bryant litigation, ambiguity is given lip service and then applied in
such a way that it really merges with the legislative intent inquiry by
the examination of factors external to the words of the statute.38
38 1. The court of appeals had found that the statute "does not refer to reemployment as an
exception, nor does it exempt tenured personnel." 95 N.M. at 622, 624 P.2d at 1019.
382. The supreme court, as part of its threshold inquiry into ambiguity, relied, in part, on
the tenure laws which refer to renewal contracts as "reemployment," and to the automatic
renewal of contracts for tenured teachers. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-10-12 (1978). In light of
that statute the supreme court found that "the annual reemployment process resembles merely
a procedure for regular review of the teacher's performance rather than a procedure to 'approve the employment' of a teacher." 95 N.M. at 590, 624 P.2d at 532.
383. Id. at 591, 624 P.2d at 533. Under the test of ambiguity embraced by the court-"fairly
susceptible of different constructions by reasonably intellilgent men," id., the court virtually
conceded that any colorable or arguable claim that a statute could be subject to more than one
construction is sufficient to meet the ambiguity standard. But see Perea v. Baca, 94 N.M. 624,
614 P.2d 541 (1980).
384. Perea v. Baca, 94 N.M. 624, 614 P.2d 541 (1980), also decided this term, clearly demonstrates the result-oriented "labelling" approach. In Perea the petitioner had purchased a liquor license in one zone, then obtained its transfer to an area within that zone which overlapped with another zone. A subsequent application to transfer the license to an area solely
within the second zone was denied by the Director of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control. The district court granted petitioner a writ of mandamus ordering the transfer of the
license. The liquor director appealed, claiming that the practice of leapfrogging from one zone
to another by first obtaining a transfer to an overlapping buffer zone violated the Liquor Control Act.
On appeal the court affirmed the issuance of the writ. In doing so, the court looked to the
relevant statute and found that "[tihe statute authorizes the requested transfer [within the
Albuquerque zone]. The language of the statute is clear. There is no room for interpretation."
94 N.M. at 627, 614 P.2d at 544. The court took this mechanical approach despite the policy
implications in the statute precluding interzone transfers, noting only "[t]he fact that the
license was also in the Tijeras zone does not justify a departure from established rules of statutory construction." Id. For a discussion of the mandamus portion of the case, see text accompanying notes 482-495 infra.
385. Occasionally the court has merged the ambiguity question with the search for legislative intent. See State ex rel. Maloney v. Sierra, 82 N.M. 125, 134, 477 P.2d 301, 310 (1970):
"absent any clear intent expressed to the contrary, words are to have their ordinary and usual
meaning." Such an approach is inconsistent with the general view expressed in the New Mexico
cases that "the initial question presented is whether the meaning and application of the statute
" New Mexico State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ. of Alamo• . . isfree from doubt ..
gordo, 95 N.M. 588, 590, 624 P.2d 530, 532 (1981).
Bryant is an example of the confusion of the ambiguity notion with that of the search for legislative intent:
If, after applying the common, usual, ordinary and everyday meaning to
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It may be possible for a statute to be completely unambiguous, but
that would be a rarity."'6 The court, therefore, should abandon the
ambiguity issue entirely, and make explicit what is implicit in the
Bryant litigation-that the court must make a searching inquiry for
legislative intent. Where that intent is not clear, the court must, as
the final arbiter of the dispute, select that reading of the law which
furthers the societal goals behind the statute. Such an approach
would explicitly recognize the policy-setting role the court is often
called upon to assume. Performing the role and acknowledging it,
rather than performing it while disclaiming it, would be more forthright and, in the long run, would engender more respect for the court.
If the court honestly wishes to eschew this policy-making role, at
least in its review of law questions which arise in the administrative
context, then deference to agency interpretation is the appropriate
path.387 Deference to the agency interpretation would have brought
the supreme court in Bryant to the same conclusion it ultimately
reached. If, however, distrust of agency determinations of law lead
the court away from deference to agency interpretations, and it is
unwilling to forthrightly assume its policy-choosing role, then the
court forces itself into word-play over whether a given statute is or is
not ambiguous.
In one other case involving the scope of a statute governing agency
authority, 8 ' the court again confronted the standard to be applied
when deciding questions concerning the scope of a statute. In Human Rights Commission of New Mexico v. Board of Regents of the
University of New Mexico,38 ' the supreme court held that with
words in a statute, its meaning is unclear, the legislative intent clearly indicates
another meaning, or a different meaning must be applied to prevent absurdity,
then a statute may be declared ambiguous and resort may be had to the rules of
construction to determine its meaning.
95 N.M. at 622, 624 P.2d at 1019.
386. Under the supreme court formulation in Bryant, however, it is hard to see how any case
which results in litigation over the interpretation of a statutory term cannot meet the test. See
note 383 supra.
387. On the federal level, deference to agency interpretation is often relied upon to avoid
court imposed policy-making. Where an agency's interpretation of a statute is thoroughly
reasoned and consistently applied, the role of the reviewing court has been defined by the
Supreme Court: "not to interpret the statute as it thought best but rather the narrower inquiry
into whether the . . . [agency's] construction was 'sufficiently reasonable.' " Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 50 U.S.L.W. 4001,4004 (1981).
The accepted rationale is that if Congress disagrees with the agency it is for Congress to amend
the authorizing statute. See e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 8, 12 (1965).
388. Statutory interpretation in the administrative law area often involves the scope of
agency authority. In that context, the question can also be framed in terms of agency jurisdiction, or whether or not the agency acted ultra vires. See text accompanying notes 79-99 supra.
389. 95 N.M. 576, 624 P.2d 518 (1981). For an in-depth analysis of this case, see Note,
Human Rights Commission v. Board of Regents: Should a University be Considered a Public
Accommodation Under the New Mexico Human Rights Act?, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 541 (1982).
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respect to the manner and method of administering its academic program the university is not "a 'public accommodation' within the
meaning of New Mexico Human Rights Act. .. "390 The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a discrimination charge
brought by a nursing student who was given a failing grade. 9' The
court concluded that because the university is not a public accommoRights Commisdation within the meaning of the Act, the Human
39 2
sion did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim.
In Human Rights Commission, the court failed to afford even a
passing nod of deference to the Commission's finding that the statute applied. 3 93The court made an independent judgment of the statute's meaning. The court reached its conclusion on the basis of its
reading of the "historical and traditional meanings as to what constitutes a 'public accommodation,' "9' as well as its understanding
of the legislative intent in light of the fact that prior New Mexico
anti-discrimination law did not include universities within the specifically enumerated list of public accommodations. 9 5
390. 95 N.M. at 577, 624 P.2d at 519.
391. The complainant charged that the University had discriminated against her on the basis
of race "by giving her a failing grade in a clinical nursing course and then refusing to provide
an opportunity for her to immediately retake the course." Id. at 576, 624 P.2d at 518. The
commission found that the University had exercised great flexibility with respect to most students, but that "contrary to its practice with other students, the University had taken a very inflexible position with respect to Tyler, and concluded that the inflexibility was based on Tyler's
race." Id.
392. Id. at 578, 624 P.2d at 520.
393. As a threshold matter, the Commission must have determined that the statute applied
to the University. These kinds of determinations of authority are most often left to the agency.
See e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941). See generally, Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 470 (1950). The scope of review question in this context necessarily implicates the ultra vires doctrine. See text accompanying notes
52-99 supra.
394. 95 N.M. at 577, 624 P.2d at 519. The court looked to the common law definition of
public accommodations-places of lodging, entertainment, and public transportation-to inform its judgment. Id.
395. Id. at 578, 624 P.2d at 520. Under previous anti-discrimination statutes, 1955 N.M.
Laws. ch. 192, §§ 1-7 and 1963 N.M. Laws ch. 202, § 1, universities were not listed within specifically enumerated public accommodations. The court concluded from this history: "that the
legislature, by including a general, inclusive clause in the Human Rights Act, . . . [did not intend] to have all establishments that were historically excluded, automatically included as public accommodations subject to the Human Rights Act." 95 N.M. at 578, 624 P.2d at 520. The
reference to the historical meaning
court was obviously searching for legislative intent. Yet its
of the term "public accommodations" linked this consideration to the question of whether the
statute was ambiguous. The court then went on to merge the two questions. "We look to the
previous act for guidance and should, unless the contrary is apparent, construe the wording of
the statute in its ordinary and usual sense." Id. This language indicates that the history of a
term will be part of its "plain meaning." Thus the court may look to statutory history, extrinsic evidence, in considering whether a statute is ambiguous.
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The Human Rights Commission court was clearly troubled by the
possible consequences of its holding. The holding implies that the
university is not subject to state anti-discrimination laws. The court
sought to avoid this implication by expressly reserving "whether
under a different set of [non-academic] circumstances the University
would be a 'public accommodation,' and subject to the jurisdiction
of the Human Rights Commission." 39 6 This reservation, however, is
unsupported by the legal analysis used. The statutory history cited
by the court did not suggest that it was only in the conduct of their
academic programs that universities are not public accommodations, but rather that universities in general are not public accommodations. The court was trapped by its attempt to decide the case on
purely legal, rather than policy grounds. The legal analysis leads to a
result so extreme that it requires limitation as a matter of policy. By
failing to give some consideration to the remedial nature of the
Human Rights Act, as a valid external criteria,39 7 and by attempting
to resolve the case solely as a matter of statutory construction rather
than a balancing of competing policies, the court was forced to embrace a limitation foreign to its own analysis.399
Human Rights Commission makes a silent statement about the
principle of deference to agency interpretation of its enabling statute. In Human Rights Commission, the court did not even suggest
the possibility of such deference. Human Rights Commission, Perea
v. Baca39 9 and the Bryant litigation all demonstrate that judicial

396. Id. This limitation could make some sense if, for example, the present case were contrasted with a claim brought against a university for discrimination in the assignment of oncampus housing, or the allocation of meal privileges in on-campus dining facilities in a public
university. Both of these factors would fall within even the most traditional definitions of
public accommodations. However, the court left no logical room for these kinds of distinctions.
397. It is a well accepted principle that remedial statutes are to be broadly construed to encourage the fullest accomplishment of their underlying remedial purposes. See e.g., United
States v. Beach Assocs., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1968) (federal Civil Rights Act);
Security Trust v. Smith, 93 N.M. 35, 596 P.2d 248 (1979) (State Workmen's Compensation
Act); Parsons v. Employment Security Comm'n, 71 N.M. 405, 397 P.2d 57 (1963) (State Unemployment Compensation Statute).
398. The court might have achieved its result in a more satisfactory fashion by adopting a
reading of the statute which included the university as a public accommodation within the
meaning of the Act, and then reaching the merits of the claim. It may be that the court saw the
public accommodation issue as an easy way out because of the difficulty of considering discrimination claims in the delicate context of academic evaluations. Cf. Board of Curators of
the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
399. 94 N.M. 624, 614 P.2d 541 (1980). See note 384 supra for a discussion of this case.
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3. Questions of Fact-Applying the Substantial Evidence Standard
There is a tension which exists in the New Mexico cases'I between

the traditional "substantial evidence" standard40 2 and the laterdeveloped "whole record" variation of that standard." 3 That tension was highlighted this term in Jones v. Employment Services Division. 40 Another case decided this year, American Automobile Association v. State Corporation Commission"°5 (AAA), raises the
threshold question which often accompanies the application of the
substantial evidence standard-what it is that the evidence must substantiate. The former case helps explain how the standard ought to
apply. The latter case demonstrates that substantive law issues can
be resolved under the rubric of the substantial evidence standard.
In Jones v. Employment Services Division,"°6 the supreme court
affirmed a district court ruling that the Employment Services Division had properly denied unemployment compensation benefits to
Jones. The court held, inter alia,4 7 that there was substantial
400. Another level of the deference question is involved when the courts are called upon to
review agency interpretations of their own regulations as opposed to state statutes. There too,
the New Mexico courts have not been deferential to agency expertise. See e.g., Hughes v. State
ex rel. Human Servs. Dep't., 95 N.M. 739, 626 P.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1980). In such cases, the
court considers the entire statutory scheme of the agency and judges the agency interpretation
of the regulation in light of the statutory purposes. See id. at 740, 626 P.2d at 277.
401. See 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 26-29.
402. "Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." American Auto. Assoc. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 95
N.M. 227, 228, 620 P.2d 881, 882 (1980) citing Rinker v. State Corp. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626,
506 P.2d 783 (1973); Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Co., 78 N.M. 86, 428 P.2d 625 (1976).
Under the traditional standard every inference must be drawn in support of the decision.
Public Serv. Co. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 92 N.M. 721, 594 P.2d 1177 (1979). The
similarity or difference between the substantial evidence test applied to a trial court's judgment, and the substantial evidence applied to an agency decision, is less than clear. See, e.g., K.
Davis, Administrative Law Text §29.02 (1972).
403. The whole record standard, enacted by Congress as part of the Federal Administrative
Procedures Act in 1946, see 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), requires that an agency decision be set aside
when the court "cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the . . . [agency's] view." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.). See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-19 (1978) (whole record
standard in the state Administrative Procedures Act).
404. 95 N.M. 97, 619 P.2d 542 (1980).
405. 95 N.M. 227, 620 P.2d 881 (1980).
406. 95 N.M. 97, 619 P.2d 542 (1980).
407. The court also addressed the standing of the employer to appeal from the agency ruling, which granted benefits to the employee. The employer had failed to return a form which
precluded the right to be heard within the agency. This failure suggests that the employer sub-
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evidence to support both the agency finding that the appellant had
failed to notify the employer of his impending absence from work, '
and the district court's conclusion that the employee's termination
resulted from his own misconduct."' 9
In a compelling dissent, Justice Felter condemned the failure of
the court to adopt and apply the whole record standard. He also
noted the court's disregard of both the remedial nature of the unemployment compensation statute and of its own ruling six months
earlier in Trujillo v. Employment Security Commission.I10
Justice Felter admitted that the federal origin of the whole record
standard does not govern New Mexico law, but he concluded that
the whole record standard "carries with it a more providential approach to judicial review of administrative acts which should be
adopted by this Court." ' 4' Applying the higher standard of review
required by a consideration of the entire record,"1 2 Justice Felter
mitted to a final determination by the agency. The court concluded, however, that the failure
to return the form did not foreclose the statutorily authorized judicial review rights of the
employer as an "interested party." Id. at 99, 619 P.2d at 544.
408. The court made a cursory review of the facts. Those facts indicated that Jones, a truck
driver, returned from a trip in the early evening, but did not punch out until later that night, in
violation of ICC regulations; that he reported being ill but agreed to take a later run on the following day; and that he failed to report his inability to do so in accordance with the time requirements of company policy. Id. at 99-100, 619 P.2d at 544-45. It is clear that the court applied the traditional substantial evidence standard, from the fact that it failed to give weight to
contrary evidence, which a "whole record" standard would have required. The court stated:
"The findings of the tribunal are not unsubstantiated simply because the evidence may be conflicting [citations omitted]. Although the evidence is conflicting, we find substantial evidence
which supports the findings of the appeals tribunal." Id. at 99, 619 P.2d at 544.
409. The court recognized that "mere absence or tardiness alone, without unheeded warnings or past history of absence . . ." is hardly sufficient to support a conclusion of employee
misconduct, id. at 100, 619 P.2d at 545. In rather bootstrap fashion, however, the court made
of the single incident three separate acts of "misconduct": 1)clocking in late in violation of the
ICC regulations, 2) failure to timely report an inability to take a shift, and 3) failure to report
periodically while ill. Id. This characterization of the facts allowed the court to conclude that
while "[ijndividually these incidents may not have been enough to constitute misconduct, ...
taken together they do." Id.
410. 94 N.M. 343, 610 P.2d 747 (1980).
411. 95 N.M. at 101,619 P.2d at 546.
412. The additional portions of the record brought out by the dissent are indeed compelling:
During petitioner's long working day on May 15, 1978, he felt ill and nauseated
having had diarrhea all day at the job site. He was physically and emotionally exhausted and told the Big Three dispatcher he was sick and wanted to be taken off
the dispatching board. According to the petitioner, Mike Chandler never told
him he was to make an 8:00 a.m. run on May 16, although Mr. Chandler was irritated that petitioner was not going to make a run at 1:30 a.m., just two hours
after petitioner clocked in after a 21 hour day.
. Since he lived by himself and thought he might be seriously ill, he went
to the house of some friends, waking them up during the early hours of May 16.
He went to bed at their house, but was unable to fall asleep until 4:00 a.m. Dur-

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

concluded that there was not substantial evidence to support the
decision of the court 4 3 and that "the acts of Mr. Jones do not rise to
the level of misconduct contemplated by the statute. . . .
Justice Felter also noted that because of the remedial nature of the
Unemployment Compensation statute,' the definition of "misconduct" should be strictly construed against the forfeiture of benefits.
Finally, the dissent points out that two critical findings against Jones
were supported only by hearsay testimony.4 6 A result based on such
evidence, according to the dissent, cannot be sustained under the
"legal residuum" rule as applied in Trujillo, which requires at least
ing the afternoon of May 16, 1978, petitioner awoke and went to see his physician, Dr. Don Hedges, who diagnosed his condition as physical and mental fatigue . ..
After coming back from the doctor's office, at approximately 6:30 p.m. on
May 16, 1978, petitioner called the Big Three plant and talked to two employees
of Big Three, including Mr. Gene Buck, an operator at the plant ....
After speaking with Gene Buck and his friend, Don Moore, petitioner went
back to bed and did not get up for more than twenty hours. When he awoke he
felt able to go back to work so he called the plant and asked the dispatcher, Mike
Chandler, to put him back on the board. Mr. Chandler then informed petitioner
that he had been fired.
95 N.M. at 102-103, 619 P.2d at 547-548.
413. 95 N.M. at 104, 619 P.2d at 549. With some justification, Justice Felter accused the
majority of affording a scanty evidentiary review: "This Court has said in effect that its job is
done when it finds that there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the administrative
decision and that it need look no further once that point is reached." 95 N.M. at 100, 619 P.2d
at 545. This cursory glance, according to Judge Felter, did not fulfill the court's duty of review.
414. 95 N.M. at 104, 619 P.2d at 549. Justice Feter and the majority agreed on the appropriate definition of misconduct:
[M]isconduct . . . is limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violations or disregard
of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employee, or carelessness or negligence of such degree or reoccurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design or to show unintentional and
substantial disregard of the employer's interest or the employee's duties and
obligations to his employer.
Id. at 100, 619 P.2d at 545, quoting from Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 259-60,
296 N.M. 636, 640 (1941) (adopted as the New Mexico standard in Mitchell v. Lovington Good
Samaritan Center, Inc., 89 N.M. 575, 555 P.2d 696 (1976)). What they disagreed on was
whether that standard had been met in this case.
415. The statute reads:
[Elconomic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health,
morals and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is
therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now
so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family.
The achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest
hazard of our economic life.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §51-1-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
416. The hearsay testimony concerned whether Jones agreed to report at 8:00 a.m. on May
16, and whether he intentionally violated ICC clocking-out regulations. 94 N.M. at 106, 619
P.2d at 557.
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some residuum of evidence admissible in a court of law before the
"substantial right" of unemployment benefits can be taken away." 7
Jones, therefore, raises two critical points about the substantial
evidence standard. First, as argued by Justice Felter, the facts and
circumstances of the case demonstrate why it is necessary for the
supreme court to accept the whole record standard." 8 It is clearly the
more prudential standard, and would preclude the court from reading and relying on only one side of the case. In Jones, the majority
virtually ignored the portions of the record contrary to its holding." ' 9
This may have led to an inequitable result. As Jones illustrates,
failure to apply the whole record standard means the courts can
avoid the full and complete exercise of independent judgment which
must be afforded 4to20 assure fairness in the application of any administrative standard.
The second point that Jones raises is also discussed in the dissent.
The dissent raises the essential difficulty of the interplay between the
substantial evidence standard and the legal residuum rule. ' 2' A lit417. Under a literal reading of Trujillo, receipt of unemployment benefits is a "substantial
right as a matter of public policy." Therefore, any action depriving someone of that right must
be " 'based upon such substantial evidence as would support a verdict in a court of law.' "
Trujillo v. Employment Security Comm'n, 94 N.M. 343, 344, 610 P.2d 747, 748 (1980) (quoting Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 81 N.M. 5, 9,462 P.2d 139, 142 (1969); see text accompanying notes 257-269 supra.
418. See 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 28.
419. Criticism of just such an approach was one of the factors leading to the adoption of the
whole record standard in the federal APA. Justice Frankfurter noted the concern of the dissenting members of the Attorney General's Committee on the Walter-Logan Bill, who as early
as 1939, pointed out the impropriety of a standard which allows a reviewing court to ignore
portions of the record. These members suggested that "judicial review" could extend to "findings, inferences, or conclusions of fact unsupported, upon the whole record, by substantial evidence." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 484 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.).
420. See id.
421. Professor Davis has argued forcefully that:
[Tihe strongest reason against the residuum rule is the lack of correlation between reliability of evidence and the exclusionary rules of evidence. The exclusionary rules were designed for guiding admission or exclusion of evidence, not
for weighing its reliability, and were designed for juries, not for administrators.
Wigmore said that the residuum rule "is not acceptable" because it rests upon
the fallacy "that this 'residuum of legal evidence' which is to be indispensable,
will have some necessary relation to the truth of the finding. But the 'legal' rules
have no such necessary relation. . . .This 'residuum' rule, then, is decidedly
not the wise and satisfactory rule for general adoption. . . . Let us remember
that the greatest part of the community's industrial, commercial and financial
activity already functions on a solid basis of fact determined without any formal
rules of proof. Let us, here too, put our trust in men and minds, rather than in
rules."
Davis, Administrative Law Text § 14.07 at 279, quoting I Wigmore, Evidence §4b (3rd ed.
1940).
The gathering of administrative evidence ought to be less rigid and more informal than in the
courts, giving probative effect to evidence of a type "commonly relied upon by reasonably pru-
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eral application of Trujillo to the facts in Jones would undoubtedly
require a reversal of the district court 2 2 because, although there is
substantial evidence to support the district court holding, the evidence would not be admissible in a court of law. The court must at
some point address the question of when and under what circumstances the legal residuum rule will serve to limit the substantial evidence standard by requiring that some residuum of the evidence be
admissible. It is a significant issue, and we are not well served by a
judicial approach which merely avoids the matter.
Finally, Jones suggests another consideration which affects the
application of the substantial evidence doctrine when judicial review
of an agency's decision advances to the appellate level. The United
States Supreme Court recently indicated that when an appellate
court is confronted with a substantial evidence case after one level of
judicial review has been afforded, its role is limited to a consideration of whether "the standard was misapprehended or grossly misapplied"" rather than a de novo determination of the substantial
evidence balance. In Jones, as in virtually every other case involving
state supreme court judicial review after an initial review at a lower
level, 2 ' our supreme court engaged in a de novo substantial evidence
review.4 " The practice of de novo review in these circumstances
should be reconsidered. Where judicial review runs in the first indent men in the conduct of their affairs." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-11 (1978) (State APA standard). If the use of the residuum rule is permitted to confuse the question of weight to be given
to evidence with questions of admissibility, it might undercut the traditional leeway given to
agencies to hear whatever evidence is relevant and probative, without regard for its admissibility. See generally, Utton, SubstantialEvidence to Review Administrative Findings of Fact in
New Mexico, 10 N.M.L. Rev. 103 (1979-80).
422. Trujillo can be read more narrowly to require reversal on the basis of the legal
residuum rule only when benefits are denied on the basis of controverted hearsay alone. Trujillo v. Emplyoment Sec. Comm'n, 94 N.M. 343, 344, 610 P.2d 747, 748 (1980).
423. American Textile Mfg. Co. v. Donovan, 49 U.S.L.W. 4720, 4729 (June 17, 1981).
Justice Stewart, dissenting on the substantial evidence point, concluded "this is one of those
rare instances where an agency has categorically misconceived the nature of the evidence necessary to support a regulation." Id. at 4734.
424. See e.g., New Mexico Dept. of Human Servs. v. Garcia, 94 N.M. 175, 608 P.2d 151
(1980). In Garcia the Supreme Court not only reassessed the substantial evidence balance, it
misapplied the statutory standard involved. See 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra
note 54, at 28-29.
425. The second appeal to our supreme court may often be a matter of right as distinguished
from the discretionary review in the United States Supreme Court. In New Mexico, where the
initial review is to the district court, the statute usually provides for appeal to the supreme
court as a matter of right. See e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §51-1-8(M) (1978) (unemployment compensation cases) and N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-11-7 (1978) (appeals from Public Service Commission). The United States Supreme Court has discretion over what appeals it will hear. See 28
U.S.C. § 1254(l) (1976) and Sup. Ct. R. 17. This distinction, however, does not justify a different result. In either circumstance, the appellant has already received one complete substantial
evidence review. Another full review would be expensive and redundant.
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stance to a lower court, a more limited review on a subsequent appeal to the supreme court would serve several important interests. It
could conserve judicial time and energy and would respect the decision-making role of the initial reviewing court."2 6 Such a procedure
would also preserve for the supreme court its proper role of reviewing law rather than fact questions.
American Automobile Association v. State CorporationCommission"2 7 demonstrates that when the substantial evidence standard is
applied it often raises other significant judicial review considerations. AAA involved an application by the New Mexico Wrecker
Operations Association for a rate change. AAA intervened in the action, claiming that the rates sought were excessive. After two sets of
hearings and a staff report, the Commission adopted a rate schedule
for state-wide use from which AAA appealed. The district court affirmed the order of the Commission, but the supreme court reversed.
The court concluded "that the Commission's order is not based on
substantial evidence in that the sample on which it is based does not
fairly represent the wrecker industry in New Mexico." 2
The important part of the AAA case was not the court's substantial evidence ruling, but rather its legal conclusion that in performing
its rate-setting function "the Commission must take a state-wide
sample which must include large and small operators and be representative." '2 9 Because the Commission did not meet that legal
requirement, the court concluded that there was not substantial evidence to support the Commission's conclusion. Thus, the Commis426. This increased respect is particularly important where the legislature has placed the initial stage of review in a specific court. In those instances where the legislature has reposed initial review in the court of appeals, see e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §27-3-4 (1978) (public assistance
appeals); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 74-1-9 (1978) (environmental appeals, or in one particular district
court, see, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §63-9-13 (1978) (telephone company orders of the corporation commission appealable to the district court for Santa Fe County), expertise should be

allowed to develop. One way to develop that expertise is for the supreme court to withdraw
from plenary review to a more removed role of assuring only the accuracy of the legal standard
applied by the lower court.

Where initial review lies in the district courts in general, perhaps there is greater reason for
substantive review by the supreme court. First, with diverse district courts making the initial
review, there may be no particular expertise being developed. Second, with so many courts involved, the supreme court may need to oversee the cases to assure uniformity and consistency
of application of the law.
427. 95 N.M. 227, 620 P.2d 881 (1980).
428. Id. at 229, 620 P.2d at 883. At the first hearing, the Commission heard testimony from
six wrecker operators from Gallup, Albuquerque, and San Ysidro. The commission then sent a
staff team to Gallup to audit the two wreckers from that area who had testified. At its second
hearing the commission received a rate proposal from the staff which it modified before adoption for state-wide use. Id. at 228, 620 P.2d at 882.
429. Id. at 229, 620 P.2d at 883.
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sion's decision was not reversed for its failure to meet an evidentiary
standard. The decision was reversed for its failure to follow what the
court on review imposed as the process of decision-making necessary
for the Commission to carry out its statutory duty of setting just and
reasonable rates. 30
The courts must be cautious, of course, not to remake clear statutory standards.13' Judicial guidance is appropriate, however, where

the statutory standard is so broad and general as to provide no real
guidance for the agency or litigants before it. In those instances, an
agency would be well advised to articulate definable standards for
itself. 43 2 It is essential, however, for the court to review those
agency-imposed standards; in the process the judiciary becomes directly involved in the standard-setting itself.433 AAA serves as an example of judicial involvement, under the guise of the application of
the substantial evidence test.
430. The "just and reasonable" standard is an extremely general one. Agencies, however,
sometimes flesh out extremely general standards by imposing their own procedures, thereby
avoiding delegation problems. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workers v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 759 (D.D.C. 1971)
(Leventhal, J.) (Three-Judge Court).
This problem is usually couched in non-delegation terms, and the administrative gap-filling
is used to avoid the invalidation of an otherwise impermissibly broad delegation of authority.
Such was the case in both Yakus and Amalgamated Meat Cutters. See also text accompanying
notes 23-31, supra. However, the "just and reasonable" rule-making standard has been uniformly upheld against non-delegation attack. See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 600 (1944).
The AAA court analyzed the nature and scope of agency review as one involving the responsibility of the commission "to be thorough in its decision making." 95 N.M. at 229, 620 P.2d
at 883. In that regard, the court-imposed state-wide sampling procedure resembles more a judicial inquiry at whether the commission took "a 'hard look' at the salient problems" before
making its decision. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). For a discussion of the "hard look" doctrine, see notes 349 & 362 supra.
431. For example, in Greyhound Lines v. New Mexico St. Corp. Comm'n, 94 N.M. 496,
612 P.2d 1307 (1980), the court recognized that the statutory standard contained in N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 65-2-7 (1978) required the commission to determine whether "there is a public need for
the proposed additional service and [whether] . . . the existing facilities are . . . reasonably
adequate." 94 N.M. at 498, 612 P.2d at 1309. This kind of standard needs no elaboration. The
role of the reviewing court is merely to see that the standard is properly applied, and that properly admitted evidence is sufficient to support a conclusion based on the standard. For a discussion of Greyhound in its process of proof posture see text accompanying notes 270-278 supra.
432. See note 430 supra. But see, Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1700-01 (1975).
433. See American Auto. Ass'n v. State Corp. Comm'n, 95 N.M. 227, 620 P.2d 881 (1980).
Even Justice Rehnquist has acknowledged that the legislature need not fill in all the blanks
while setting standards for administrative agencies. It is only complete legislative abdication of
the more difficult policy-making aspect of setting standards which, in his view, ought to trigger
use of the nondelegation doctrine. American Textile Mfg. Co. v. Donovan, 49 U.S.L.W. 4720,
4735 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is therefore appropriate, if not necessary, for the agency
and the courts do to the blank-filling when that becomes necessary.
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C. Res Judicata& Estoppel"3 "
The doctrine of res judicata operates to preclude the relitigation of
claims or issues when a reasonable opportunity has been afforded to
'
The
the parties to litigate those claims or issues at an earlier time. 35
doctrine arose in the context of traditional civil litigation and is
designed to allow parties and others to rely on the finality of a decision in ordering their subsequent affairs.436 Early cases suggested
that res judicata principles do not apply to administrative deci'
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Utah
sions. 37
Construction and Mining Co., "3 ' however, stated the prevailing
modern view: "When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial
capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it,
which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the
courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.'"3

434. Last year's cases touched upon administrative estoppel, see 1979-80 Administrative
Law Survey, supra note 54, at 30-33. This year saw only minor treatment of res judicata, and
no cases on estoppel.
435. Restatement of the Law of Judgments9 (1942).
436. Id. For a discussion of the principle in the context of traditional civil litigation see
generally, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata,65 Harv. L. Rev. 818 (1952); Cleary, Res
JudicataReexamined, 57 Yale L. J. 339 (1948).
437. See, e.g., Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281 (1906).
438. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
439. Id. at 421-22. In matters involving administrative res judicata the initial inquiry involves the provisions of the governing statute. Where the statute provides for or allows a reconsideration or modification of the initial agency decision, then the statutory authority will control to allow relitigation despite res judicata. See Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n.
Inc., 390 U.S. 459 (1968) (Relitigation of compensation claim allowed when new evidence discovered despite res judicata because statute allowed reconsideration on grounds of changed
conditions or mistake in determination of fact). Where a statute or regulation does not confer
reopening power, however, and the case resembles a traditional judicial action, it is more likely
that res judicata principles will apply.
When the prior decision involves uniquely administrative functions, in which public interest
considerations predominate, a more flexible approach is taken toward res judicata principles.
The essential consideration is whether "application of res judicata principles unduly impede
the agency's effectuation of the social objectives which the legislature has committed to its
care." W. Gellhorn, supra note 27, at 403-04. In licensing, for example, the public interest
considerations in the granting of a license must have been held to outweigh the reliance by competitors on an initial denial. Mulcahy v. Public Service Comm'n, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298
(1941). Similarly, res judicata has been rejected in the rate-making context: "[tihe appropriateness of a particular rate schedule typically depends on factual circumstances and policy considerations which change dratistically, and often quite rapidly over time. A doctrine barring all
reconsideration would seem to be contrary to sound regulatory policy." Borough of Lansdale
v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 494 F.2d 1104, 1115, n. 45 (D.C. Cir. 1974), quoting K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1802 at 548 (1958).
In a recent New Mexico case the supreme court failed to follow the Borough of Lansdaleapproach and upheld an application of res judicata principles to rate-making. Hobbs Gas Co. v.
New Mexico Public Serv. Comm'n, 94 N.M. 731, 616 P.2d 1116 (1980) involved a utility appeal from a Commission order denying a rate increase. The district court overturned the order,
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This term the New Mexico Supreme Court in State ex rel Reynolds
v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc.,'"' confronted one narrow aspect of the
application of res judicata to the administrative process-that of the
res judicata impact of a prior agency proceeding on subsequent court
litigation."'I In Reynolds, the subdivision had applied for a permit to
repair a well. The State engineer granted the permit subject to the
condition that in the process the well would not be deepened or the
diameter enlarged. No appeal was taken from that decision. It was
subsequently found that the well could not be repaired. Rio Rancho
then applied for a permit to move the well, and to increase its diameter. That permit was granted, but the initially imposed limitations
on size were retained. On de novo review the district court found
that Rio Rancho had a right to construct the well, and that the size
limitation could not be imposed. The supreme court affirmed, holding inter alia4 4 2 that the doctrine of administrative res judicata did
not apply to bar litigation of the depth of the well and diameter of
the pipe.
The court applied the principle that res judicata, or issue preclusion, will attach only when the prior case actually addressed the issue
in a manner that was essential to the decision. 4 3 In Reynolds, the initial application had not requested a change in the amount of the
concluding that the order was arbitrary and capricious" and unsupported by substantial evidence. The supreme court affirmed the district court.
One of the issues on appeal in Hobbs Gas Co. involved whether the district court erred in applying res judicata principles to bar the Commission from disallowing a plant acquisition adjustment from the company's equity capital-a step which was contrary to the previous policy
of the Commission and previous rate-making orders of the Commission. 94 N.M. at 735, 616
P.2d at 1120. The court held that the application of res judicata (and collateral estoppel) principles was not in error in that case. Id. at 736, 616 P.2d at 1121. The court limited its holding to
the facts of the case, however, out of a concern that its holding "not restrict the ability of the
Commission to adapt to changes in circumstances in the rate-making determination from one
year to the next." Id. The parameters of the limitation are unclear, however, and the holding in
Hobbs Gas Co. creates a hurdle for future rate-making policy changes by the Commission.
440. 95 N.M. 560,624 P.2d 502 (1981).
441. The range of administrative res judicata problems is truly expansive. The usual context
involves matters of agency reconsideration, but the issue can arise over the extent to which one
agency must give res judicata effect to the decision of a sister agency, as well as the res judicata
impact of a court decision in a subsequent agency proceeding. See generally, Markley, Conflict
in the Courts: NLRB Decisions as Res Judicatain Section 303 Suits, 27 Admin. L. Rev. 83
(1975); Note, The Preclusive Effect of State Agency Findings in FederalAgency Proceedings,
64 Iowa L. Rev. 339 (1979); Comment, Application of Res Judicatato Agencies with Parallel
Jurisdictions,52 Denver L. J. 595 (1975).
442. The main point on appeal involved the court's affirmance of the lower court's conclusion that the Mendenhall doctrine afforded Rio Rancho an inchoate water right not subject to
size limitations. 95 N.M. at 564, 624 P.2d at 506; see State v. Mendenhall, 68 N.M. 467, 362
P.2d 998 (1961).
443. 95 N.M. at 562, 624 P.2d at 506, quoting Paulos v. Janetakos, 46 N.M. 390, 393, 129
P.2d 636, 638 (1942).
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water, "nor was a statement of limitation of the right required for
the State Engineer to grant [the initial] approval." 4 ' The court concluded that "the State Engineer's [initial] determination did not bar
the subsequent litigation of those issues here.""' 5
The Reynolds court properly reasoned that "[a] party should not
be required to litigate every incidental matter which might come up
in the course of a proceeding before the State Engineer or forever
lose its claim."" ' 6 This rationale underlies the general principle that
res judicata will not attach to issues not litigated when not essential
to the earlier decision. 4 7 Reynolds highlights the importance of insuring that the policy-making processes of administrative agencies
remain open for full consideration, and are not foreclosed by an unbalanced concern for finality.

D. Limitations on JudicialReview-Exhaustion and PrimaryJurisdiction
During the Survey year, one decision, First CentralService Corporation v. Mountain Bell Telephone,""8 involved exhaustion and primary jurisdiction considerations. 4 9 Hernandez v. Home Education
Livelihood Program, Inc., 50 although not arising in the administrative context, also raised administrative exhaustion considerations.
In First Central, the plaintiff, a subscriber to Mountain Bell services, sought to retain the telephone number of its predecessor subscriber. Mountain Bell conditioned its approval of the request upon
plaintiff's agreeing to pay the indebtedness of its predecessor. 45, The
plaintiff refused and sought relief in the district court. From an
444. 95 N.M. at 562, 624 P.2d at 506.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. See Paulos v. Janetakos, 46 N.M. 390, 129 P.2d 636 (1942).
448. 95 N.M. 509, 623 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1981).
449.
These are two of several doctrines which limit judicial review of administrative decisions. One commentator has stated: "[all of these doctrines . . . presuppose that administrative action may be subject to review in appropriate circumstances, although not necessarily
at the behest of this plaintiff (standing) or at this time (ripeness, exhaustion, primary jurisdiction)." G. Robinson, E. Gellhorn, & H. Bruff, The Administrative Process 207 (West. 1979).
Last year's survey gave substantial treatment to venue as a tangential limitation on judicial
review of administrative decision-making. 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54,
at 33-36.
450. 95 N.M. 281,620 P.2d 1306 (1980).
451. The relevant phone company tariff, approved by the State Corporation Commission,
provides: "In any case where existing service is continued for a new subscriber, the telephone
number may be retained by the new subscriber only if the former subscriber consents and an
arrangement acceptable to the Telephone Company is made to pay all outstanding charges
against the service." Id. at 511, 623 P.2d at 1025 (quoting Mountain Bell's General Exchange
Tariff, Section 20, paragraph N(2) (Sixth Revised Sheet) (emphasis by the court deleted).
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adverse ruling, plaintiff appealed. 5 2 The court of appeals upheld the
district court, holding that the utility had an absolute right to withhold the use of any given telephone number. 4"
The court expressly rejected an exhaustion defense put forward by
Mountain Bell, although a ruling on that issue was unnecessary to
the decision."' Mountain Bell argued that the New Mexico Constitution455 and a state statute4 56 granted exclusive jurisdiction to the
State Corporation Commission, requiring exhaustion of commission
remedies as a precondition to judicial review.
The court conceded that the complaint could have been filed with
the Corporation Commission in the first instance, but held that the
plaintiff was not required to file with the Commission.5 7 The court
reasoned that "[n]o utility commission or state agency should be
allowed to usurp the jurisdiction granted district 4courts
under Article
58
VI, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution."
452. The district court entered a temporary restraining order and continued the TRO pending appeal despite the adverse ruling on the merits. At the time of the court of appeals' decision, therefore, plaintiff retained use of the phone number in dispute.
453. The court of appeals also dissolved the temporary restraining order and ordered the
discontinuation of service under the contested number "unless First Central pays the outstanding charges against this service." 95 N.M. at 513, 623 P.2d at 1027.
454. Because the court ruled for Mountain Bell on the merits, it was unnecessary for the
court to consider Mountain Bell's alternative theory-that plaintiff's case should be dismissed
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
In theory, the exhaustion question is a threshold matter, the resolution of which could obviate the need for consideration of the merits. The court, by first resolving the merits in favor
of the phone company, relegated the exhaustion discussion to the status of dicta.
455. N.M. Const. art. 11, §7.
456. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 63-9-11 (A) (1978).
457. Smith v. Southern Union Gas Co., 58 N.M. 197, 269 P.2d 745 (1945) held to the contrary with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, but the First
Central court distinguished Smith on the ground that the Public Service Commission's jurisdiction is "general and exclusive" whereas the Corporation Commission's jurisdiction under the
Telephone and Telegraph Company Certification Act was read to be permissive and concurrent with the district court. 95 N.M. at 513,623 P.2d at 1027.
A careful reading of N.M. Stat. Ann. §63-9-11 (1978) and related sections does not support
the court's permissive reading. First, the statute lays out an elaborate procedural mechanism
for the conduct of hearings on complaints. Second, the hearing on the complaint results in an
order, N.M. Stat. Ann. §63-9-1 1(D) (1978), which is judicially reviewable as any other order of
the Commission. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §63-9-13 (1978). Finally, the statute specifically confers only on the Commission the authority to use the courts to enforce the Act or Commission
regulations issued thereunder. N.M. Stat. Ann. §63-9-19 (1978).
This elaborate statutory scheme suggests that matters concerning the regulation of telephone
companies were intended to be left to the Commission, even though the legislature did not use
the "general and exclusive" language found in the Public Service Commission statute. In any
event, consideration of that question merited more than offhand treatment. The First Central
court answered the argument only by reference to dicta in Smith to the effect that litigants
ought not be forced into an administrative arena "at the whim of . . . the commission.
. ."95 N.M. at 573,623 P.2d at 1027.
458. Id.
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This minor and unnecessary portion of the First Central opinion
contorted the law of exhaustion. First, the court confused the interplay between exhaustion and primary jurisdiction. Second, the court
failed to acknowledge the policies which underlie those doctrines,
and in the process stood exhaustion on its head. The court incorrectly viewed exhaustion as a doctrine which can usurp judicial authority, ' when in fact exhaustion is a judicially imposed mechanism to assure that judicial review is orderly, expeditious and does not
usurp agency authority. 60
The doctrines of exhaustion and primary jurisdiction must be
carefully separated. Exhaustion, according to Justice Brandeis, is
"the long-settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. ' '4 6' The doc459. The anti-agency animus implied in the First Central opinion evokes a nostalgic notion
of self-reliance rooted in the notion that less government intervention in private matters makes
for a better society. It is more likely that the administrative state will not only remain with us,
but will continue to grow for three important reasons:
First, escape from the administrative state would not mean escape from the
administered society. The latter is ubiquitous and exists in both public and
private sectors: for the business of society, the whole of society, is conducted by
organizations with specialized functions. On the private side, organizationscorporations, unions, associations-are now the dominant factor in the economy. . . . Man is, in other words, inescapably a subject of private administration.
Second, the ballot of the market place does not provide to man an adequate
means of protecting and promoting his interests. Man casts his ballot much more
frequently in the market place than he does in the political system. He votes
when he chooses a product, or elects to buy or not to buy, to sell or not to sell, to
borrow or not to borrow, to patronize one dealer rather than another. Yet in
spite of the multitude of individual ballots, continuously cast, there are grave
limitations on the capacity of the economic vote.
• . . Man has turned to politics and to creation of the administrative state because his ballot in the market place did not satisfy all of his interests.
Third, the public and the private sectors of the administered society are interlocked. The private sector is dependent upon the public, just as the public sector
is dependent upon the private. The private sector is propped, and serviced in innumerable ways by the administrative state.
E. Redford, Democracy in the AdministrativeState, 180-82 (1969).
460. The exhaustion doctrine is premised on notions of judicial economy and regard for the
relationship between courts and agencies:
A complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process. If he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts
may never have to intervene. And notions of administrative autonomy require
that the agency be given a chance to discover and correct its own errors. Finally,
it is possible that frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes
could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its
procedures.
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969).
461. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (Brandeis, J.).
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trine only applies to the timing of judicial review, and only comes
into play when there is some kind of agency action which is sought to
' When, however, the issue is whether it should be the
be reviewed. 62
court or an agency which takes the initial action, then the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction comes into play.4 63 Both primary jurisdiction
and exhaustion constrain court action and both are based on considerations for the proper relationship between court and agency. Primary jurisdiction concerns itself with the proper initial forum. Exhaustion is concerned only with the timing of judicial review once
there is agency action.
The First Central court's confusion between the two doctrines
emanates from the confusion in an earlier case, Smith v. Southern
Union Gas Co. "6 " Smith involved the determination of the appropriate utility rate schedule to be applied to the plaintiff. The court
held that exclusive original jurisdiction over the matter was conferred by statute on the Public Service Commission, 6 5 and that the
statute was not an unconstitutional usurpation of the general jurisdiction of the district court. 66 The phrase "exclusive, original juris462. " 'Exhaustion' applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an adminis" United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956). Extrative agency alone ..
haustion is used in four general circumstances: 1)to preclude resort to agency relief after the
expiration of a stated period of time; 2) to preclude the raising of an issue for the first time on
an appeal from an agency; 3) to prevent the thwarting of agency processes by litigants who seek
to wait until agency decisions are rendered before attacking agency processes; and 4) to prevent
premature challenges to agency decisions. See G. Robinson, supra note 448, at 235-39.
There are several recognized exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. It will not bar judicial action where the administrative remedy is inadequate. See Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United
States, 249 U.S. 557 (1919). Nor will exhaustion preclude judicial action where resort to the
agency process would in itself cause the legal cognizable injury, see Utah Fuel Co. v. National
Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939). Also the doctrine does not apply where the application of agency procedures could impinge upon constitutionally protected rights. See, e.g.,
Barney v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979). But see, Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3244 (1981).
463. The policy behind primary jurisdiction is that the expertise of the agency can best
decide certain questions, at least in the first instance.
"Primary jurisdiction," . . . applies where a claim is originally cognizable in
the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within
the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for
its views.
United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956). Primary jurisdiction is
rarely mandated by statute. It is a question of judicial recognition of a need for agency expertise in the resolution of a matter which is before the court.
464. 58 N.M. 197, 269 P.2d 745 (1954).
465. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-6-4 (1978).
466. The Smith court stated: "[Wihat has been done in the Public Utility Act is not a
deprivation or ouster of jurisdiction of the courts, but a postponement until the commission
has passed upon the complaint." 58 N.M. at 199, 219 P.2d at 747. While Smith may not have
articulated the usurpation question in delegation terms, see note 457, supra, the question is
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diction" can be read to include both a requirement of exhaustion insofar as the jurisdiction is exclusive, and an implication of the
policies behind primary jurisdiction insofar as the jurisdiction is
original. The Smith court was reading from the statute and did not
disentangle the two. The doctrines remained entangled in the First
Central decision.
The claims of the plaintiffs in Smith and First Central were very
much the same. Both cases involved a legal determination of the
meaning and applicability of an established tariff. The First Central
court distinguished Smith by noting that the statutory language involved is different. The Public Service Commission statute at issue
in Smith confers "general and exclusive power and jurisdiction to
regulate and supervise every public utility in respect to its . . . ser,""' whereas the Corporation Commission
vice regulations ....

statute at issue in First Central only states that complaint against the
phone company "may be made" by resort to the Commission. 6 '
The First Central court's reading of the telephone statute may be
subject to question. 6' 9 That reading, however, makes it very clear
that there is concurrent jurisdiction over this type of complaint-and
it is just that situation which renders the question one of primary jurisdiction rather than exhaustion. 70
Under primary jurisdiction, as articulated by our court in State ex
rel. Norvell v. Arizona Public Service Co.,4 7' the question should be

resolved in favor of the primary jurisdiction of the agency when, 1)
there is a potential for conflicting court decisions if uniform standards must be maintained under a pervasive regulatory scheme, or 2)
the issue is one involving experience and technical judgment within
the agency's area of particular competence.4 72 These factors seem to
most fundamentally whether the legislature may, without running afoul of separation of
powers, confer power on an agency which has the effect of depriving a court of judicial power
conferred by the Constitution. See generally text accompanying notes 34 & 35 supra.
467. 95 N.M. at 513, 623 P.2d at 1027.
468. Id. (emphasis by the court).
469. The statute uses the term "may" in a context which indicates that the word was used to
describe how agency complaints could be brought. In context, it does not read as suggesting
that there are complaint mechanisms other than the commission available. See note 457 supra.
470. See L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 121 (1965).
471. 85 N.M. 165, 510 P.2d 98 (1973). In Norvell the supreme court applied the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction to preclude judicial consideration of an action to abate power plant emissions on a common law nuisance theory. The court held that primary resort must be had to
agency process afforded by the state Environmental Improvement Act.
472. The Norvell court quoted Justice Frankfurter:
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular
agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more
rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the
circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than
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be present in the First Central case. Application of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction might have led to the same result in First Central, but misplaced reliance on the analysis in Smith led the court to
apply the wrong doctrine of limitation.
During the Survey year the court relied upon the administrative
exhaustion doctrine in what was in essence a private contract dispute. In Hernandez v. Home Education Livelihood Program,
Inc.,' 73 the court of appeals reversed a district court decision which
dismissed a private damage action based on the exhaustion doctrine.
Plaintiff sued her prior employer for wrongful discharge. The case
was dismissed for her failure to exhaust the grievance procedures in
the employer's personnel manual. The court of appeals reversed on
the ground that the manual placed a duty on the employer to inform
the employee of her procedural rights, and the emloyer's failure to
comply with that duty 7 ' barred the exhaustion defense.
Hernandez indicates that administrative law principles pervade
the private sector as well as areas of public law." 75 Because the plaintiff was part of a private administrative structure which imposed its
rules and regulations as a matter of contract, the employer and employee were bound by the private administrative processes, just as
they would have been if the employer had been an administrative
agency. 7 ' Cases like Hernandez suggest that administrative law
principles like exhaustion will increasingly be found to be applicable
to private relationships.
E. Non-Statutory Review
This section deals with the kind of judicial review of agency action
which was not expressly mentioned either by the statute creating the
agency or a statute conferring general administrative review powers
on the courts. 77 The two classic routes to non-statutory judicial
review are extraordinary writs and suits for declaratory and injunccourts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure.
Id. at 171, 510 P.2d at 104 (quoting Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 572
(1952)).
473. 95 N.M. 281,620 P.2d 1306 (Ct. App. 1980).
474. For a discussion of this case in the context of "notice" see text accompanying notes
216-220 supra.
475. See note 459, supra.
476. One essential distinction remains, however. Hernandez could not claim a lack of due
process or equal protection in treatment afforded by her private employer because of the lack
of state action in the private employment context.
477. The commentators refer to review mechanisms that exist outside of the administrative
law framework as "non-statutory" review. See K. Davis, Administrative Law Text §23.02 at
444 (1972); 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 36, n. 242.
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tive relief. During this survey year there were several cases in both
categories, demonstrating the willingness of our courts to intercede
in agency processes where necessary to protect substantial rights.
1. The Prerogative Writs
Prerogative writs may be an inefficient means of reviewing agency
action because of procedural anachronisms. 78' That method, however, continues to provide a vehicle for the litigation of purely legal
claims against agencies. In two cases, Perea v. Baca4 9 and State ex
rel Edwards v. City of Clovis,48 writs of mandamus were successfully used to challenge agency action or inaction. In State ex rel Martinez v. Padilla,"8 ' the quo warranto remedy was used to determine
title to a public office.
In Perea, the supreme court affirmed the district court's issuance
of a writ of mandamus ordering the Director of the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control to grant a transfer of a license. 8 ' The
Director approved a transfer of a liquor license from one zone to a
buffer area overlapping two zones. He denied a second transfer,
however, which would have put the license into the zone it now overlapped. The Director conceded that all statutory conditions had been
met for the second transfer but argued that he denied the transfer in
the exercise of his discretionary powers, which are not controllable
by issuance of a writ. 83 The court held that the Director's discretion
was only to determine "whether the statutory requirements have
been met." 84 Once the requirements were met, as they were in this
case, the Director was "performing a ministerial function and man,,411
damus is an appropriate remedy ....
State ex rel Edwards v. City of Clovis,4 6 which involved the fail478. Professor Davis has observed that the prerogative writs are laden with the procedural
baggage from an earlier era. He states: "the litigant must be prepared to negotiate the procedural paths presented by the particular writ in addition to establishing the substantive claim
against the agency action." See 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 38.
479. 94 N.M. 624, 614 P.2d 541 (1980).
480. 94 N.M. 136, 607 P.2d 1154 (1980).
481. 94 N.M. 431,612 P.2d 223 (1980).
482. The case also concerned statutory construction of the law on transfers and the weight
to be given to the agency interpretation of the statute. That portion of the decision is discussed
in note 384 supra.
483. One of the historical limitations on the use of mandamus is that the writ will not issue
to control the exercise of discretion. See El Dorado at Santa Fe, Inc. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 89 N.M. 313, 551 P.2d 1360 (1976). See generally, Mandamus in New Mexico, supra
note 145, at 177-84.
484. 94 N.M. at 627, 614 P.2d at 544.
485. Id.
486. 94 N.M. 136, 607 P.2d 1154 (1980).
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' used a similar
ure of the city to enforce its swine ordinance, 87
analysis. The court found that the law at issue prohibited the keeping
of swine, and that enforcement of the law was ministerial. 88' Therefore a writ of mandamus was proper. The court seemed to imply that
it is only in interpreting a statute that there might be discretion. Acting under a correct interpretation of the statute is ministerial and
subject to the writ of mandamus. Edwards also considered the adequacy of the remedy at law, a procedural hurdle which could have
been used to preclude the issuance of the writ. The court concluded
that "[tlhe fact that petitioner may have available to him other
remedies against private individuals does not prevent petitioner from
seeking mandamus against respondents. "489
Perea and Edwards suggest that concern about the complexity of
the prerogative writ approach is misplaced. Both cases make clear
that when the court is convinced that a serious breach of a legal requirement has taken place, the procedural hurdles in extraordinary
writ practice will not be permitted to stand in the way of relief.
Similarly, the complexities of quo warranto requirements did not
prevent the court's granting of that writ in State ex rel Martinez v.
49 0
Padilla.
A quo warranto suit was brought to challenge defendants'
title to seats on a local Board of Education, alleging misuse of public
funds. The district court issued the writ, and the supreme court affirmed. In reaching its decision, the court found that the defendants
had misused public funds and concluded that "[a]n action in quo
warranto is a proper method of correcting the usurpation, misuser,
or nonuser, of a public office or corporate franchise." 4 9' The court
had to contend with several procedural attacks on the propriety of
the writ. In the view of the Martinez court, none of the problems

487. The portion of the case dealing with the enforceability of the city's rule in light of a rule
change during litigation is discussed in the text accompanying notes 141-155 supra.
488. The court stated: "Once petitioner showed that there was a valid ordinance in existence
and that it was being violated, the duty cast upon the City became ministerial and subject to enforcement by mandamus." 94 N.M. at 139, 607 P.2d at 1157.
489. Id. Although mandamus is rooted in law rather than equity, Jenks, The Prerogative
Writs in English Law, 32 Yale L.J. 523, 532 (1923), the prerogative nature of the writ has precluded its issuance where an adequate remedy "in the ordinary course of law" is available.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §44-2-5 (1978).
It is difficult to say whether, in deciding the adequate remedy question, it is permissible or
necessary to look to available legal remedies against other parties. The court's ruling implies
that the court can only look to available legal remedies between the parties to the suit.
490. 94 N.M. 431, 612 P.2d 223 (1980).
491. Id. at 434, 612 P.2d at 227 (quoting J. High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies §591 (3d
ed. 1896)).
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were insurmountable, 49 and the antiquated quo warranto writ 493
proved useful as a device to remove wrongdoers from public office.
2. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
The suit for declaratory and injunctive relief is an appropriate
means of challenging state administrative action where there is no
statutory avenue for review or where that avenue is inappropriate or
ineffective.4 9 The mechanism has frequently been used in New Mexico to challenge the constitutionality of agency action. 495 Nall v.
Baca496 and Lung v. O'Chesky497 illustrate such challenges. In addition, one unique case, In re Remains of Johnson,4 98 suggests that
resort to the court for declaratory and injunctive relief may, under
492. The court gave short shrift to the argument that the Constitution limits grounds for
public officer removal to conviction for a felony. The court held that the applicable constitutional provision, N.M. Const. art. 8, §4, requires only a judicial finding of public fund misuse
and that "disqualification is not dependent on a felony conviction." 94 N.M. at 433, 612 P.2d
225. Defendants also argued that the only proper procedure for removal was a recall election.
The court found that the term "disqualification" contained in the Constitution was synonymous with the "forfeiture" notion in quo warranto "in that both go to eligibility to hold office." Id. at 434, 612 P.2d 226. The court therefore concluded that defendants' acts were a
forfeiture "and the court has jurisdiction to remove public officers by a writ of quo warranto." Id.
Finally, the court rejected the defense that petitioner as a private party could not seek the
writ. The court noted that the office in question pertains to a local school district "so it is clear
that a private person may maintain the quo warranto action." Id. The court paid no attention
to the conditions under which a private action is allowed. For a discussion of the problem of
meeting those conditions see 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 37-38.
493. See e.g., Huning v. Los Chavez Zoning Comm., 93 N.M. 655, 604 P.2d 121 (1979);
State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
494. See 1979-80 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 40.
495. During the survey year, two cases brought constitutional challenges in the context of
employment terminations. In Gallegos v. Los Lunas Consol. Schools, 95 N.M. 160, 619 P.2d
836 (Ct. App. 1980) the court of appeals reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendants and ordered that plaintiff's claim of wrongful dissmisal be returned to the district court
for trial. Gallegos involved the lawfulness of the termination under both due process and the
state statute conferring employee discharge power on local school boards.
Lux v. Board of Regents, 95 N.M. 361, 622 P.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1980) involved the dismissal
of a tenured professor who claimed that his dismissal violated due process and equal protection
as well as first amendment and federal statutory rights. The court of appeals reversed a jury
verdict for the plaintiff finding no violation of plaintiff's liberty interest or first amendment
rights. Id. at 369, 622 P.2d at 274. Both of these cases continue the well established tradition of
allowing resort to the general jurisdiction of the courts where serious constitutional claims concerning the terms and conditions of state agency employment are involved, even when other
administrative processes subject to traditional judicial review are available. For a discussion of
the constitutional issues discussed in Lux, see Schowers, ConstitutionalLaw, 12 N.M. L. Rev.
191 (1982).
496. 95 N.M. 783, 626 P.2d 1280 (1980).
497. 94 N.M. 802, 617 P.2d 1317 (1980).
498. 94 N.M. 491, 612 P.2d 1302 (1980).
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some circumstances, become the exclusive remedy, despite the presence of administrative processes which could afford the same relief.
In Lung v. O'Chesky, 9 9 the plaintiffs sued in district court to
challenge the constitutionality of applying the New Mexico state income tax against them. Plaintiffs were Texas residents employed on
a federal enclave within New Mexico. The court held that there was
sufficient nexus for the State of New Mexico to tax the plaintiffs 00
and that the tax was not being discriminatorily applied. The case
proceeded as a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief under the
general jurisdiction of the district court. It illustrates the use of this
procedure as an expeditious way of resolving the constitutionality of
an agency's applying its law to the plaintiffs.
Similarly, in Nail v. Baca, 50, the invocation of the district court's
power to issue declaratory and injunctive rulings was deemed an appropriate method of testing the constitutionality of allowing a violation of the nude dancing statute to serve as grounds for revocation of
a liquor license.52 The substantive claim was rejected and the statute
upheld against constitutional attack. The declaratory/injunctive
procedural route again proved expeditious, and was used despite
available administrative procedures. 0 3
Finally, in one case involving an agency's invocation of the general jurisdiction of the court, the court suggested that resort to the
courts may foreclose alternative administrative procedures. In re Remains of Johnson'0 4 involved a request by the state Board of Medical
Investigators for an order to disinter the remains of the decedent.5 05
The court granted the motion ex parte, but, upon a subsequent motion by the son of the decedent, 0 6 and after notice and a hearing, the
court set aside its order.
499. 94 N.M. 802, 617 P.2d 1317 (1980).
500. Id. at 804, 617 P.2d at 1319.
501. 95 N.M. 783, 626 P.2d 1280 (1980). For a more detailed analysis of the constitutional
issues in this case, see Note, Regulating Nude Dancing in Liquor Establishments-The Preferred Position of the Twenty FirstAmendment, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 611 (1982).
502. The court expressly withheld a ruling on "whether the entertainers may attack the constitutionality of the statute because it also prohibits indecent dancing in a 'public place' or for
other reasons." Id. at 788, 626 P.2d at 1285.
503. The licensees could have litigated the question through the normal hearing appeal process. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§60-6C-1 to -9 (Repl. Pamp. 1981). Indeed, the appeal statute seeks
to preclude resort to judicial intervention by way of injunction, id. §60-6C-6, but constitutional cases like Nail are a clear, although unarticulated, exception.
504. 94 N.M. 491,612 P.2d 1302 (1980).
505. The decedent had been living with her daughter and there was some evidence of physical abuse by the daughter prior to the decedent's last hospital stay. The police report which
contained this information was not filed until after decedent was buried. The report triggered
the Board's application for an order permitting disinterment. Id. at 492-93, 612 P.2d 1303-04.
506. At the hearing on the son's motion for reconsideration there was conflicting evidence
about foul play. Id. at 493, 612 P.2d at 1304.
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After the hearing on the son's motion, but before the decision, the
Board moved to dismiss the case claiming independent statutory authority to exhume without court authorization. The district court
denied that motion, and rescinded its order of disinterment. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the district court, holding that "it
was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to rescind its first
order permitting disinterment." ' 7 The court added that despite an
alternative administrative route to disinterment,0 8 "the trial court
did have subject matter jurisdiction . . . and there exists no statute
in New Mexico which . . . deprives a court of general jurisdiction
from hearing such cases." 5"9 The court reasoned that since it was the
Board which invoked the jurisdiction of the court in the first instance, "the Board cannot now deny that such jurisdiction exists.
''510

While the court may have somewhat miscast plaintiffs' request for
dismissal by putting it in terms of jurisdiction,5 ' the result in the
case, rooted in equity consideration, is certainly proper. 2' The reasoning suggests that going to district court may, under some circumstances, preclude resort to alternative administrative decisionmaking processes. That might be an appropriate principle in cases
involving attempts at forum shopping. Extending such a principle,
however, could improperly bar agency hearings, thereby undermining the important policies upon which the doctrines of exhaustion
and primary jurisdiction rest."1 3 The holding of the case, although
correct, must be carefully limited. In re Remains of Johnson is an interesting sport in the law, and due regard for the proper relationship
between courts and agencies requires that it remain just that.

507. Id. at 494, 612 P.2d at 1305.
508. The court acknowledged that although a permit is required for disinternment, the medical examiner could have obtained a permit administratively without resort to the courts. Id. at
493-94, 612 P.2d 1304-05; see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-12-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
509. Id. at 494, 612 P.2d at 1305.
510. Id.
511. Rather than suggesting a jurisdictional bar, the Board's motion is more accurately read
as based on discretionary prudential considerations-urging the court not to exercise its jurisdiction where, because of other administrative avenues, judicial intervention is not necessary.
This argument, however, is somewhat disingenuous, in that the Board itself had -initially invoked the jurisdiction. The posture of the case suggests that the Board engaged in forumshopping to avoid an adverse ruling. Such circumstances seriously undercut the Board's position.
512. Of obvious import to the court were the substantial rights of the decedent's next of kin,
see Barela v. Frank A. Hubbell Co., 67 N.M. 319, 355 P.2d 133 (1960), and the fact that
removal of the case from the court, at that stage, might have defeated their right to protest the
disinterment. 94 N.M. at 494, 612 P.2d at 1305.
513. See text accompanying notes, 460-463 supra.
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First Central Service Corp. v. Mountain Bell Telephone, 95 N.M. 509, 623
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Harper v. New Mexico Department of Human Services, 95 N.M. 471, 623
P.2d 985 (1980).
Hawthorne v. Director of Revenue Division, 95 N.M. 480, 612 P.2d 710
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Hernandez v. Home Education Livelihood Program, Inc., 95 N.M. 281,
620 P.2d 1306 (1980).
Hobbs Gas Co. v. New Mexico Public Service Commission, 94 N.M. 731,
616 P.2d 1116 (1980).
Hughes v. State exrel. Human Services Department, 95 N.M. 739, 626 P.2d
276 (Ct. App. 1980).
Human Rights Commission v. Board of Regents of University of New Mexico, 95 N.M. 576, 624 P.2d 518 (1981).
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McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate Commission, 94 N.M. 602, 614 P.2d 14
(1980).
Mitchell v. Hedden, 94 N.M. 348, 610 P.2d 752 (1980).
Molycorp, Inc. v. State Corporation Commission, 95 N.M. 613, 624 P.2d
1010 (1981).
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of Alamogordo v. Bryant, 95 N.M. 620, 624 P.2d 1017 (Ct. App. 1980).
State ex rel. Edwards v. City of Clovis, 94 N.M. 136, 607 P.2d 1154 (1980).
State v. Clayton, 95 N.M. 644, 625 P.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1981).
State v. Gardner, 95 N.M. 171, 619 P.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1980).
State v. Joyce, 94 N.M. 618, 614 P.2d 30 (Ct. App. 1980).
State ex rel. Martinez v. Padilla, 94 N.M. 431, 612 P.2d 223 (1980).
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 95 N.M. 560, 624 P.2d
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Taxation and Revenue Department v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 95 N.M. 519,
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Tiffany Construction Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 93 N.M. 593, 603 P.2d 332
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Trujillo v. Employment Security Commission, 94 N.M. 343, 610 P.2d 747
(1980).
United States v. State of New Mexico, 624 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, Feb. 23, 1981.
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Montoya v. O'Toole, 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190 (1980).
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B. Orders andAdjudications
Hernandez v. Home Education Livelihood Program, Inc., 95
N.M. 281,620 P.2d 1306 (1980).
Katz v. New Mexico Department of Human Services, 95 N.M. 530,
624 P.2d 39 (1981).
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McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate Commission, 94 N.M. 602, 614
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95 N.M. 588, 624 P.2d 530 (1981), reversing, Board of Education of Alamogordo v. Bryant, 95 N.M. 620, 624 P.2d 1017
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